to this temporary inequality of representation, expecting it would much sooner have been rectified, it never was understood that by the resolution above cited, a power was given to the smaller states to fix that inequality upon them for ever, as those small states have now attempted to do by combining to vote for this 17th article, and thereby to deprive the larger states of their just right, acknowledged in the same resolution. Smaller states having given us in advance, this striking instance of the injustice they are capable of, and of the possible effects of their combination, is of itself a sufficient reason for our determining not to put ourselves in their power by agreeing to this article, as it stands connected with those concerning the quotas of each state, since being a majority of states in congress, they may by the same means, at any time, deprive the larger states of any share in the disposition of our strength and wealth, and the management of our common interests.

"But as the smaller colonies may object, that if the larger are allowed a number of votes in proportion to their importance, the smaller will then be equally in danger of being overpowered and governed by them. We, not having the least desire of any influence or power that is unjust or unequal or disproportioned to the burthens we are to bear, do hereby offer our consent to the said 17th article as it now stands, provided the quotas to be contributed by the larger provinces

shall be reduced to an equality with the smallest, in which case all, by contributing equally, will have a right to equal votes. Not that we mean thereby to avoid granting additional aids, when the exigence of our common interests shall appear to us to make them proper and necessary; but, leaving to the congress, with regard to such additional aids, the right of making requisitions as enjoyed by our late kings, we would reserve to ourselves the right of judging of the propriety of these requisitions, or of refusing or complying with them in part, or in the whole, as to us shall seem best, and of modifying our grants with such conditions as we shall judge necessary, in like manner as our assemblies might formerly do with regard to requisitions from the crown: for it appears to us just and reasonable, that we should retain the disposition of what strength we have, above the equal proportion contributed as aforesaid by our state to the common service, with every power necessary to apply the same, as occasions may arise, for our particular security; this we mean to do from this time forward, unless we are allowed votes in congress proportioned to the importance of our state, as was originally intended.

'Signed by order of the Convention."

Though this protest was not acted upon, for the reasons previously assigned by Dr. Franklin, it serves however to show his opinion and arguments

in support of a very important question of American legislature, and is an additional feature in his political mind.

American paper money beginning about this time to fall into disrepute, and immediate supplies of arms and ammunition for the use of the army being absolutely necessary, congress turned their attention towards Europe, and to France in particular, for the purpose of obtaining aids in money and military stores, as the only means of resisting the power of Great Britain, and preserving their newly acquired independence.

In the latter end of 1776, a commission was appointed for this object; and Dr. Franklin, though then in his 71st year, was considered, from his talents as a statesman, and reputation as a philosopher, the most suitable person to effect the desired end, and was consequently nominated commissioner plenipotentiary to the court of France, in conjunction with Silas Deane and Arthur Lee, Esquires: the former had already been sent to Europe, for the purpose of secretly obtaining and forwarding warlike stores, &c., and the other had been employed by congress as a private and confidential agent in England.

Previous to Dr. Franklin's departure, he conceived it would be advisable, on many accounts, to be the bearer of propositions for peace with

Great Britain; and with this view he drew up, and submitted to the secret committee of congress, the following paper.

SKETCH OF PROPOSITIONS FOR A PEACE, 1776.

There shall be a perpetual peace between Great Britain and the United States of America, on the following conditions.

Great Britain shall renounce and disclaim all pretence of right or authority to govern in any of the United States of America.

To prevent those occasions of misunderstanding which are apt to arise, where the territories of different powers border on each other, through the bad conduct of frontier inhabitants on both sides, Britain shall cede to the United States the provinces or colonies of Quebec, St. John's, Nova Scotia, Bermuda, East and West Florida, and the Bahama Islands, with all their adjoining and intermediate territories now claimed by her.

In return for this cession, the United States shall pay to Great Britain the sum of. sterling, in annual payments, that is to say, per annum, for and during the term of

years.

And shall moreover grant a free trade to all British subjects throughout the United States and the ceded colonies, and shall guarantee to Great Britain the possession of her islands in the West Indies.

Motices for proposing a Peace at this time. 1. The having such propositions in charge, will by the law of nations be some protection to the commissioners or ambassadors, if they should be taken.

2. As the news of our declared independence will tend to unite in Britain all parties against us; so our offering peace with commerce and payments of money, will tend to divide them again. For peace is as necessary to them as to us: our commerce is wanted by their merchants and manufacturers, who will therefore incline to the accommodation, even though the monopoly is not continued, since it can be easily made appear their share of our growing trade will soon be greater than the whole has been heretofore. Then for the landed interest, who wish an alleviation of taxes, it is demonstrable by figures, that if we should agree to pay, suppose ten millions in one hundred years, viz. 100,000l. per annum for that term, it would, being faithfully employed as a sinking fund, more than pay off all their present national debt. It is besides a prevailing opinion in England, that they must in the nature of things sooner or later lose the colonies, and many think they had better be without the government of them; so that the proposition will, on that account, have more supporters and fewer opposers.

3. As the having such propositions to make, or any powers to treat of peace, will furnish a pre