advantage in septennial elections, for when compared with a greater frequency, they are inadmissible; but merely as a proof, and I conceive it to be a very substantial proof, that the liberties of the people can be in no danger from biennial elections.

The conclusion resulting from these examples will be not a little strengthened, by recollecting three circumstances. The first is that the Federal Legislature will possess a part only of that supreme Legislative authority which is vested completely in the British Parliament; and which, with a few exceptions, was exercised by the Colonial Assemblies and the Irish Legislature. It is a received and well founded maxim, that, where no other circumstances affect the case, the greater the power is, the shorter ought to be its duration; and, conversely, the smaller the power, the more safely may its duration be protracted: In the second place, it has, on another occasion, been shown, that the Federal Legislature will not only be restrained by its dependence on the people, as other Legislative bodies are; but that it will be moreover watched and controlled by the several collateral Legislatures, which other Legislative bodies are not. And in the third place, no comparison can be made between the means that will be possessed by the more permanent branches of the Federal Government, for seducing, if they should be disposed to seduce, the House of Representatives from their duty to the people; and the means of influence over the popular branch, possessed by the other branches of Governments above cited. With less power, therefore, to abuse, the Federal Representatives can be less tempted on one side, and will be doubly watched on the other.

PUBLIUS

NUMBER LIII.

BY MR. HAMILTON,

The same Subject continued, with a View of the Term of Service of the Members.

I SHALL here, perhaps, be reminded of a current observation, "that where annual elections end, tyranny begins." If it be true, as has been often remarked, that sayings which become proverbial, are generally founded in reason, it is not less true, that, when

once established, they are often applied to cases to which the reason of them does not extend. I need not look for a proof beyond the instance before us. What is the reason on which this proverbial observation is founded? No man will subject himself to the ridicule of pretending, that any natural connection subsists between the sun or the seasons, and the period within which human virtue can bear the temptations of power. Happily for mankind, liberty is not, in this respect, confined to any single point of time; but lies within extremes, which afford sufficient latitude for all the variations that may be required by the various situations and circumstance of civil society.

The election of magistrates might be, if it were found expedient, as in some instances it actually has been, daily, weekly, or monthly, as well as annual; and if circumstances may require a deviation from the rule on one side, why not also on the other side? Turning our attention to the periods established among ourselves, for the election of the most numerous branches of the State Legislatures, we find them by no means coinciding any more in this instance, than in the elections of other civil magistrates. In Connecticut and Rhode Island the periods are half-yearly. In the other States, South Carolina excepted, they are annual. In South Carolina they are biennial; as is proposed in the Federal Government. Here is a difference, as four to one, between the longest and the shortest periods; and yet it would be not easy to show, that Connecticut or Rhode Island is better governed, or enjoys a greater share of rational liberty than South Carolina, or that either the one or the other of these States are distinguished in these respects, and by these causes, from those whose elections are different from both.

In searching for the grounds of this doctrine, I can discover but one, and that is wholly inapplicable to our case. The important distinction, so well understood in America, between a Constitution established by the people, and unalterable by the Government; and a law established by the Government, and alterable by the Government, seems to have been little understood, and less observed in any other country. Wherever the supreme power of legislation has resided, has been supposed to reside also a full power to change the form of the Government.-Even in Great Britain, where the principles of political and civil liberty have been most discussed, and where we hear most of the rights of the

Constitution, it is maintained, that the authority of the Parliament is transcendent and uncontrollable, as well with regard to the Constitution, as the ordinary objects of Legislative provision. They have accordingly, in several instances actually changed, by Legislative acts, some of the most fundamental articles of the Government. They have, in particular, on several occasions, changed the period of election; and on the last occasion, not only introduced septennial, in place of triennial elections, but, by the same act, continued themselves in place four years beyond the term for which they were elected by the people. An attention to these dangerous practices has produced a very natural alarm in the votaries of free government, of which frequency of elections is the corner-stone; and has led them to seek for some security to liberty against the danger to which it is exposed. Where no Constitution, paramount to the Government, either existed or could be obtained, no constitutional security, similar to that established in the United States, was to be attempted. Some other security, therefore, was to be sought for; and what better security would the case admit, than that of selecting and appealing to some simple and familiar portion of time, as a standard for measuring the danger of innova tions, for fixing the national sentiment, and for uniting the patriotic exertions? The most simple and familiar portion of time, applicable to the subject, was that of a year; and hence the doctrine has been inculcated, by a laudable zeal to erect some barrier against the gradual innovations of an unlimited government, that the advance towards tyranny, was to be calculated by the distance of departure from the fixed point of annual elections. But what necessity can there be of applying this expedient to a government, limited as the Federal Government will be, by the authority of a paramount Constitution? Or who will pretend, that the liberties of the people of America will not be more secure under biennial elections, unalterably fixed by such a Constitution, than those of any other nation would be, where elections were annual or even more frequent, but subject to alterations by the ordinary power of the Government.

