known rule or other,"* &c. However requisite the consideration of general consequences must obviously be in the construction of universal rules, it can very rarely happen that any person in the ordinary stations of life is called upon to make the calculation for himself. † If the action he is about to commit is manifestly * Prin. of Mor. and Polit. Philos. Vol. II. p. 412.Edit. 5. "It is on few only and great occasions that men deliberate at all; on fewer still that they institute any thing like a regular inquiry into the moral rectitude or depravity of what they are about to do; or wait for the result to it. We are, for the most part, determined at once; and by an impulse which is the effect and energy of pre-established habits: and this constitution seems well adapted to the exigencies of human life and to the imbecility of our moral principle. In the current occasions and rapid opportunities of life, there is oftentimes little leisure for reflection; and were there more, a man who has to reason about his duty, when the temptation to transgress it is upon him, is almost sure to reason himself into an error.”—Prin. of Mor. and Polit. Phil. Vol. I. p. 43. In the chapter on contrary to any of these established rules, he is justly taught to regard it as decidedly unlawful, notwithstanding the advantages to which, in his own apprehension, it might lead. Mr. Gisborne, however, argues as if these were not in fact Paley's opinions, because the latter, in his second volume, has introduced an example relative to the right of the subject to resist the tyranny of civil governors, under circumstances in which it becomes unavoidable that each individual should decide for himself. Whether this, or any other exception, can be properly justified, is a question to which I shall have occasion to advert in the sequel of these observations; but what has been so clearly stated by our Author on the subject of general consequences, and more especially on habit, ought to be deemed Virtue, from which this quotation is taken, the reader will find more to the same effect; but it deserves to be noticed, that the supposed neglect of these very sentiments is always alleged by the opponents of Paley, as affording a strong argument against the truth of his system. a full confutation of the charges advanced by his opponents on this particular point. But though it is sufficiently clear that these general rules, whether derived from Scripture, from the law of the land, or from experience, require unhesitating obedience when fully understood; it is nevertheless true that many of them are expressed in terms so comprehensive as to leave much to the discretion of those to whom they are addressed. And even when their purport is free from every shade of doubt, the proper application of them in numerous cases that actually arise, must depend upon the judgment of the individual. No moral precept is more frequently inculcated in the New Testament, than that which enjoins the practice of charity; and yet in what mode it can best be applied, is a point which leaves room for much deliberation. This virtue, with all its excellence, if exercised indiscriminately, would inevitably defeat its own object; and we need scarcely to be re minded that some benevolent plans, which long attracted universal approbation, are now discovered to be indisputably errone ous. Nor can we assign any other reason for this change, than that such plans, if generally carried into execution, would be prejudicial to the welfare of the community. The congiaria distributed among the populace of ancient Rome, the stated supply of provisions to the indigent and idle by the opulent monasteries before the Reformation, and in more modern times the periodical donations of money to the poor, so long regarded as meritorious by Christians of every denomination, and which to this hour are not altogether abolished, may furnish examples of a mistaken method of relieving poverty. It is at length beginning to be understood, that whatever tends to diminish the exertions of industry, whatever habituates the poor to expect that from the charitable disposition of others which might be procured by their own activity, ought most decidedly to be condemned. We may very We may very consistently applaud the motive, while we repro с bate the measure. In what particular manner, therefore, the precept which enjoins beneficence towards those in distress can best be fulfilled,* must be left to the * Though there are few considerate persons in the present day who would not in theory readily condemn every measure which tends to promote an increase of population beyond the demand for labour, or which encourages the imprudence of marrying among the labouring classes before they possess the means of supporting a healthy offspring, yet there are many who in practice utterly disregard the maxims thus acknowledged to be essential to the welfare of society. Notwithstanding the unjust clamour raised on the subject, and which even now has not entirely subsided, the world will at length become fully sensible of the supreme value of the doctrines which Mr. Malthus has so clearly proved and illustrated in his "Essay on Population," and which the present Bishop of Chester has so ably and judiciously defended. It matters not that some few errors of minor consequence may have been discovered in the details of that work: it matters not whether the proportion there stated, between the increase of population and the means of subsistence, be perfectly correct; the leading facts, on which the whole fabric rests, have been shown by |