NUMBER XXVII. BY MR. HAMILTON. The Subject continued with the same View. IT has been urged, in different shapes, that a Constitution of the kind proposed by the Convention, cannot operate, without the aid of a military force to execute its laws. This, however, like most other things that have been alleged on that side, rests on mere general assertion, unsupported by any precise or intelligible designation of the reasons upon which it is founded. As far as I have been able to divine the latent meaning of the objectors, it seems to originate in a pre-supposition, that the people will be disinclined to the exercise of Federal authority, in any matter of an internal nature. Waiving any exception that might be taken to the inaccuracy, or inexplicitness of the distinction between internal and external, let us inquire what ground there is to pre-suppose that disinclination in the people. Unless we presume, at the same time, that the powers of the General Government will be worse administered than those of the State Governments, there seems to be no room for the presumption of ill-will, disaffection, or opposition in the people. I believe it may be laid down as a general rule, that their confidence in, and their obedience to, a Government, will commonly be proportioned to the goodness or badness of its administration. It must be admitted, that there are exceptions to this rule; but these exceptions depend so entirely on accidental causes, that they cannot be considered as having any relation to the intrinsic merits or demerits of a Constitution. These can only be judged of by general principles and maxims. Various reasons have been suggested, in the course of these papers, to induce a probability, that the General Government will be better administered, than the particular Governments; the principal of which are, that the extension of the spheres of election will present a greater option or latitude of choice to the people: that, through the medium of the State Legislatures, who are select bodies of men, and who are to appoint the members of the National Senate, there is reason to expect, that this branch will generally be composed with peculiar care and judgment; that these circumstances promise greater knowledge, and more comprehensive information, in the National Councils; and that, on account of the extent of the country from which will be drawn those to whose direction they will be committed, they will be less apt to be tainted by the spirit of faction, and more out of the reach of those occasional ill humors or temporary prejudices and propensities, which, in smaller societies, frequently contaminate the public deliberations, beget injustice and oppression towards a part of the community, and engender schemes, which, though they gratify a momentary inclination or desire, terminate in general distress, dissatisfaction, and disgust. Several additional reasons of considerable force will occur, to fortify that probability, when we come to survey, with a more critical eye, the interior structure of the edifice which we are invited to erect. It will be sufficient here to remark, that, until satisfactory reasons can be assigned to justify an opinion, that the Federal Government is likely to be administered in such a manner as to render it odious or contemptible to the people, there can be no reasonable foundation for the supposition, that the laws of the Union will meet with any greater obstruction from them, or will stand in need of any other methods to enforce their execution, than the laws of the particular members. The hope of impunity is a strong incitement to sedition; the dread of punishment, a proportionably strong discouragement to it. Will not the Government of the Union, which, if possessed of a due degree of power, can call to its aid the collective resources of the whole Confederacy, be more likely to repress the former sentiment, and to inspire the latter, than that of a single State, which can only command the resources within itself? A turbulent faction in a State, may easily suppose itself able to contend with the friends to the Government in the State; but it can hardly be so infatuated, as to imagine itself equal to the combined efforts of the Union. If this reflection be just, there is less danger of resistance from irregular combinations of individuals, to the authority of the Confederacy, than to that of a single member. I will, in the first place, hazard an observation, which will not be the less just, because to some it may appear new; which is, that the more the operations of the National authority are intermingled in the ordinary exercise of Government, the more the citizens are accustomed to meet with it in the common occurrences of their political life; the more it is familiarized to their sight, and to their feelings, the further it enters into those objects, which touch the most sensible cords, and put in motion the most active springs of the human heart; the greater will be the probability, that it will conciliate the respect and attachment of the community. Man is very much a creature of habit. A thing that rarely strikes his senses, will have but a transient influence upon his mind. A Government continually at a distance and out of sight, can hardly be expected to interest the sensations of the people. The inference is, that the authority of the Union, and the affections of the citizens towards it, will be strengthened rather than weakened, by its extension to what are called matters of internal concern; and that it will have less occasion to recur to force, in proportion to the familiarity and comprehensiveness of its agency. The more it circulates through those channels and currents, in which the passions of mankind naturally flow, the less will it require the aid of the violent and perilous expedients of compulsion. One thing at all events, must be evident; that a