Political Determinants of Corporate Governance: Political Context, Corporate Impact

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Oxford University Press, 2003 - 231 páginas
In a painstaking analysis, Roe (law, Harvard Law School) examines the impact of a nation's strong social policies on the corporate governance, suggesting that stronger social policies can cause an American style of diffuse ownership among shareholders to fail. The link between social policies and corporate governance is examined statistically for a large number of countries, and in case studies for seven: Italy, Germany, Sweden, the UK, France, Japan, and the US. Product markets, securities markets, and the ability of corporate and economic structures to induce a political backlash are discussed. Annotation (c)2003 Book News, Inc., Portland, OR (booknews.com).
 

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Contenido

Introduction
1
Political Conflict and the Corporation
11
Peace as Predicate
13
The Wealthy Wests Differing Corporate Governance Structures
16
A General Theory
21
Social Conflict and the Institutions of Corporate Governance
27
Raising the Stakes
29
Reducing Shareholders Power to Control Managers
38
The Direction of Causality
109
1
111
11
116
32
121
21
137
27
158
Corporate Laws Limits
159
Figures
170

Data
47
LIST OF GRAPHS AND FIGURES
51
Data and Confirmation
53
Nation by Nation
55
France
65
Germany
71
Italy
83
Japan
92
Sweden
94
United Kingdom
98
United States
104
Extending the Sample?
106
29
189
38
190
Unifying Two Political Theories
197
Acknowledgements
205
49
217
Index
221
71
225
94
226
98
228
106
229
Derechos de autor

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Political Determinants of Corporate Governance: Political Context, Corporate ...
Mark J. Roe
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Términos y frases comunes

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Acerca del autor (2003)

Mark J. Roe is Berg Professor Law at the Harvard Law School. He has previously held positions at Columbia University School of Law; University of Pennsylvania School of Law; and Rutgers University School of Law. His publications include Corporate Reorganization and Bankruptcy: Legal and Financial Materials (Foundation Press, 2000) and Strong Managers, Weak Owners: The Political Roots of American Corporate Finance (Princeton University Press, 1994).

Información bibliográfica

TítuloPolitical Determinants of Corporate Governance: Political Context, Corporate Impact
Clarendon lectures in management studies
AutorMark J. Roe
Ediciónilustrada, reimpresa
EditorOxford University Press, 2003
ISBN0199205302, 9780199205301
Largo231 páginas
  
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