capable of affording to mankind a ready

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apology for their deviations from the ordinary maxims of right and wrong The argument against the use of any thing, from its liability to abuse, trite as it is, has too often succeeded with the multitude where every other has failed; but its real value is well estimated by Lord Bacon in his Novum Organum: "Should any one object that the arts and sciences may be abused to evil purposes, as luxury and wickedness, let this sentiment be allowed to have no weight. The same objection would equally apply to all the most excellent things in the world,—as genius, courage, strength, beauty, riches, and even light itself."

Whatever theory we may profess to follow, that some room for the exercise of his own discretion must be left to the individual in framing his moral conduct, will be found to be unavoidable; and indeed, we are furnished with exemplifications of this truth, where, perhaps, we might least expect to find them, in the injunctions contained in the inspired writings. It is

sufficient to refer to the precepts which relate to the malevolent affections, as they are termed by Dr. Hey, and a few other writers. The indulgence of anger, hatred, and resentment, is frequently forbidden in the sacred Volume, and yet it is satisfactorily shown by this liberal and acute divine, that these passions are not only lawful, but salutary. In the same manner, we are to view the prohibitons in Scripture against killing, swearing, and the use of wine, for example, not as absolutely universal, but as admitting of certain exceptions. On what occasions we are to refrain from these actions, and when they may be lawfully indulged, must not unfrequently be left to our own decision; and this decision must be regulated, as the same author has truly observed, by our persuasion of what will be productive of the greatest good.*

* Discourses on the Malevolent Sentiments, Part I. p. 27. and Part VII. 172.

p.

CHAPTER III.

The Objections of the Rev. Dr. Pearson, late Master of Sidney College, Cambridge, briefly considered.

Having examined, with sufficient attention I hope, the objections of Mr. Dugald Stewart, and of Mr. Gisborne, I will now advert to those which have been urged by Dr. Pearson. In the first place, he objects, as several other writers have done, to Paley's definition of virtue, observing that the subject matter, as there stated, is not virtue itself, but virtuous actions, and that of the latter only one class is specified.*

This

* See Remarks on the Theory of Morals, containing an examination of the theoretical part of Dr. Paley's Principles of Mor. and Polit. Philosophy.

definition was, in fact, borrowed from the last of the essays prefixed to Archbishop King's work on the Origin of Evil, and it must excite surprise that, objectionable as it undoubtedly is, in more respects than one, it should have been retained by Dr. Paley in every successive edition of his Moral Philosophy, during his life time. The author of those Essays, if he agreed, as he appears to have done, with Mr. Gay, (who is known to have written the Preliminary Dissertation to the same work of the archbishop,) confined the appellation of virtue to those duties only which refer to our fellow-creatures. Those which regard ourselves individually, he classed under the name of prudence, and the actions which relate immediately to the Deity he termed religious. Hence it is plain why the two latter classes of duties were omitted in his definition. But this was not the case with Paley, who in the very next page adopts the threefold division of the moral duties commonly made use of by ethical writers; a circumstance, let it be observed, which prevents

the student from experiencing any inconvenience from the defectiveness complained of. Again, we admit that in every definition of virtue, reference must be made to the rule or criterion; but this remark cannot be applied to the obligation, which ought to be kept entirely distinct. From the language of the definition before us, we might undoubtedly be led to infer that no action can be virtuous which does not immediately arise from the prospect of a future reward. That this, however, was not the meaning intended to be conveyed by Dr. Paley, is perfectly evident from his observations on habitual virtue, in the seventh chapter of his second book, to which I have already adverted. But, notwithstanding this explanation, I am free to acknowledge that a want of precision in defining the terms of science, frequently gives rise to errors for which the author is justly responsible.

The definition of virtue chosen by Dr. Pearson himself is, "voluntary obedience to the will of God." But since the term voluntary here implies design, no actions, it