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indeed, against its expediency, has been ree. It has been represented, on this acn appearance, useless in practice. But use it might rarely, it would never be hich it is chiefly designed, that of an stitutional rights, of the Executive, or good was evidently and palpably iness would avail himself of his and would listen to the admoniIn the former supposition, his his immediate interest in the he probability of the sanction would naturally incline to , would hardly suffer their none. I speak now with Common share of firmness. ices, will have the cour

in this business, which vested in this respect fficacy to depend on ative body. Instead cutive the qualified hich would be much who might be afraid uple to return it for 1, only in the event in the sufficiency he reflection, that k in it a very ree influence would of his conduct in gative, has somere apt to irritate, ctions to be apaddressed. In

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It may perhaps be said, that the power of preventing bad laws includes that of preventing good ones and may be used to the one purpose, as well as to the other. But this objection will have little weight with those who can properly estimate the mischiefs of that inconstancy and mutability in the laws, which form the greatest blemish in the character and genius of our Governments. They will consider every institution calculated to restrain the excess of law-making, and to keep things in the same state in which they may happen to be at any given period, as much more likely to do good than harm; because it is favorable to greater stability in the Legislation. The injury which may possibly be done by defeating a few good laws, will be amply compensated by the advantage of preventing a number of bad ones.

Nor is this all. The superior weight and influence of the Legislative body in a free government, and the hazard to the Executive in a trial of strength with that body, afford a satisfactory security, that the negative would generally be employed with great caution; and, that in its exercise, there would oftener be room for a charge of timidity than of rashness. A King of Great Britain, with all his train of sovereign attributes, and with all the influence he draws from a thousand sources, would, at this day, hesitate to put a negative upon the joint resolutions of the two Houses of Parliament. He would not fail to exert the utmost resources of that influence to strangle a measure disagreeable to him, in its progress to the throne, to avoid being reduced to the dilemma of permitting it to take effect, or of risking the displeasure of the nation, by an opposition to the sense of the Legislative body. Nor is it probable, that he would ultimately venture to exert his prerogative, but in a case of manifest propriety, or extreme necessity. All well-informed men in that kingdom will accede to the justness of this remark. A very considerable period has elapsed since the negative of the crown has been exercised.

If a magistrate, so powerful, and so well fortified as a British monarch, would have scruples about the exercise of the power under consideration, how much greater caution may be reasonably expected in a President of the United States, clothed, for the short period of four years, with the Executive authority of a Government wholly and purely republican?

It is evident, that there would be greater danger of his not using his power when necessary, than of his using it too often, or too

much. An argument, indeed, against its expediency, has been drawn from this very source. It has been represented, on this account, as a power odious in appearance, useless in practice. But it will not follow, that because it might rarely, it would never be exercised. In the case for which it is chiefly designed, that of an immediate attack upon the constitutional rights, of the Executive, or in a case in which the public good was evidently and palpably sacrificed, a man of tolerable firmness would avail himself of his constitutional means of defence, and would listen to the admonitions of duty and responsibility. In the former supposition, his fortitude would be stimulated by his immediate interest in the power of his office; in the latter, by the probability of the sanction of his constituents; who, though they would naturally incline to the Legislative body in a doubtful case, would hardly suffer their partiality to delude them in a very plain one. I speak now with an eye to a magistrate possessing only a common share of firmness. There are men, who, under any circumstances, will have the courage to do their duty at every hazard.

But the Convention have pursued a mean in this business, which will both facilitate the exercise of the power vested in this respect in the Executive magistrate, and make its efficacy to depend on the sense of a considerable part of the Legislative body. Instead of an absolute, it is proposed to give the Executive the qualified negative, already described. This is a power which would be much more readily exercised than the other. . A man who might be afraid to defeat a law by his single veto, might not scruple to return it for reconsideration; subject to being finally rejected, only in the event of more than one third of each House concurring in the sufficiency of his objections. He would be encouraged by the reflection, that if his opposition should prevail, it would embark in it a very respectable proportion of the Legislative body, whose influence would be united with his in supporting the propriety of his conduct in the public opinion.-A direct and categorical negative, has something in the appearance of it more harsh, and more apt to irritate, than the mere suggestion of argumentative objections to be approved or disapproved, by those to whom they are addressed. In proportion as it would be less apt to offend, it would be more apt to be exercised; and for this very reason it may in practice be found more effectual. It is to be hoped that it will not often happen, that improper views will govern so large a proportion as two-thirds

of both branches of the Legislature at the same time; and this too in defiance of the counterpoising weight of the Executive. It is at any rate far less probable, that this should be the case, than that such views should taint the resolutions and conduct of a bare majority. A power of this nature in the Executive, will often have a silent and unperceived, though forcible operation. When men, engaged in unjustifiable pursuits, are aware, that obstructions may come from a quarter which they cannot control, they will often be restrained by the bare apprehension of opposition, from doing what they would with eagerness rush into, if no such external impediments were to be feared.

This qualified negative, as has been elsewhere remarked, is in this State vested in a council, consisting of the Governor, with the Chancellor and Judges of the Supreme Court, or any two of them. It has been freely employed upon a variety of occasions, and frequently with success. And its utility has become so apparent, the persons who, in compiling the Constitution, were its violent. opposers, have from experience become its declared admirers. *

I have in another place remarked, that the Convention, in the formation of this part of their plan, had departed from the model of the Constitution of this State, in favor of that of Massachusetts. Two strong reasons may be imagined for this preference. One, that the judges, who are to be the interpreters of the law, might receive an improper bias, from having given a previous opinion in their revisionary capacity. The other, that by being often associated with the Executive, they might be induced to embark too far in the political views of that magistrate, and thus a dangerous combination might by degrees be cemented between the Executive and Judiciary departments. It is impossible to keep the judges too distinct from every other avocation than that of expounding the laws. It is peculiarly dangerous to place them in a situation to be either corrupted or influenced by the Executive.

PUBLIUS.

* Mr. Abraham Yates, a warm opponent of the plan of the Convention, is of this number.

NUMBER LXXIV.

BY MR. HAMILTON.

The same View continued, in Relation to the Command of the National Forces, and the Power of Pardoning.

THE President of the United States, is to be "Commander-inchief of the army and navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several States, when called into the actual service of the United States." The propriety of this provision is so evident, and it is, at the same time, so consonant to the precedents of the State Constitutions in general, that little need be said to explain or enforce it. Even those of them which have, in other respects coupled the Chief Magistrate with a council, have for the most part concentrated the military authority in him alone. Of all the cares or concerns of government, the direction of war most peculiarly demands those qualities which distinguish the exercise of power by a single hand. The direction of war, implies the direction of the common strength; and the power of directing and employing the common strength, forms an usual and essential part in the definition of the Executive authority.

"The President may require the opinion, in writing, of the principal officer in each of the Executive departments upon any subject relating to the duties of their respective offices." This I consider as a mere redundancy in the plan; as the right for which it provides would result of itself from the office.

He is authorized" to grant reprieves and pardons for offences against the United States, except in cases of impeachment." Humanity and good policy conspire to dictate, that the benign prerogative of pardoning, should be as little as possible fettered or embarrassed. The criminal code of every country partakes so much of necessary severity, that without an easy access to exceptions in favor of unfortunate guilt, justice would wear a countenance too sanguinary and cruel. As the sense of responsibility is always strongest, in proportion as it is undivided, it may be inferred, that a single man would be most ready to attend to the force