talents is but transient, unless accompanied with real merit, a character which always harmonizes with the public good.

Although checks, to be created by an opposition of powers and interests, are not in our institutions admissible on any rational grounds, yet there are other reasons well founded for distibuting the powers of government into three distinct departments, and for a further division of the legislature into two branches, a senate and house of representatives, which have been explained in the preceding chapter. If the view there taken of the subject be correct, the legislature forms one entire départment of the government, and its division into two branches, and the power of a negative between them, is not designed to provide a power of control for the purpose of mutual defence, but solely to produce amicable discussion, a more thorough examination of public measures, and a general accommodation of the laws, to the manners, sentiments, and interests of the people. It is claimed by the citizens for their sakes only, not for the sake of the rulers. It is made necessary that each body should be satisfied of the goodness of a measure, before it can be adopted; if either be dissatisfied it is to be no farther pursued at that time. Such is the natural consequence between two bodies having equal powers; when ever they disagree, they must have a mutual negative. one can carry a measure against the other, their powers are no longer equal. Their deliberations will not be mutual, nor will they long be amicable. The superior body will bear a difference of opinion with impatience. Hoc volo-"It is my pleasure" will always be found the most ready the most decisive answer.

If

As to the third branch, supposed in this theory to be one of the co-ordinate powers constituting the balance, the executive or president, he has none of the peculiar powers or prerogatives of the monarch. It is generally made his duty to inform and advise the legislature; but he has no power to arrest their proceedings by interposing an absolute negative. Here, even in point of form, the similitude is much less than in the situation of the senate and house of representatives; and instead of a co-ordinate, he possesses no efficient power in legislation. Thus, these two departments, the legislature

and executive, are in the exercise of their powers, maintained separate and distinct.

A frequent rotation in all the offices of government, has, by some statesmen of no inconsiderable authority, been esteemed one of the most effectual provisions against the abuse of power. The advocates for this institution urge, that a rotation in office, has the tendency to prevent the danger which constantly arises from an inveterate habit in the exercise of power by one man, family, or set of men on the one hand, and the habit which the people, on the other, are too prone to acquire, of directing their obedience to particular men or families, rather than to the laws and ordinances of their country. That these habits become inveterate, in any way, are not sufficiently checked by the frequency of elections, and always counteract the true principles of a representative government. The experiment, although often tried in ancient as well as more modern republics, has never succeeded in preventing the abuse of power; but has served rather to increase the violence of faction, and the rapacity of rulers, and render government but the more insupportable. The reason of these effects is, I think, obvious. Where a rotation in office is established, there will frequently be found in those who succeed, the want of a thorough knowledge of the business of their trust, a want of address, a degree of which is unavoidable to persons in new employments. But this is of less importance. An interest in the approbation of the people, and a strong sense of accountability in all official conduct is the greatest, or rather the only effectual security against abuses by those who exercise the powers of government. An institution, agreeable to which, the greatest wisdom, the most distinguished patriotism, the highest integrity in a ruler, cannot entitle him to the proper reward of his virtue, an expression of the approbation of his fellow citizens in his re-election to office, diminishes the most flattering interest which he ought to feel in their favor, and in some degree relaxes his sense of accountability to the tribunal of public sentiment.

He no

His interest is seen directed into another channel. longer looks for a public reward, but hopes rather that his crimes may escape detection, or that his rapacity, and acts

of oppression will furnish the means of baffling future enquiry, and to this end every intrigue will be employed and all the satellites of faction put in motion. An enquiry, if instituted, will soon be found to be pursued with less zeal by a set of men who, while they served to the same offices, served to the same views and the same interest. In a representative government, every thing ought to be avoided, that tends to deprive the people of the right of employing at their option, except in cases of present incompatibility in office, men of known abilities, and experienced integrity, or which tends to diminish in the rulers a deep sense of accountability, a perpetual interest in the approbation of the people.

