quences of their actions, notwithstanding Mr. Stewart's assertion; but when they are, utility their best guide.— The objections contained in Mr. Stewart's "Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers of Man" next considered. He contends for an intuitive moral sense.-His remarks on the difference between duty and interest. His proofs of an original conscience derived from the universality of its existence, and from the early period of life at which it appears.-Paley does not deny the distinctions contended for, but accounts for them in a different way, which renders an innate or an intuitive conscience unnecessary.-Mr. Stewart's abstract ideas of virtue and obligation.-Right and wrong, he maintains, are simple ideas incapable of being defined. The notions of Dean Sherlock and Abp. King, respecting the nature of virtue, very similar to those of Paley. The opinions of Dr. Reid and Mr. Stewart with regard to ultimate facts, and their discouragement of deep investigation censured page 1 CHAPTER II. The arguments contained in Mr. Gisborne's "Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy," declared by Mr. Stewart to be unanswerable.-Mr. Gisborne's own theory examined, and shown to be fraught with the same difficulties as those alleged against Paley's.-The objections to the former often greater than those urged against the latter. The former also more liable to the charge of selfishness.-Mr. Gisborne, as well as Mr. Stewart, condemns Paley's system for allowing of ex- ceptions to the rules of morality.-Several cases ad- duced, in which such exceptions are clearly justifiable. -Examples of the same to be found in Scripture.— Mr. Gisborne's inconsistency in this particular.—A striking example of such an exception, afforded by Mr. G. in the case of the West Indian slaves.-The exceptions to general rules, defended by Paley, upon the same principles as the rules themselves, viz. be- Dr. Pearson's objections considered.-His objection or whether he commands it because it is right, briefly considered.-Dr. Pearson's opinion respecting the foundation of virtue.-Denies that there is any rule, or criterion, universally applicable.-His ideas respecting moral obligation. — This he maintains refers to the principle of virtue, and has no connexion with the motive. He is by no means clear on this point. That obligation and motive coincide, the opinion of numerous moralists. That nothing can oblige a moral agent which is not in some way or other necessary to his happiness, the opinion of Bishop Law, Puffendorf, Bishop Cumberland, and many other writers.-Dr. Pearson insists that obligation arises from a principle of duty, which, when examined, differs but little from the former opinion. His singular assertion that right and wrong cannot be applied to motives, examined.-Paley's definition of obligation defended.-Shown to be consistent with Pearson's, in which it is derived from the will of God.-The latter writer agrees, that the true motive to the practice of virtue is individual happiness, but thinks that Paley ought to have included the happiness of the present, as well as that of the future.-The latter moralist, however, shown to be consistent on that point. The question briefly considered, whether Regulus, Mutius, the Decii, &c. were morally obliged to perform the heroic deeds recorded of them, and in what the obligation could consist. page 70 The objections of Dr. Brown examined. His principal charge against Paley is the selfishness of his theory, which he regards as more deserving of censure, than any other modification of the selfish system. -Paley vindicated from this aspersion.-His theory as remote from selfishness, as far as the present life is considered, as any other with the highest pretensions, and even with regard to the next life, as soon as a habit of virtuous conduct is established, it becomes perfectly disinterested. But this state of perfection scarcely ever attainable in the present world, nor is it required.— If the motive arising from the prospect of a future state of happiness be regarded as selfish, then is Christianity the most selfish religion in the world.-Our Saviour and his Apostles constantly enforce their precepts by this sanction.-In the Gospels and in the Epistles a perpetual reference to a future retribution.-Several passages quoted in proof of this assertion.-Dr. Brown's own theory, when strictly examined, shown to be selfish.-According to him, the feelings of approbation or disapprobation constitute both the criterion and the obligation of virtue.-The dilemma to which he is reduced by this theory.—The idea of making virtue its own reward visionary in our C present condition.-Some objections in the Quarterly Review relative to Paley's theory briefly noticed.—They chiefly relate to the origin of our moral sentiments.— The proofs of an innate conscience derived from the feelings and conduct of the uneducated classes shown to be deceptive. The examples adduced by the reviewer from the instantaneous expressions of approbation among the Hindoos, and among the lower orders at a theatre, not to be depended upon.-Warburton's notions on the ment, and Conclusion . of the argu · page 112 APPENDIX. In a note contained in Dr. Whatley's Logic on the meaning of the term reason, Paley charged with denying that man is possessed of a moral faculty, or the power of distinguishing right from wrong. This accusation shown to be groundless.-Paley denies that this faculty is either instinctive or intuitive, and disputes the common arguments in favour of an innate conscience. The existence of such a power he fully admits, but he maintains that it is acquired by education, discipline, imitation, and the associating principle. Asserted by Dr. W., that Paley's principle |