The second question stated is, whether biennial elections be necessary or useful? The propriety of answering this question in the affirmative, will appear from several very obvious consider

ations.

No man can be a competent legislator, who does not add to an

upright intention and a sound judgment, a certain degree of knowledge of the subjects on which he is to legislate. A part of this knowledge may be acquired by the means of information, which lie within the compass of men in private, as well as public stations. Another part can only be attained, or at least thoroughly attained, by actual experience in the station which requires the use of it. The period of service ought, therefore, in all such cases, to bear some proportion to the extent of practical knowledge, requisite to the due performance of the service. The period of Legislative service, established in most of the States for the more numerous branches is, as we have seen, one year. The question then may be put into this simple form: Does the period of two years bear no greater proportion to the knowledge requisite for Federal legislation, than one year does to the knowledge requisite for State legislation? The very statement of the question, in this form, suggests the answer that ought to be given to it.

In a single State, the requisite knowledge relates to the exist ing laws, which are uniform throughout the State, and with which all the citizens are more or less conversant; and to the general affairs of the State, which lie within a small compass, are not very diversified, and occupy much of the attention and conversation of every class of people. The great theatre of the United States presents a very different scene. The laws are so far from being uniform, that they vary in every State; whilst the public affairs of the Union are spread throughout a very extensive region, and are extremely diversified by the local affairs connected with them, and can with difficulty be correctly learnt in any other place, than in the Central Councils, to which a knowledge of them will be brought by the representatives of every part of the empire. Yet some knowledge of the affairs, and even of the laws of all the States, ought to be possessed by the members from each of the States. How can foreign trade be properly regulated by uniform laws, without some acquaintance with the commerce, the ports, the usages, and the regulations of the different States? How can the trade between the different States be duly regulated, without some knowledge of their relative situations in these, and other points? How can taxes be judicially imposed, and effectually collected, if they be not accommodated to the different laws and local circumstances relating to these objects in the different

States? How can uniform regulations for the militia be duly provided, without a similar knowledge of some internal circumstances, by which the States are distinguished from each other? These are the principal objects of Federal Legislation, and suggest most forcibly, the extensive information which the representatives ought to acquire. The other inferior objects will require a proportional degree of information with regard to them.

It is true, that all these difficulties will, by degrees, be very much diminished. The most laborious task will be the proper inauguration of the Government, and the primeval formation of a Federal Code. Improvements on the first draught, will every year become both easier and fewer. Past transactions of the Government, will be a ready and accurate source of information to new members. The affairs of the Union, will become more and more objects of curiosity and conversation among the citizens at large. And the increased intercourse among those of different States, will contribute not a little to diffuse a mutual knowledge of their affairs, as this again will contribute to a general assimilation of their manners and laws. But, with all these abatements, the business of Federal legislation must continue so far to exceed, both in novelty and difficulty, the Legislative business of a single State, as to justify the longer period of service assigned to those who are to transact it.

A branch of knowledge which belongs to the acquirements of a Federal representative, and which has not been mentioned, is that of foreign affairs. In regulating our own commerce, he ought to be not only acquainted with the treaties between the United States and other nations, but also with the commercial policy and laws of other nations. He ought not to be altogether ignorant of the law of nations; for that, as far as it is a proper object of municipal legislation, is submitted to the Federal Government. And, although the House of Representatives is not immediately to participate in foreign negotiations and arrangements, yet from the necessary connection between the several branches of public affairs, those particular subjects will frequently deserve attention in the ordinary course of legislation, and will sometimes demand particular Legislative sanction and co-operation. Some portion of this knowledge, may, no doubt, be acquired in a man's closet; but some of it also can only be derived from the public sources of information; and all of it will be acquired to best effect, by a practical