it will be found that the change which it proposes, consists much less in the addition of new powers to the Union, than in the invigoration of its original powers. The regulation of commerce, it is true, is a new power; but that seems to be an addition which few oppose, and from which no apprehensions are entertained. The powers relating to war and peace, armies and fleets, treaties and finance, with the other more considerable powers, are all vested in the existing Congress by the Articles of Confederation. The proposed change does not enlarge these powers; it only substitutes a more effectual mode of administering them. The change relating to taxation, may be regarded as the most important: and yet the present Congress have as complete authority to require of the States, indefinite supplies of money for the common defence and general welfare, as the future Congress will have to require them of individual citizens; and the latter will be no more bound than the States themselves have been, to pay the quotas respectively taxed on them. Had the States complied punctually with the Articles of Confederation, or could their compliance have been enforced by as peaceable means as may be used with success towards single persons, our past experience is very far from countenancing an opinion, that Governments would have lost their constitutional powers, and have gradually undergone an entire consolidation. To maintain that such an event would have ensued, would have been to say at once, that the existence of the State Governments is incompatible with any system whatever, that accomplishes the essential purposes of the Union.

PUBLIUS.

NUMBER XLVI.

BY MR. MADISON.

The Subject of the last Paper resumed; with an Examination of the Comparative Means of Influence of the Federal and State Governments.

RESUMING the subject of the last paper, I proceed to inquire, whether the Federal Government, or the State Governments, will have the advantage with regard to the predilection and support of the people.

Notwithstanding the different modes in which they are appointed,

we must consider both of them as substantially dependent on the great body of citizens of the United States. I assume this position here as it respects the first, reserving the proofs for another place. The Federal and State Governments are in fact but different agents and trustees of the people, instituted with different powers, and designed for different purposes. The adversaries of the Constitution seem to have lost sight of the people altogether in their reasonings on this subject; and to have viewed these different establishments, not only as mutual rivals and enemies, but as uncontrolled by any common superior, in their efforts to usurp the authorities of each other. These gentlemen must here be reminded of their error. They must be told, that the ultimate authority, wherever the derivative may be found, resides in the people alone; and that it will not depend merely on the comparative ambition or address of the different Governments, whether either, or which of them, will be able to enlarge its sphere of jurisdiction at the expense of the other.-Truth, no less than decency, requires, that the event in every case, should be supposed to depend on the sentiments and sanction of their common constituents

Many considerations, besides those suggested on a former occasion, seem to place it beyond doubt, that the first and most material attachment of the people, will be to the Governments of their respective States. To the administration of these, a greater number of individuals will expect to rise. From the gift of these, a greater number of offices and emoluments will flow. By the superintending care of these, all the more domestic and personal interests of the people will be regulated and provided for. With the affairs of these, the people will be more familiarly and minutely conversant; with the members of these, will a greater proportion of the people have the ties of personal acquaintance and friendship, and of family and party attachments; on the side of these, therefore, the popular bias may well be expected most strongly to incline.

Experience speaks the same language in this case. The Federal administration, though hitherto very defective, in comparison with what may be hoped under a better system, had, during the war, and particularly whilst the independent fund of paper emission was in credit, an activity and importance as great as it can well have, in any future circumstances whatever. It was engaged too in a course of measures, which had for their object, the

protection of everything that was dear, and the acquisition of everything that could be desirable to the people at large. It was, nevertheless, invariably found, after the transient enthusiasm for the early Congresses was over, that the attention and attachment of the people were turned anew to their own particular Governments; that the Federal Council was at no time the idol of popular favor; and that opposition to proposed enlargements of its powers and importance, was the side usually taken by the men, who wished to build their political consequence on the prepossessions of their fellow-citizens.

If, therefore, as has been elsewhere remarked, the people should in future become more partial to the Federal than to the State Governments, the change can only result from such manifest and irresistible proofs of a better administration, as will overcome all their antecedent propensities. And in that case, the people ought not surely to be precluded from giving most of their confidence, where they may discover it to be most due: but, even then, the State Governments could have little to apprehend, because it is only within a certain sphere, that the Federal power can in the nature of things, be advantageously administered.

The remaining points on which I propose to compare the Federal and State Governments, are the disposition, and the faculty they may respectively possess, to resist and frustrate the measures of each other.

