] LONDON, July 1 to July 9, 1803. 12 AN ENQUIRY INTO THE NATURE OF THE Terrorum et fraudis abunde est; Stant belli cause. VIRGIL. The of this country has more than once been Engaged as we are so soon again in hostilities with France, with very little hopes of terminating our differences either by negotiation, or under the arbitration of any foreign power, it has very properly been asked, could we have avoided the present contest consistently with the honour and dignity of this nation? Mutual complaints have, for some time, filled the public prints of both nations: our minds are inflamed with real or supposed injuries: the ancient enmity between this country and France, which no length of time, no fortune can eradicate, has broke out, and war, whether from necessity or design, seems not so much to be dreaded as sought. I revere that gal | eyes of other powers is at stake; that our lant, unconquerable spirit of my country men, which supported them, during the Jate bloody contest, amidst the wreck and dissolution of nations, and struck terror into their enemies before whom the rest of Europe fell down in abject submission. I honour that patriotic zeal and firmness which they now display on the eve of a war, which, God knows, may excede all the former in its horrors and duration. But let us not rashly stake, if it be possible to prevent it, the existence of our nation; the tranguillity of our colonies, and the safety of Europe upon the event of a war, entered into, it may be, without sufficient grounds, and execrated when too late to retreat with honour. It is of the utmost importance for the people to be satisfied with the conduct of their rulers. In time of war, nothing can be of greater moment to the internal peace and security of the nation. We may be unavoidably forced to draw the sword; but if there is the least ground to suppose, that, either through indecision, or want of frmness, or, what may sometimes give rise to both, a dread of losing the honours and emoluments of office, to which the honour ΓΗΣ. ١٧. existence as a nation is endangered; that our religion, laws, and liberties, for which alone life is worth possessing, are all menaced; we shall then, I hope, feel but one sentiment, to act as becomes the bonour and dignity of Britons; to fight, if it be necessary, at the tombs of our fathers, in defence of that independence, of that religion, and of that proud, unsullied honour, which they transmitted to their posterity as the noblest gift they could bequeath. ous. The known character of the First Consul of the French, is a sufficient ground for jealousy and alarm. His great military talents; his unsatiable ambition; his despotic power; his violent measures; his unblushing perfidy; his open and secret treachery, are all formidable, suspicious, and dangerThe animosity he is known to bear against this country, which alone turned back the tide of his ambition and deprived him of the much wished for name of a second Alexander, never left him, even amidst the pacific congratulations of ambassadors, and the lively feelings of an oppressed, miserable people. The conduct which he has pursued towards the unresisting powers up B on the Continent is a proof both of his ambition and the little respect he pays to the rights of nations. By breaking the spirit of resistance, and forcing them to crouch, under the banners of France, he has made them, instead of independent states, the abject slaves of his will; the miserable subjects of his rapacity and extortion, the wretched victims of his perfidy and ambition. I will not shew him in that accommodating garb in which he wished to become all things to all men.... I will not raise the abhorrence of my countrymen, whom I know to be religious, against the most sacrilegious conduct the world ever witnessed. I will not hold up to view the speckled features of his reEgious transformations, from the adoration of the naked Goddess of Liberty, and the soothing idea of an eternal sleep, to the joys of a Mahometan Paradise, and the blessed society of the faithful. Such a daring outrage to all religious opinions would have called down the vengeance of Greece or Rome upon the impious wretch; but which, by a Frenchman, will be considered as a mark of greatness of mind, and a happy stroke of political sagacity. Let us pardon his past failings, for he is now a good Christian, and desires his pious bishops to offer up prayers to the Almighty, that he may prosper in his injustice and villainy. Here too we trace the features of his character, for it is in every respect singular and consistent. From the Palace of St. Cloud he issues mandates that astonish Europe, as well by their novelty as their injustice. Amidst the representatives of Sovereigns, his rage breaks out with all the acrimony and inso; lence of a leader of banditti, traversed in his schemes of rapine and plunder. Before the eyes of Europe he acts the political madman; and the boldness and singularity of his gestures and actions are really astonish iug. His paroxysms would be highly amusing were he deprived of the means of rendering them dangerous. To the voice and sentiments of mankind he pays no regard. To the authority of religion he is to great and too unprincipled to submit. Few despots are proof against the keen