THE MONTHLY REVIEW, For MAY, 1774. ART. I. Eundmus; or, Dialogues concerning the Law and Conftitution of England. With an Effay on Dialogue. 8vo. 4 Vols. 14. Boards. White. 1774. THA HAT the Author of thefe Dialogues is, or has been, a profeffed lawyer, cannot be doubted; and he is fo accuftomed to the language and forms of his profeffion, that he adheres clofely to them, even in his preface. Under the character of Editor, he adopts the idea of confidering the Public as a jury. Placing himself, therefore, for a moment, on the bench, he addreffes the Public, at large, with respect to the fate of the prefent work; and declares that he lays afide any private regard for the Author, in assuming the impartiality of a judge. The gentlemen of the jury are told that the caule now before them, for their determination, is in the nature of a feigned iffue. It is not a question of damages, but a queflion of right merely; in which the Author is to be confidered as the plaintiff, and thofe readers who happen to dispute his prefent claim are the defendants. Among other language of this kind, which is carried on to a degree that cannot well be vindicated from the charge of pedantry, the Editor thus bespeaks a favourable verdict : If you fhould be of opinion that the subject interests the Public; that the form in which it is treated, is not only uncommon, but taken together with the fubject is calculated for a few hours to fupply the place of fuch books of amusement as have nothing but the form to recommend them; if you think the notions the Author has advanced are, upon the whole, fupported by the many great names that you obferve he has called as his witnesses on the prefent occafion; if you find that he has diffented with candour where he differs in opinion; if where he cenfures things, he has induftrioufly fpared perfons, or where he thought himfelf obliged to cenfure paffages he has fairly cited VOL. L. Ꮓ thems them; if you should be inclined to think rather favourably of his head, and at the fame time you find no grounds for any imputation on his heart, you will give your verdict in his favour; but if, upon the whole, you think otherwife, you will find for the defendants." Our Author, in opening his Effay on Dialogue, points out the advantages, and the antiquity, of this form of writing. With regard to its ufe of fiction, he obferves that it is a kind of poetry. It is of a double nature, didactic as well as dramatic. The didactic nature of it confifts in teaching fomething by feigned characters, and in an imaginary conversation: but the dramatic caft of the work must foften the rigour of profeffed inftruction. After confidering the didactic and dramatic qualities of the dialogue, and making fome reflections on the fcenery of the ancient dialogue, the Author fhews why imaginary characters have been preferred to real, in the prefent performance. This naturally leads him to an examination of what the ingenious Dr. Hurd has advanced upon the fubject. What is here faid, in oppofition to the fentiments of that able critic, is not unworthy of notice; though we ftill agree in opinión with Dr. Hurd, that, where it can be attained, the conducting of the dialogue, by real characters is far preferable to the ufe of imaginary ones. We do not, however, fee any fufficient reason for totally excluding the latter mode of compofition, which, on fome occafions and on fome topics, may have its peculiar advantages. In difcuffing the fubjects proper for dialogue, the Writer be-fore us contends that none are excluded by their nature from being treated in this manner, except fuch as are too abftrufe or too trifling to be fit for converfation pieces. The subject of law, fays he, in general steers very happily between these two extremes. Its connection with morality; its being what every body in fociety muft live under, and confequently know fome-thing of, will always make it an interefting and not a difficult subject for converfation. And this propriety, which stands its ground in the eye of reafon, has an additional fupport from very early example. The treatifes of Plato and Tully of this name, are still extant to vindicate the affertion. The law of England in particular, fo very liberal and diffufive in its nature, will fcarce be difputed to afford many entertaining and inftructive topics of difcourfe. One reason to recommend this way of writing on fuch fubjects, may be drawnfrom a circumftance to which law and dialogue have equally, a relation, that of " argument," by which I mean the exercife rather of a natural than artificial kind of logic.' Having fhewn that law may be properly treated in the form of dialogue, the Author proceeds to the confideration of the various various modes that have been adopted in writing on this fubject. The dialogues that have been compofed on law-matters next come in review before him, and he particularly characterizes and commends thofe of Germain and Fortefcue. He then lays before his readers a view of the prefent work; after which he makes fome remarks on feveral publications relative to the English conftitution, and paffes a high encomium on Sir Thomas Smith's "Republic of England," and Sir Bulẞtrode White. locke's "Comment on the King's Writ for choosing Members of Parliament." The effay concludes with an apology for treating on the subject of the third dialogue, after its having been fo ably difcuffed by other writers, and especially by Mr. Justice Blackstone. Our Author is far from pretending that this form of writing is the best way of becoming acquainted with the fubjects contained in thefe dialogues; much lefs, that the present are the most pleafing fubjects for this form. It is fufficient,' he obferves, for me, if what these dialogues contain has weight enough to fend any of my readers, who before were ftrangers to the fubject, to thofe great authorities, the fountain head, from whence fuch learning flows the pureft; and that this mild and engaging form is not improper for the subject itself. I fhall then, with the vanity of an Author, compare myfelf to one who in his travels over a bleak and dreary country, has picked up fome plants, which he afterwards transfers to fome delightful spot, in a milder climate; where their novelty at least may make them admired even among more agreeable productions, by those who would never have vifited them on their native foil. And if after all they should have any medicinal virtues useful in life, they will be welcome wherever they can be made to grow.' The scene of thefe dialogues is laid at the country-house of Eunomus, a lawyer of eminence in his profeffion. He is vifited, in his retreat, by Policrites, a