mena, whether physical, mental, or moral, from causes which are acknowledged by all parties to be constantly in operation, it is surely, to say the least, highly unreasonable to resort to some other cause, which is not only superfluous and undefinable, but of which the very existence is a subject of dispute. It is not to the mere use of the words conscience and `moral sense, that any objection is made by the followers of Paley: on the contrary, the terms are readily admitted to be extremely useful in the nomenclature of ethics. All that is affirmed is, that the faculty they are intended to designate is neither innate nor instinctive; because, in the first place, such a supposition is not at all requisite; and in the second place, it is destitute of substantial proof. We must not forget the rule of philosophizing laid down by Newton in his "Principia," that "No more causes of the phenomena of nature ought to be admitted, than are known to exist, and are sufficient to explain their appearances." But however ready Mr. Stewart may be to admit the truth of this maxim in natural philosophy, yet, with singular inconsistency, its justness, if not expressly denied, is manifestly disregarded both by himself and Dr. Reid, in their theory of mental and moral science. These writers find no difficulty in believing that the attraction of gravitation and cohesion, the various chemical affinities, the attractive powers of electricity and magnetism, may all of them be nothing more than modifications of one simple cause; but when they come to discuss the operations of the human mind, and the moral principles which influence human conduct, their love of simplicity at once deserts them; they condemn those philosophers whose investigations have led them to ascribe mental phenomena to a few adequate causes, and forbid the analysis of many of the more complex operations of the understanding, by pronouncing them to belong to those ultimate facts, which are incapable of being resolved into simpler elements. This mode of conduct, alike favourable to the indolence of some, and the prejudices of others, has been successfully exposed in the more recent publications of Dr. Brown; nor is it possible to deny, that the serious obstacle which it presents to the advancement of truth, must materially diminish the value of every system in which it is found. However undisputed the merits of such a system may be in other respects, it must at all events be extremely unfit to be adopted by those whose duty it is to promote the diffusion of accurate knowledge, and to encourage a habit of assiduous inquiry. CHAPTER II. Reply to the Objections of the Rev. Thomas Gisborne, M.A. Prebendary of Durham, &c. THE observations of so respectable a writer as Mr. Gisborne, must at all times merit our attention; but after the encomium passed by Mr. Dugald Stewart, on his "Principles of Moral Philosophy," it becomes doubly incumbent on us to examine the arguments contained in that work against Dr. Paley's theory, and to inquire how far they are entitled to be called "quite unanswerable."* Few persons, I should imagine, who have adopted the Christian faith, will hesitate * Stewart's Philosophy of the Human Mind, Vol. II. Note cc. in acknowledging, that whenever the Divine will can be clearly ascertained by referring to the pages of Inspiration, immediate conformity becomes our imperative duty, without pausing to consider to what extent it may coincide with our previous sentiments. But when (as Mr. Gisborne* asks) the Scriptures do not give the detail of moral information which is found requisite, by what rule is the will of God respecting points of morality to be ascertained?" It is in the answer to this question that he considers Dr. Paley's theory to be chargeable with error and danger. In the opinion of the latter moralist, expediency, estimated according to the best of our judgment, must alone be resorted to for discovering the Divine will, while, by the former of these writers, the truth of this doctrine is strenuously denied. The arguments, on which Mr. Gisborne chiefly dwells in support of his reasoning, are derived from the alleged difficulty imposed * Principles of Moral Philosophy examined, &c. Chap. V. p. 90. |