attacks of public censure. They endeavour to colour over their injustice with some plausible pretence; and it is not until they are dead to all shame, and regardless of the opinion either of contemporaries or of posterity that they venture upon actions which transmit their names with infamy to all eternity. They may disregard the sullen curses of the miserable wretches subject to their authority; but they ought to be considered as hardened indeed in villainy if they do not feel sore at the generous indignation of a free and independent people. But the Chief Consul, if he be a despot, is a hero also; and heroes must not be confined, like ordihary men, within the bounds of old prescriptions, and the beaten track of dull uniformity. They must astonish by their actions. They must force their way over the neck of laws, and rights, and opinions, and justice, and every thing which other men hold sacred. How else should they be known to be heroes? And who does not know that the greatest heroes are the great. est madmen? Satan in his Palace of Pandemonium would scarcely have been distinguished from his infernal counsellors, had he not had the daring to issue out at hell gates to explore and ruin the world, "As when a Vulture on Imaus bred, springs Of Ganges or Hydaspes, Indian streams, The conduct of the First Consul towards this country, if it has not been equally violent as towards other nations, did not proceed from any regard to justice, but from a well grounded fear of openly enraging a high spirited and formidable people. He knew our strength; he had felt our power; he shrunk from our vengeance. Like a fugitive and deserter he fled from his brave army in Egypt to usurp the ancient throne of the Bourbons. From that time till the present moment, power has been his object, and he has but too well succeeded. We alone had the courage to oppose him, and to oppose him with vigour. Our success in the late war, notwithstanding the defection of our allies, was such as to warrant us to prescribe terms instead of receiving them, We had taken from France the best part of her, West-India possessions, and all that she held in the East. We had almost annibilated her navy. The remnant of her ships were either rotting in her harbours, or taken successively by our cruizers. All her attempts upon us baffled by the vigilance of our ministers and the skill and bravery of our sailors and soldiers. What thep did France gain from us? Not an inch of ter ritory: not the shadow of an advantage. We indeed felt sorely the perfidy and distresses of our allies; and it was for them we made so many sacrifices, For ourselves, we did not despair. We stood firm as a rock; growing every day more formidable as dangers thickened around us. The we Chief Consul, aware of all these advantages on our side, made some concessions, which, it is plain, he never meant to ratify. He probably thought, that, could he once make us drop our arms, we would not suddenly resume them, though he should continue to wound us through the subjugation of Switzerland, the oppression of Holland, and Sebastiani's famous mission. He thought, no doubt, that, since we were almost entirely excluded from the Continent, would not have the boldness to encounter him single-handed. He certainly valued himself much upon his dextrous policy in forcing the continental powers to withdraw from our alliance; and not without reason. It appears to have been the intention of France, for more than a century, to loos n our connexion with those nations on the Continent, who, apprehending danger from her growing power, had joined in a strict alliance with us. Our statesmen were, however, better acquainted with the interests of this country; and those nations knew too well the value of our alliance, to suffer France to obtain this important end. Louis XIV. entertained the same ambitious views as Buonaparte; but Europe was preserved from slavery, chiefly by the exertions of this country, conducted by the abilities of a man who, to the talents of a great general, united those of a consummate statesman and politician. France was driven within her ancient limits; and only saved by the dissensions which broke out among the confederates. The issue of last war has not been so favourable to Europe. During the course of it we lost our allies one after another. The King of Prussia basely betrayed us. The Dutch, most fatally for their own interest and independence, threw them selves into the arms of France. Spain, after a few feeble efforts, joined the conqueror. The intrigues of the Italian powers vanished before French ferocity. Some of the smaller states have been blotted out of the other, we found ourselves deserted by our allies, and left to maintain the combat alone. Thus, that balance of power, which cost our ancestors so much blood and treasure, and which cost us little less to maintain, has, for the present, by unforeseen events, been in a great measure overturned. We are now to consider France as the most dangerous enemy to the liberties of Europe, and as avowedly aiming at universal empire. Viewing her in this light, what are we to do? Ought we to sit quietly down, and give up the cause as hopeless? Ought we to look quietly on and see her hem us in on every side by her conquests? We ought