whenever a competition arises, the former must invariably yield to the latter. The expression of acting from a sense of duty occurs in various places of his Moral Philosophy; and since this evidently implies a regard to the divine will, (which ultimately coincides with a regard to our future happiness,) the distinction contended for is fully preserved, without having recourse to instinct or intuition, and without ascribing to the term any mysterious, undefinable meaning. Whatever proximity may be thought to exist between this Author's notions of interest and duty, and though it is conceded, beyond all question, that they must ultimately coincide, they are yet as much distinguished from each other, even according to this theory, in all that concerns our conduct in the present life, as finite from infinite, as time from eternity.

Again, when Mr. Stewart alleges that the emotions arising from the consideration of what is right or wrong are very different from those which are produced by a regard to our own happiness, and that the dis

tinction between duty and interest is confirmed by the early period at which our moral judgments make their appearance, long before children can form a general notion of happiness; there is nothing in Paley which contradicts these sentiments. On the contrary, he fully admits the truth of this statement, though, from the language of some of his opponents, we might be led to suppose that he actually doubted whether the valour of Leonidas, for example, would excite the admiration of a child old enough to comprehend the narrative, or whether the same child would experience feelings of horror on hearing of the atrocities of Caligula. But whether this moral approbation and disapprobation would arise instantaneously in the mind of an untutored savage, similar to the wild boy* caught in the woods of Hanover, could any means be devised

"Were it possible," observes Dr. Adam Smith, who was decidedly opposed to the theory of utility," that a human creature could grow up to manhood in some solitary place, without any communication with his own species, he would no more think of his own character,

is a very

of relating to him the same historical facts, distinct question, and one respecting which Paley does not pretend to decide, because the experiment is altogether impracticable. The purport of what he contends for is, that these moral emotions are not instinctive nor intuitive, and that their origin, however early, is easily accounted for, without supposing the existence of any peculiar faculty like the moral sense and conscience of Shaftesbury and Hucheson. Nor is he combating, as Mr. Stewart asserts, a phantom of his own raising, but that theory of morals which maintains that an original faculty is implanted in the human

of the propriety or demerit of his own sentiments and conduct, of the beauty or deformity of his own mind, than of the beauty or deformity of his own face. All those are objects which he cannot easily see; which naturally he does not look at; and with regard to which he is provided with no mirror which can present them to his view. Bring him into society, and he is immediately provided with the mirror which he wanted before."-Theory of Moral Sentiments, Vol. I. part III. chapter i.

mind, to inform us of what is right and wrong, without leaving room for a moment's hesitation, and to urge us by the vivid feelings which it excites, to pursue the one and shun the other. That no such unerring guide was ever given to man in his natural state, we have the strongest presumptive evidence, from the practices of savage nations, and even from those which were often countenanced among civilized heathens and although Mr. Locke's details* on this point are sometimes censured, as being derived from works of disputable authority, the facts furnished by history are more than sufficiently numerous to prove either that no such innate or intuitive moral principles exist, or that, if they do, they are totally inadequate to regulate the conduct of no inconsiderable portion of mankind.†

* Essay on Human Understanding, Book I. c. 3. + For one who contends for the supreme authority of conscience, and the immutability of the moral principle, the following concession of Mr. Stewart is, I confess, not very consistent. "Where the police, there

But notwithstanding the feelings of alarm excited in the breast of the amiable Scotch metaphysician, by the principles inculcated in Paley's theory, it will appear to any one who attentively examines the arguments advanced, that these celebrated authors by no means differ from each other so entirely as the language of the former would lead us to infer. Thus, they both agree in believing that there is an essential difference between right and wrong; that, in the great majority of cases, this difference is at once perceived by the mind, long anterior to the exercise of the reasoning powers, and consequently without adverting to the influence of actions on the general welfare; and that this

fore, is weak, murders must not only be more frequent, but are really less criminal, than in a society like ours, where the private rights of individuals are completely protected by law, and where there hardly occurs an instance, except in a case of self-defence, in which one man can be justified for shedding the blood of another.” See Philos. of the Active & Mor. Powers of Man. Vol. I. p. 187.

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