It has been already proved, that the members of the Federal will be more dependent on the members of the State Governments, than the latter will be on the former. It has appeared, also, that the prepossessions of the people, on whom both will depend, will be more on the side of the State Governments than of the Federal Government. So far as the disposition of each, towards the other, may be influenced by these causes, the State Governments must clearly have the advantage. But in a distinct and very important point of view, the advantage will lie on the same side. The prepossessions which the members themselves will carry into the Federal Government, will generally be favorable to the States; whilst it will rarely happen that the members of the State Governments will carry into the public councils a bias in favor of the General Government. A local spirit will infallibly prevail much more in the members of the Congress, than a national spirit will prevail in the Legislatures of the particular States. Every one

knows, that a great proportion of the errors committed by the State Legislatures, proceeds from a disposition of the members to sacrifice the comprehensive and permanent interests of the State, to the particular and separate views of the counties or districts in which they reside. And if they do not sufficiently enlarge their policy, to embrace the collective welfare of their particular State, how can it be imagined, that they will make the aggregate prosperity of the Union, and the dignity and respectability of its Government, the objects of their affections and consultations? For the same reason, that the members of the State Legislatures will be unlikely to attach themselves sufficiently to national objects, the members of the Federal Legislature will be likely to attach themselves too much to local objects.-The States will be to the latter, what counties and towns are to the former. Measures will too often be decided according to their probable effect, not on the national prosperity and happiness, but on the prejudices, interests, and pursuits of the Governments and people of the individual States. What is the spirit that has in general characterized the proceedings of Congress? A perusal of their journals, as well as the candid acknowledgments of such as have had a seat in that assembly, will inform us, that the members have but too frequently displayed the character, rather of partisans of the respective States, than of impartial guardians of a common interest; that where, on one occasion, improper sacrifices have been made of local considerations to the aggrandizement of the Federal Government, the great interests of the nation have suffered on a hundred from an undue attention to the local prejudices, interests, and views of the particular States. I mean not by these reflections to insinuate, that the new Federal Government will not embrace a more enlarged plan of policy, than the existing Government may have pursued; much less, that its views will be as confined as those of the State Legislatures; but only that it will partake sufficiently of the spirit of both, to be disinclined to invade the rights of the individual States, or the prerogatives of their Governments. The motives on the part of the State Governments, to augment their prerogatives by defalcations from the Federal Government, will be overruled by no reciprocal predispositions in the members. Were it admitted, however, that the Federal Government may feel an equal disposition with the State Governments to extend its power beyond the due limits, the latter would still have the

advantage in the means of defeating such encroachments. If an act of a particular State, though unfriendly to the National Government, be generally popular in that State, and should not too grossly violate the oaths of the State officers, it is executed immediately, and of course, by means on the spot, and depending on the State alone. The opposition of the Federal Government, or the interposition of Federal officers, would but inflame the zeal of all parties on the side of the State; and the evil could not be prevented or repaired, if at all, without the employment of means which must always be resorted to with reluctance and difficulty. On the other hand, should an unwarrantable measure of the Federal Government be unpopular in particular States, which would seldom fail to be the case, or even a warrantable measure be so, which may sometimes be the case, the means of opposition to it are powerful, and at hand. The disquietude of the people; their repugnance, and perhaps refusal, to co-operate with the officers of the Union; the frowns of the Executive magistracy of the State; the embarrassments created by Legislative devices, which would often be added on such occasions, would oppose, in any State, difficulties not to be despised; would form, in a large State, very serious impediments; and where the sentiments of several adjoining States happened to be in unison, would present obstructions which the Federal Government would hardly be willing to

encounter.

But ambitious encroachments of the Federal Government, on the authority of the State Governments, would not excite the opposition of a single State, or of a few States only. They would be signals of general alarm. Every Government would espouse the common cause. A correspondence would be opened. Plans of resistance would be concerted. One spirit would animate and conduct the whole. The same combination, in short, would result from an apprehension of the Federal, as was produced by the dread of a foreign yoke; and unless the projected innovations should be voluntarily renounced, the same appeal to a trial of force would be made in the one case as was made in the other. But what degree of madness could ever drive the Federal Government to such an extremity? In the contest with Great Britain, one part of the empire was employed against the other. The more numer ous part invaded the rights of the less numerous part. The attempt was unjust and unwise: but it was not in speculation absolutely