surely more than ever to make the balance of power the object of our thoughts, and direct all our measures for restoring it to its proper level. The language of Buonaparté upon this head is equaly unjust to this country, and insulting to the other nations of Europe. Rightly interpreted, it runs thus: "The powers upon the Continent are all under the dominion and protection of France. Not one of them dares move without her permission. They have it not in their power to conclude, or break off alliances. You alone are our rivals. But you are our rivals only by sea. On the Continent you have no ally, no force, no interest." Such language, the weakness alone of Germany ought to prevent her from chastising. But we ought, from the first, to have remonstrated with spirit, and if remonstrances were of no avail, to have followed them up by action. From our insular situation we never can endanger the liberties of any nation upon the Continent, nor acquire any permanent authority among them, farther than mutual interest may promote. We have long since abandoned the idea of continental conquests. All the efforts we have made in that quarter were either intended to divide the power of France, or, more frequently, to protect our allies. But the situation and views of existence, and others have risen upon their | France are very different. She has shewn ruins. Russia, after making a considerable impression upon France, withdrew from the common alliance, and was only prevented, by the premature death of her Sovereign, from turning her arms against us. Ard the Emperor of Germany, our only valuable and best tried ally, forced, by a train of defeats, to conclude a treaty in which we were not comprehended. Thus, after a series of events which have no parallel, partly occasioned by ill-judged policy, pertidy, and weakness, on the one hand and by a spirit of enthusiasm, ambition, irresistible power, and astonishing success, on herself both able and inclined to wrest from them their independence, laws, and possessions. She maintained herself, during the greatest part of the late war, at their expense. And, had it not been for the defeats she received from us, defeats which checked her pride and taught her to stop in the career of conquest, all Europe, and, per. haps, most of Asia, would, ere now, have been subject to her power. There cannot be a doubt, that, should France ever have the good fortune to ruin our navy (which God forbid!) the balance of power in Europe would be entirely lost; and she may 79 then go on conquering and to conquer, acquiring an increase of strength from every new accession of territory. Nor is this al together improbable while she commands such an extensive line of coast. From the mouth of the Elbe,* it takes a wide sweep along the German and Atlantic Ocean up the shores of the Mediterranean. It bounds the most fertile and populous countries in Europe. I know that other means are necessary to create a great and respectable navy fit to cope with ours. But these means, I atfirm, France has been labouring to ob. tain: first, by excluding us from the Continent: next, by preventing all British manufactures from entering France and the * The French have taken possession of Hanover, and also, it is said, of Hamburgh and other free maritime towns in Germany. These are acquisitions which ought to alarm every State upon the Continent, but more particularly the Germans themselves. The avowed design of the First Consul is to exclude our manufactures and commerce from the whole of the Continent. This measure involves in it a train of evils which will not tall so heavily upon this country as upon Germany and France herself. The commerce of France and her maritime allies, it is to be hoped, will be soou entirely ruined by the superiority of our fleets. Germany has no foreign possessions, nor foreign trade. The Northern nations possess nearly as Jitrie, and cannot furnish her with those commodities which she has been accustomed to receive from us. coun She will find it almost impossible to want them, And France herself will sustain a -heavy loss by the interruption of that contraband trade of British manufactures, which, in spite of the jealousy and vigilance of his Consular Majesty, was poured in upon her through the medium of Germany. What will be the consequence? France will either be obliged to give up the free towns or incense every state upon the Continent so much against her, that she will be attacked by enemies on every side. Even the politic and avaricious Poussian will find his interest severely wounded by destroying the liberty of the fice towns. Perhaps it would be better tor this try, while her navy blocks up the French fleets and armies in their ports, that the Germans submitted patiently to this act of injustice and robbery. The First Consul must keep up numerous armies, but how shall he pay them when he has -no provinces to plunder, no commerce to tax? Let the continental powers think of this. If we keep him at bay, as I hope in God we shall, whenever he is stratened, he will seek a pretence to invade Italy or Germany, and gather the glean ings of his former rapacity. We are threatened with burdens and dangers, but they are threatened with the loss of every thing; and, what is worse, they seem so