Government like the one proposed, would bid much fairer to avoid the necessity of using force, than the species of league contended for by most of its opponents; the authority of which should only operate upon the States in their political or collective capacities. It has been shown, that in such a Confederacy, there can be no sanction for the laws, but force; that frequent delinquencies in the members, are the natural offspring of the very frame of the Government; and that as often as these happen, they can only be redressed, if at all by war and violence. The plan reported by the Convention, by extending the authority of the Federal head to the individual citizens of the several States, will enable the Government to employ the ordinary magistracy of each, in the execution of its laws. It is easy to perceive, that this will tend to destroy, in the common apprehension, all distinction between the sources from which they might proceed; and will give the Federal Government the same advantage for securing a due obedience to its authority, which is enjoyed by the Government of each State; in addition to the influence on public opinion, which will result from the important consideration of its having power to call to its assistance and support the resources of the whole Union. It merits particular attention in this place, that the laws of the Confederacy, as to the enumerated and legitimate objects of its jurisdiction, will become the supreme law of the land; to the observance of which, all officers, legislative, executive, and judicial, in each State, will be bound by the sanctity of an oath. Thus the legislatures, courts, and magistrates, of the respective members, will be incorporated into the operations of the National Government, as far as its just and constitutional authority extends; and will be rendered auxiliary to the enforcement of its laws.* Any man who will pursue, by his own reflections, the consequences of this situation, will perceive, that if its powers are administered with a common share of prudence, there is good ground to calculate upon a regular and peaceful execution of the laws of the Union. If we will arbitrarily suppose the contrary, we may deduce any inferences we please from the supposition; for it is certainly possible, by an injudicious exercise of the authorities of the best government that ever was, or ever can be instituted, to provoke and precipitate the people into the wildest excesses. But though the adversaries of the proposed Constitution should presume that the national rulers would be insensible to the motives of public good, or to the obligations of duty; I would still ask them, how the interests of ambition, or the views of encroachment, can be promoted by such a conduct? PUBLIUS. NUMBER XXVIII. BY MR. HAMILTON. The same Subject continued. THAT there may happen cases in which the National Government may be under the necessity of resorting to force, cannot be denied. Our own experience has corroborated the lessons taught by the examples of other nations; that emergencies of this sort will sometimes exist in all societies, however constituted; that seditions and insurrections are, unhappily, maladies as inseparable from the body politic, as tumors and eruptions from the natural * The sophistry which has been employed, to show that this will tend to the destruction of the State Governments will, in its proper place, be fully detected. body; that the idea of governing at all times by the simple force of law, (which we have been told is the only admissible principle of republican government), has no place but in the reveries of those political doctors, whose sagacity disdains the admonitions of experimental instruction. Should such emergencies at any time happen under the National Government, there could be no remedy but force. The means to be employed, must be proportioned to the extent of the mischief. If it should be a slight commotion in a small part of a State, the militia of the residue would be adequate to its suppression: and the natural presumption is, that they would be ready to do their duty. An insurrection, whatever may be its immediate cause, eventually endangers all government: regard to the public peace, if not to the rights of the Union, would engage the citizens to whom the contagion had not communicated itself, to oppose the insurgents and if the General Government should be found in practice conducive to the prosperity and felicity of the people, it were irrational to believe that they would be disinclined to its support. If, on the contrary, the insurrection should pervade a whole State, or a principal part of it, the employment of a different kind of force might become unavoidable. It appears that Massachusetts found it necessary to raise troops for suppressing the disorders within that State; that Pennsylvania, from the mere apprehension of commotions among a part of her citizens, has thought proper to have recourse to the same measure. Suppose the State of New York had been inclined to re-establish her lost jurisdiction over the inhabitants of Vermont; could she have hoped for success in such an enterprise, from the efforts of the militia alone? Would she not have been compelled to raise, and to maintain, a more regular force for the execution of her design? If it must then be admitted, that the necessity of recurring to a force different from the militia, in cases of this extraordinary nature, is applicable to the State Governments themselves, why should the possibility, that the National Government might be under a like necessity in similar extremities, be made an objection to its existence? Is it not surprising that men, who declare an attachment to the Union in the abstract, should urge, as an objection to the proposed Constitution, what applies with tenfold weight to the plan for which they contend; and what, as far as it has any found |