system, (which in truth is wrongly attributed to Paley,) and adduces the following arguments in proof of its fallacy :-that there are in all languages words equivalent to duty and interest, which men have always distinguished in their signification :-That the emotions arising from the contemplation of what is right and wrong in conduct, are different both in degree and kind from those which are produced by a calm regard to our happiness; (and here he appeals, by way of illustration, to the emotions produced by contemplating the characters exhibited in history or in novels, or represented on the stage :)-that though a sense of duty and a regard to our own happiness conspire in most instances to give the same direction to our conduct, yet (he observes) the connexion between virtue and happiness is by no means obvious to the common sense of mankind, but is deduced from an accurate investigation of the remote consequences of our different actions :—and that the same distinction is strongly confirmed by the early period of life at which our

moral judgments make their appearance, long before children are able to form the general notion of happiness, and indeed, in the very infancy of reason.

The facts here advanced Mr. Stewart considers as furnishing a sufficient refutation of the selfish theory of morals; but before he dismisses the subject, he thinks it necessary to notice a doctrine which he describes to be "fundamentally the same, though modified in such a manner as to elude some of the foregoing arguments," and which he believes to be at present the prevailing opinion of moralists in England. "According to this doctrine we do, indeed, in many cases, approve or disapprove of particular actions without any reference to our own interest at the time, but it is asserted that it was views of self-interest which originally created these moral sentiments and led us to associate agreeable or disagreeable emotions with human conduct." Thus "a particular action, which was at first approved or disapproved of merely on account of its supposed tendency

with respect to our own interest, comes, in process of time, to be approved or disapproved of the moment it is mentioned, and without any reflection on our part that we are able to recollect."* The author acknowledges that this refinement, as he calls it, on the old selfish system, gives it a degree of plausibility which it did not originally possess, and obviates one of the objections to it already stated; but still he maintains that the others retain their full force.

The argument on which he lays the principal stress is, "the degree of experience and reflection necessary for discovering the tendency of virtue to promote our happiness, compared with the very early period of life, when the moral sentiments display themselves in their full vigour." He warmly combats the answer which is given to this statement-that the generation of these moral sentiments is to be ascribed to imitation, to instruction, and to the association of ideas in the infant mind; and strenuously Vol. I. p. 164.

denies that these causes are sufficient to account for the origin of the powers of moral perception, and of our notions of right and wrong. The great object of this writer (as he tells us himself,) is to prove that "the moral faculty is an original principle of our constitution, which is not resolvable into any other principle or principles more general than itself."

But after examining with calmness the several objections which have been here adduced by Mr. Stewart, against what has been termed the selfish system, it is scarcely possible to avoid feeling surprised at observing to how little they really amount, when applied to the theory embraced by Dr. Paley. Thus, with respect to the distinction between duty and interest, it is, in truth, as fully acknowledged by the latter, as by any other writer, though he explains it in a different manner. Duty, according to Dr. Reid and his disciple, Mr. Stewart, is a simple idea, incapable of being defined. But duty and right, it will be admitted, are synonymous; and right is defined by Paley

to be consistency with the will of God. Now as strict conformity with the divine will must not unfrequently interfere with our immediate interest, it is impossible that this writer could be said to have overlooked the distinction, even supposing that he had said nothing more on the subject. In his chapter on Obligation, however, he has explicitly stated what he conceives to be the difference between prudence or a regard to our interest and duty; and though he maintains that in the one case we consider what we shall gain or lose in the present world, and in the other case, what we shall also gain or lose in the world to come; this distinction is abundantly sufficient to answer every moral purpose proposed by those who contend for an instinctive principle of duty, which, while they pronounce it to be imperative, they are unable to define. All that he means to affirm is, that interest and duty are resolvable into what conduces to our present, and what conduces to our future happiness; but still he maintains that they must not be suffered to interfere with each other, and that