2

In the difficult passage from error to truth, the state that succeeds the almost total ignorance of the savage, and which precedes a more general knowledge of the relations of nature and of man in society, a state in which the public voice of the moral sense is lost amid the violence of passions and appetites, may require, at least, it may endure a government founded in violence, and sometimes supported, but more frequently, overthrown, or brought to the brink of ruin by an opposition of powers. The history of Athens, of Rome, and many of the modern states have exhibited mankind mostly in this character. A few men have arisen in almost every nation, great beyond the age, the instruments of providence for the improvement of the world. To these, modern times, after ages of the darkest ignorance, are indebted for the first dawnings of science. As benefactors of mankind, their names will be held in perpetual remembrance; but the history of their times informs us that they were able to communicate little of their knowledge to the body of the people, to moderate their passions, or to influence, in any considerable degree, the general sentiments.

The governments of those times, were as ill balanced as the passions of the people. Men in such a state are keenly sensible of the present, but almost regardless of the future. They are little capable of adjusting combinations, or of discovering any but the most obvious relations and tendencies. From the history and character of those times, we have reason to conclude that the violence of government, and the violence of the people, who often destroyed one set of tyrants to make

room for another and were often guilty of greater abuses than those which they attempted to reform, did not proceed from the want of a balance of power in their civil institutions or any other provision, which in that state of society, human wisdom could have devised, but from the violence of the passions and appetites,from the weakness of the moral sense, and consequently, of the sense of accountability, which rendered it difficult, we may say, impossible, to provide any sufficient barrier against the tyranny of rulers or the licentiousness of the people. Certainly, arguments drawn from such a state of society and manners, either for or against a check, constituted by a balance of powers or a rotation of office, ought with caution to be applied to the present state, in many respects so widely different.

At this day, great improvement in science, in manners, and in morals has taken place. The art of printing has facilitated the diffusion of knowledge, and rendered it more easily attainable. Useful science is no longer confined to the recluse. Much useful science and useful knowledge is accessible to the people generally. Improvements have begotten improvements, the knowledge of many things which was the fruit of long and laborious application, and for the attainment of which, a long life scarcely sufficed, is now imbibed almost with the milk in infancy. Many an ancient sage in the warmth of his philanthropy would have exulted, could he have foreseen that in many nations of Europe and in many states in America, a world then unknown, plain husbandmen would be found to possess more practical morality, more knowledge applicable in human life, more useful science than all the schools of antiquity could boast. In the present state of imperfection the abuse of power will never be wholly prevented. But in a situation, in which the idea of inherent power, exclusive rights, and separate interests, shall, in the mode of delegation and the conduct required of rulers, be no longer suggested to their minds,-temptations to abuse, will, in a great measure be removed, and the enjoyment of equal rights will be finally secured to all, by establishing, as a radical and sacred principle in all their institutions, a strict accountability of the functionaries in every department of government, a principle, which can be established with full effect,

in no nation, where knowledge has not, in some good degree, been diffused among the great mass of the people, and their minds freed from the shackles and prejudices of artificial distinctions, which have so long held a great part of the world in thraldom. The application and effect of the principle of accountability has, in treating of the various parts of the constitution, been so often mentioned, and so far explained, that nothing more is necessary here, than to exhibit the whole in a brief and summary view.

1st. The powers of the several departments are so limited and defined as to afford a sufficient ground of decision, whether the legislature or any functionary in the executive department have exceeded or improperly exercised their respective powers. 2nd. The judges are empowered to decide in all questions coming before them upon executive and legislative acts, and if found to be unconstitutional, to pronounce them void. 3d. Although the members of the legislature, consistently with the nature of their functions, and the freedom of debate and opinion, cannot be elsewhere impeached for any of their acts in that body; yet, as their debates are open, and the opinion of individuals publicly known, the conduct of each is brought under scrutiny at the periodical elections, and this scrutiny will extend not only to the constitutionality, but to the expediency of their public acts; for, from the nature of the legislative power, they may pass constitutional acts, which are nevertheless inexpedient and unnecessarily burdensome. All those members, whose conduct and opinions meet the disapprobation of their constituents, will be no longer trusted. Their places will be supplied by others, in whom the people can confide for correcting the errors of their predecessors. 4th. The president and all those whose appointment to office is retained by the people, are subject to the same scrutiny and the same judgment of the people at their elections. Executive officers of every grade are also, for their arbitrary and unconstitutional acts, subject to impeachment, to removal, and disqualification for future employment, and are further liable, according to the nature and effects of their arbitrary acts, to a criminal prosecution and punishment, and a reparation in damages to the party injured. 5th. Finally, the judges, although not accountable for mere