young gentleman defigned for the fame profeffion; who, on seeing the Odyffey of Homer, opened in that part where the difcovery of Ulyffes to his aged father is fo pathetically defcribed, expreffes his regret at being obliged to quit the enchanting fcenes of fancy for the dry and intricate paths of the law. I wifh, fays he, the poets had less power of captivating the imagination, or that their power was attended with less fatal confequences to the deeper parts of learning. The foil of Parnaffus, I am fure, is barren, however pleasant the air of it is. But why fhould I blame the poets in particular, when other arts tending only to polish and refine the manners are fubject to the fame imputation? Those who are addicted to this profeffion ought to give them all up; or at leaft muft allow, that by retaining their fondness for thefe, they retard their progrefs in that. They occafion the lofs of much time, time, and, at beft, are things with which the study of the law has no manner of connection.' These remarks give rife to the subject of the firft dialogue, in which Eunomus afferts, that all arts and sciences have fome kind of connection with one another; and fhews particularly, that there is a mutual intercourfe conftantly kept up between the law and other fciences. In the illuftration of this matter, the objections of Policrites are answered, the connection between the different liberal arts is pointed out, the meaning of fuch connection is explained, and an appeal is made to inftances and examples of it in the profeffion of the law; and especially to Sir Matthew Hale, Sir Thomas More, Lord Bacon, and Lord Somers. In the farther profecution of the dialogue, Eunomus defcribes the utility that may be derived from the ancient poets and orators, and from the fpeeches of the hiftorians and the epic poets. This brings on the confideration of the queftion, whether the profeffion of the law admits of eloquence; upon which fubject our Author has expreffed himself in the following terms: I will not go fo far as to think their opinion worth an anfwer, who hold, that modern times are ftrangers to, or rather will not bear eloquence: becaufe I think they are fufficiently refuted by fact. And the notion is as deftitute of found judg ment, as it is contrary to experience. Nor do I think the notion of others is better founded, who maintain, that an English bar will not admit of eloquence, being of a nature extremely different from the courfe of judicature in Athens or Rome: from which as we are fuppofed to be acquainted with the only true models of eloquence; fo the circumftances of former times and different forms of policy are thought to exclude all others as much from the application of eloquence, as from a competition with the great orators of thofe days. I am speaking to one who knows from hiftory and his own experience, that even here the fact is directly otherwife. But was I to borrow no argument from experience, it would be enough to fay in general that eloquence is the common child of freedom and of knowledge: that in any ftate, where the maturity of its learning keeps pace with the freedom of its conftitution, men must have conftant opportunities, and they will be able to make the best use of opportunities to perfuade or refute; will find ample field for panegyric or fatire; will be able to raise or overcome occafional oppofition. All which are no other than the various modes and characters of eloquence conceived in the abftract. Nor as to the particular application of it to our profeffion, fhould I think thofe would have very firma ground to ftand on, who would argue, that in a conftitution governed by law, particularly in the very courfe of expounding that law, or debating on it, there can be no room for the free *ufe ufe of genuine eloquence: fuch as, according to the true idea of it, may command the paffions while it convinces the judgment; may bear down all oppofition, and carry every thing in triumph before it. • To explain myself, I will not fcruple to fay, an address to a jury is the field for eloquence; as an addrefs to the court is for argument. And thus (however they may accidentally intermix) the provinces of strict reasoning and of eloquence, as to the prefent application of them, are as diftinct from each other, as law and fact are. Nor yet would I fcruple to allow, that in our books much fewer inftances occur of eloquence than of logic, though I am contending, that the fame profeffion is a fchool for both. The reafon is, one is a dry independent art that borrows no affiftance from occafion, time, or place: the other is fo much indebted to all these, and above all, to the form of expreffion and the manner of the speaker, that the best account of it at fecond hand, compared to its original exertion and influence, is like a print copied from a painting of Titian's or Claude Lorain's; which may be correct enough, perhaps, as to the defign, but must be ftript of the peculiar excellence of the original, its warmth of colouring. And thus it is, that though, for instance, the Elements of Euclid, or fome pieces of Ariftotle's, are the fame to us as they were to thofe of his own times; the remains of Tully or Demofthenes are not., With these allowances, I may venture to add, that fome few fpecimens in the State Trials may be looked upon as excellent inftances in this profeffion, both of argument and of eloquence: though I confefs for the latter, it is always better worth while to confult the times, than any books whatever." The Author next makes a tranfition to hiftory, the usefulness of which to the ftudy of the law, is judiciously displayed. But we are not equally fatisfied with what he has put into the mouth of Policrites, with regard to our hiftorical writers. I am so far, fays he, from denying the ufe of history, English hiftory I mean, that in my opinion, if any thing has a direct and immediate connection with law, it is this. I rather wonder, fo little of this kind has been left us by perfons of this profeffion. For who can be supposed to be better acquainted with the conftitution, than those whole province it is to defend it in fo many fhapes; and who, from the nature of their ftation, are most converfant in records, the pillars of hiftory? who, from their acquaintance with evidence, the manner of ftating facts diftinctly, and examining what is or is not probable, can better fill up the draught of history as it is left us by one of the beft judges of antiquity?" Nequid falfi dicere audeat, nequid veri non audean"-Perhaps it would be a slender commendation, where the track itself has been fo little frequented in this country, to say 23 none |