CHAPTER IV.

ON SEEING THE UNSEEN.

RETURNING to the thought, that on an imperfect premiss a mere process of inference, or of observation, or even of both combined, conducts us not to knowledge, but to results which still embody ignorance, a practical question arises By what process is the completion of the premiss effected? How may we know that the ignorance which vitiated the process at the first is no longer present? The answer is not at once obvious. For the problem to be solved arises not merely from the ignorance in which we start, but from the limitation also of our perception. Our course would be simple, if all we had to do were to use our observing faculties, and formulate according to our best reason the data presented to them; but it is not this. No formulating with whatever strictness or subtlety of reason of things perceived, or by any means whatever capable of being brought within perception will suffice; because the problem is how to fill up the gap in our perception, and supply aright elements which not only are unperceived at first, but to the last continue unperceivable. The gravity of the heavenly bodies is an instance. The gravitating motion, or tendency, not only is not presented to our first or casual observation, it remains equally hidden from the last and most refined; indeed, it is certain that so long as the stellar order remains undisturbed it never can be presented in relation to the bodies to which it is applied. Gravity, as a falling motion, or tendency to fall, cannot be " observed" in the regular movements either of star, planet, or satellite; the

bodies approach one another indeed, but they recede to an equal extent; falling is no more visible than recession; attraction no more obvious to the senses than repulsion. No amount of observation, nor of reasoning, upon things observed in their motions would have had any tendency to result in the present interpretation of them: in truth, both observation and reasoning had been tried, and well tried; had done probably all that was possible for them to do. The natural result of such exercise of man's faculties was that which they produced-suppositions of powers in the sun to produce rotatory motions around it; or similar hypotheses answering to that which observation presented to man's belief. Now, the nature of the error in all such suppositions is manifest; namely, that they were suppositions correspondent to the impressions that observation gave; and so embodying its imperfection. The explanation of the motions by gravity is an explanation by means of something that was seen not in them, but in something else; namely, in the fall of bodies to the earth. It introduces into our thoughts of those motions an element which, in them, is unperceivable. We may express this fact by saying, that the true explanation of the planetary motions was given by recognising in another thing something visible in them; the demand was for seeing an invisible, and this was the mode in which it was fulfilled.

Now, in this instance, there is presented to us an unusual law, rendered necessary by the fact of this limitation of our perceiving powers. Granted, the fact of this limitation, this law obviously follows; and we see in it the basis of a fact now recognised in Science, that a true scientific" induction " is by no means a mere inference from collected observations, but "a guess verified." That it must be so is evident; for only by this means can a complete basis of reality be given to our con

clusions; the gaps in our perception being supplied not by our own suppositions but by realities presented by Nature. For in this way Nature herself gives the key to her own hidden things. And thus it is not difficult to understand the assurance of truth which is given by this kind of evidence. It is Nature furnishing us the key to her own proceedings. The thing which we suppose is no invention of our own, but is a reality, and one which we are bound to believe existing everywhere, unless it be proved absent. So in respect to Gravity-Newton's own claim for it was that in suggesting it he did not "invent hypotheses" but adduced a "true true cause

ניי

-a cause

known to exist, visibly existing, in Nature. If we consider the evidence on which the explanation of the heavenly motions of gravity rests, we find that it has no other ground whatever than that all the appearances observed, agree with it, and that the cause assigned is one that is also seen on something else; that is presented to us also under a different form. And if the reader will test his convictions farther, he will find also (I believe) that he is unable even to imagine any other or farther proof as possible to be given of any account of natural phenomena, beyond this, that the cause assigned absolutely agrees with the phenomena, and that it is a thing which can be seen elsewhere in Nature.

1 Hypotheses non fingo.

CHAPTER V.

THOUGHT AND ART.

How strange it is that logic has been set up as a complete rule or mode by which thinking is performed. For logic is the expression of that which all do after a certain fashion, which every one can do perfectly who has been trained in the use of logical forms. It is related to thought, as architectural drawing which every one can do who has learned to use a ruler and compasses is to paintings. This ruler-and-compass-work, observe, is not exactly unrelated to true painting; it is in every true picture (or in all true thinking) at once present and not present. It is there, but with so much more that it is only discoverable by taking away.

Thinking, indeed, is no mere mechanical process; it is a great Art, the chief of all the Arts; nay, it is both an Art and a work; it has the attractions of an Art and the positive results of a Science. Those only can be called thinkers who have a native gift, a special endowment for the work, and have been trained, besides, by assiduous culture. When others attempt to think it should be understood that the results of such attempts have the same kind of value that belongs to amature paintings. In the one case as in the other, what most cultivated men should seek and expect is the capacity—not to do the work-but to enjoy and appropriate the work of others. And indeed though we continually assume that every one is capable of thinking, do we not all feel that there is somehow a fallacy in this assumption. Do we not feel that what people set up as their "reasons" for

disbelieving or believing a particular doctrine are often nothing of the sort, but merely statements which would be at once discarded were it not for the opinions held.

These reasons are often to be found accompanying widely-spread beliefs; but although the arguments may be dismissed, it would be very foolish to suppose that it is of no importance what innumerable people have thought. The things that made them think as they did must have their full weight. In fact the more monstrous and repugnant in any way an opinion is, the more powerful must have been the forces which compelled men to adopt it. In the true opinion, then, forces must be present, but balanced.

If thinking be one of the Fine Arts, will not a comparison of its history with that of the so-called Arts throw light on both? May we not find a correspondence even in the details of their course? May we not even get guidance for the future-guidance in thinking, the hardest of the Arts from the study of the easier and therefore the earlier developed ones. Nay, the object of Art, we know, is to "interpret Nature." May not the Arts render this service best by acting as guides and servitors to the great interpreter of Nature, Thought? Bacon supposed, and our modern philosophy supposes also, that the only materials which can legitimately be made use of by thought are those supplied to it by the senses under the form of observation and experiment. The consequence has been a disunion and even strife between Thought and the Art feeling which should have been its servant. For all Art and all observation are members of one body built up into one head-which is Thought.

Our present Art and what we now call "Thought" (i.e., Science and Metaphysics) are two halves. Each is imperfect alone. Art is so merely fanciful, and Thought