overawed by France, or so jealous of us, that they never make the least remonstrance. Their supineness is astonishing. They are not aware that the most temporising among them will only be the last victim of Consular ambition. Implacable hatred to his country is the pretence, lawless ambition the object of the politics of St. Cloud. Put her countries subject to her: then, from a of Austria, and, that sooner or later, if he does not take care to prevent it, she will strip him of all that power which she per. mitted him to acquire for her own selfish ends. Any person, who will take the trouble to consider the present humbled state of most of the nations upon the Continent, and the formidable power and ambition of France, will easily perceive that the contest, on the side of France, is for universal empire; on our side, for self defence and the maintenance of the balance of power. We are not accessories; we are principals in the present war. It is the interest of the other nations of Europe to look up to us for protection. It is their interest to coalesce with us in humbling France. Had the Dutch, instead of that mean jealousy of our power, which induced them, about the commencement of the last war, to open their gates to the French and receive the fraternal hug which, I believe, has squeezed them pretty well, imitated the conduct of their ancestors, and joined cordially in the league against France, affairs might have taken a different turn. Their defection and the dissensions which arose among the allies ruined the cause. Divided counsels and separate views weaken and destroy the general interest It is unfortunate that there was not at that time at the head of the confederates a man of superior rank and talents who could unite so many jarring interests in one. Such a man as Marlborough is not always to be found. But without the abilities of a Marlborough a confederation is feeble and divided. The same mean jealousy, which formerly proved fatal to them, ought not now to subsist among the continental powers. We then fought in defence of their freedom, but we now fight for our own in conjunction with theirs, without the smallest views of aggrandisement. Let them think of this; if they prove enemies, we can ruin their commerce, but we cannot injure their independence. We can prove a better ally, but not such a formidable enemy as France, It ought to be the policy of the small states upon the Continent to attach themselves to some respectable power, from which they can have nothing to fear, but which is capable of protecting or assisting them against a formidable and ambitious neighboor. Such was the system of policy pursued by the Italian States in the fifteenth or sixteenth centuries. They carried it, however, too far, and refined themselves at length out of their independence. Such also was the system of policy practised by the States of Greece during the Peloponnesian war; and afterwards most accurately understood and diligently inculcated upon the Athenians, on occasions very similar to the present, by Demosthenes, the greatest orator, and, perhaps, the greatest politician the world ever saw. He knew too well what it was to trust to the protection of an ambitious, faithless monarch. Those intimate connexions, says he, which republics form with tyrants are generally fatal to them. * In the present crisis it would, perhaps, be dangerous for those states that are contiguous to France, and have suffered most from her power, to enter at once into an alliance against her. While we confine her within her shores, she would direct all her rage against them. Every blow we give her marine or commerce she would revenge upon them. She would pour in her immense armies and overwhelm them in an in tant. No single, contiguous power is able to oppose her. A general combination is, perhaps, at present impossible. Fear, would restrain some, weakness, others. Germany is distracted and torn with mutual jealousies. Russia is the only power that can co-operate with us in such a manner as may most injure and humble France; and, at the same time, sustain little or no injury herself. The Emperor of Russia's dominions are extensive; his power formidable; his marine respectable; his distance from France so great, and the points of attack so few, that she never can make any impres sion upon him while awed and confined by our fleets. Two such powerful and formidable enemies as Great Britain and Russia, acting together with unanimity and effect, might not only obtain favourable and secure terms for themselves, but likewise emancipate the oppressed powers upon the Continent. Or, should France have the hardihood to oppose them both, she would soon have her commerce entirely ruined, her colonies wrested from her, and her territories threatened on all quarters. Should the Emperor of Russia pour in an army through Germany to attack her upon her frontiers, at the first reverse of fortune he would find herself deserted and threatened on all points. Then will be the time for the states of Ge-many to rise and attack her in the moment of dismay. Then will be the time for Hol. land to assert ber independence, and revenge herself for all her oppressions. Then * Ου γαρ άσφαλεις ταις πολιτείαις ὰι προς τες τυραννους αύται λιαν όμιλοις Philip. Sept. |