and ratifying the same, should give notice thereof to the United States in congress assembled. Resolved, That it is the opinion of this convention, that as soon as the conventions of nine states shall have ratified this constitution, the United States in congress assembled should fix a day on which electors should be appointed by the states which shall have ratified the same, and a day on which the electors should assemble to vote for the president, and the time and place for commencing proceedings under this constitution. That after such publication the electors should be appointed, and the senators and representatives elected: That the electors should meet on the day fixed for the election of the president, and should transmit their votes certified, signed, sealed and directed, as the constitution requires, to the secretary of the United States in congress assembled; that the senators and representatives should convene at the time and place assigned; that the senators should appoint a president of the senate, for the sole purpose of receiving, opening and counting the votes for president: and, that after he shall be chosen, the congress, together with the president, should, without delay, proceed to execute this constitution. By the unanimous order of the convention, G. WASHINGTON, PRESIDENT. W. Jackson, Secretary. SIR, IN CONVENTION, September 17, 1787. WE have now the honor to submit to the consideration of the United States in congress assembled, that constitution. which has appeared to us the most advisable. The friends of our country have long seen and desired, that the power of making war, peace and treaties, that of levying money and regulating commerce, and the correspondent exe cutive and judicial authorities, should be fully and effectually vested in the general government of the union: but the impropriety of delegating such extensive trust to one body of men is evident. Hence results the necessity of a different organization. It is obviously impracticable in the federal government of these states, to secure all rights of independent sovereignty to each, and yet provide for the interest and safety of all. Individuals entering into society must give up a share of liberty to preserve the rest. The magnitude of the sacrifice must depend as well on the situation and circumstance as on the object to be obtained. It is at all times difficult to draw with precision the line between those rights which must be surrendered, and those which may be reserved: and on the present occasion this difficulty was increased by a difference among the several states as to their situation, extent, habits, and particular interests. In all our deliberations on this subject we kept steadily in our view, that which appears to us the greatest interest of every true American, the consolidation of our union, in which is involved our prosperity, felicity, safety, perhaps our national existence. This important consideration, seriously and deeply impressed on our minds, led each state in the convention to be less rigid on the points of inferior magnitude than might have been otherwise expected: and thus the constitution, which we now present, is the result of a spirit of amity, and of that mutual deference and concession which the peculiarity of our political situation rendered indispensable. That it will meet the full and entire approbation of every state is not perhaps to be expected: but each will doubtless consider, that had her interests been alone consulted, the consequences might have been particularly disagreeable.or injurious to others; that it is liable to as few exceptions as could reasonably have been expected, we hope and believe : that it may promote the lasting welfare of that country so dear to us all, and secure her freedom and happiness, is our most ardent wish. With great respect, we have the honor to be, Sir, Your Excellency's most obedient and humble Servants, By the unanimous Order of the Convention. APPENDIX. No. VII. QUERIES and REMARKS on a paper, entitled “Hints for the Members of Convention." No. II. in the Federal Gazette of Tuesday, Nov. 3, 1789. [Referred to in MEMOIRS of the Life, PART V. vol. ii. p. 206.] HINT 1. OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH. "Your executive should consist of a single person." On this I would ask, is he to have no council? How is he to be informed of the state and circumstances of the different counties, their wants, their abilities, their dispositions, and the characters of the principal people, respecting their integrity, capacities, and qualifications for offices? Does not the present construction of our executive provide well for these particulars? And during the number of years it has existed, have its errors or failures in answering the end of its appointment been more or greater than might have been expected from a single person? "But an individual is more easily watched and controlled than any greater number." On this I would ask, who is to watch and control him? and by what means is he to be controlled? Will not those means, whatever they are, and in whatever body vested, be subject to the same inconveniences of expense, delay, ob struction of good intentions, &c. which are objected to the present executive? 2. THE DURATION OF THE APPOINTMENT. "This should be governed by the following principles, the independence of the magistrate, and the stability of his administration: neither of which can be secured but by putting both beyond the reach of every annual gust of folly and of faction." On this it may be asked, ought it not also to be put beyond the reach of every triennial, quinquennial, or septennial gust of folly and faction, and in short beyond the reach of folly and of faction at any period whatever? Does not this reasoning aim at establishing a monarchy at least for life, like that of Poland? or, to prevent the inconveniences such as that kingdom is subject to in a new election on every decease? Are the freemen of Pennsylvania convinced from a view of the history of such governments, that it will be for their advantage to submit themselves to a government of such construction? 3. ON THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH. “A plural legislature is as necessary to good government as a single executive. It is not enough that your legislature should be numerous, it should also be divided. Numbers alone are not a sufficient barrier against the impulses of passion, the combination of interest, the intrigues of faction, the haste of folly, or the spirit of encroachment. One division should watch over and control the other; supply its wants, correct its blunders, and cross its designs, should they be criminal or erroneous. Wisdom is the specific quality of the |