eyes of his countrymen and of foreigners, and no one can know better or, at least, ought to know better-what the real capabilities of these vessels are; so that the opinion he expresses will, we think, put an end to the attempts which have repeatedly been made to Americanize our Navy by the wholesale introduction of monitors. For special services monitors are, undoubtedly, to be preferred to sailing iron-clads: and we are, therefore, pleased to find that vessels of this kind, but of an improved type, have been added to our Navy during the last year or two; but for general cruising services it will be hard to find a better type than is presented by the most recent French and English broadside iron-clads, unless rigged turret-ships, such as the Monarch or Captain, are multiplied.

The essential difference in type between American and European iron-clads, has to a great extent prevented that close competition which has existed between our ships and the French; and, on the other hand, the resemblances between English and French iron-clads are very much due to the closeness of the competition. Rival designers have naturally scanned each other's work closely, and been ready to profit by each other's experience; so that, in some respects, we have followed the French models; and, in others, they have followed ours. For example, they led us to adopt what is known as "complete protection," in some ships-that is, armour plating the whole broadside from stem to stern-by following that plan in La Gloire, and nearly all their early vessels; while we taught them the advantage of "partial protection "—that is, armour plating only certain parts of the broadside. From the first, however, there were considerable differences, as well as resemblances, between the two fleets. The French continued to build mainly in wood, while we preferred iron in most cases. They built broadside ships only for some years; we soon commenced turret ships, on Captain Coles' plan. And, although we have not built many altogether, we have continued to build them ever since; whereas, the French have now, we believe, only one true turret vessel, the monitor Onondaga, purchased from the Americans a year or two ago. At present we have two coast-defence turret-ships and one coast-defence monitor, two sea-going monitors, and four rigged turret-ships-nine in all. And our superiority to the French in this respect is by no means the least important feature in the contrast between the two fleets.

Another most important feature, and one on which much stress has repeatedly been laid, is the want of homogeneity, or uniformity, in the ships of our navy, as compared with the French vessels. Our broadside frigates, for example, have lengths varying between 260 feet VOL. IV., N. S. 1870.

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and 400 feet; while the French frigates have lengths ranging between 260 feet and 290 feet. A most remarkable illustration of the variety characterising our ships was afforded, last autumn, by the squadron assembled under the nominal command of the First Lord of the Admiralty. There were three ships, of which the length was 400 feet; two about 330 feet, and one 300 feet, long; and four between 270 and 280 feet in length; besides a corvette 225 feet long. To these we might have added the Warrior, and two other ships, 380 feet long; and we should then have had a fairly representative group of our ships. The chief cause of this variety is to be found in the extreme lengths given to the six first-class iron-clads of earliest design, represented respectively by the Warrior, 380 feet long, and the Minotaur, 400 feet long; and it must be regretted that these dimensions should have been adopted, even though these vessels are the grandest specimens of naval architecture contained in our navy. Their designers, doubtless, intended to gain high speed, and they succeeded, but at an unnecessary cost; for our fastest ironclads, the Monarch and the Hercules, are both about 330 feet long-that is, 50 feet shorter than the Warrior—yet the one has steamed nearly 15 knots, and the other a little less than 14 knots, per hour; while the Warrior's speed does not exceed 144 knots. In addition to this, the long ships can only be turned with great difficulty, while the shorter vessels can be handled with ease-a feature on which naval officers lay great stress. At full speed the Minotaur takes about 7 minutes to turn completely round, and traverses a circle of 940 yards diameter in turning; the Hercules turns at full speed in 4 minutes, and moves in a circle of only 560 yards diameter. In view of these remarkable performances, it is not surprising to find the shorter ships preferred by naval men, especially as they are more strongly armoured and armed. The Warrior's and Minotaur's sides are of nearly equal strength, and are equivalent to 5-inch armour backed by nine inches of teak. The Monarch has 7-inch armour, and the Hercules 8-inch and 9-inch armour, with equal, or even greater, thicknesses of teak behind the plates. The change to moderate length must, therefore, be approved; and, though there are such great differences in dimensions among our armoured ships, it is satisfactory to find that they can act together in squadrons, both under sail and under steam. These squadrons could not, of course, proceed at the high speeds named above; but they could move at moderate speeds, and probably be able to compete in this respect with their French rivals. The want of manoeuvring power in our longest ships is the most serious point of inferiority in our squadrons

as compared with the French, and this has been to some extent removed by supplying mechanical steering apparatus to some of these vessels.

Turning next to the offensive and defensive powers of iron-clad ships, we may include the American vessels in the comparison. La Gloire and the Warrior both have armour about 4 inches thick; but, taking the backing also into account, the latter has probably the strongest side. This protection was devised in order to resist the most powerful naval gun of that period-a 68-pounder, smooth bore, weighing 4 tons-and it succeeded. In nearly all our ships laid down before the close of 1862, the protecting armour is of about the same thickness, or the side is of about equal strength with the Warrior's. The Minotaur, for example, has 5-inch armour; but she has only 9-inch teak backing, instead of 18-inch, like the Warrior, -and experiments at Shoeburyness showed the two targets to be of about equal strength. The French showed us the way to increased protection, by adopting armour nearly 6 inches thick, in the Flandre class, early in 1861; and in 1863 we put ourselves in the front, by protecting the Bellerophon with 6-inch plates, backed by 10 inches of teak and an "inner-skin" (as it is called) of iron, 1 inches thick. This was proved to be a very much stronger target than any which had been previously constructed to represent a ship's side. During this time the weight and power of naval guns had been developing rapidly, and instead of the 68-pounder being the most powerful gun, we had guns proposed to throw 600-pound projectiles, the weight of which was no less than 25 tons. Our designers, therefore, made a long stride in advance in the armour of the Hercules, commenced in 1865, and produced a target which represented the ship's side in the most vital parts, and was capable of resisting the 600-pounder gun. Armour of 9, 8, and 6 inches is carried by this vessel; and by her construction we took the lead of the French in thickness of armour. They have stopped at plates a little less than 9 inches thick; we have gone on to plating 11 and 12 inches thick in our ships designed within the last two or three years. Besides this, we have made much greater advances in the modes of backing armour plates; and our ships, on this account, have a greater superiority over those of the French than is indicated by the mere comparison of their thicknesses of armour. So far, therefore, there is good reason for congratulating ourselves on the possession of the strongest iron-clads. Let us next see how our ships compare with the American monitors.

These vessels are, in nearly all cases, protected by what is termed

"laminated" armour-that is to say, armour made up of several layers of plates, each 1 inch in thickness, riveted together. This is, of course, much cheaper than the solid armour used in French and English iron-clads; but it is also much weaker. In the early days of armour-plating, Mr. Hawkshaw proposed the "laminated" system for our ships; but, after making experiments on targets built for the purpose, the Iron Plate Committee considered it far inferior to the solid armour we have adopted from the first. The Americans were, probably, led to adopt it on account of the impossibility of procuring solid plates from their iron manufacturers during the war; and it served their purpose very fairly. But, on the other hand, the comparative success which attended their monitors in the attacks on Charleston and other ports, affords no proof of the sufficient strength of the armour, because they had only to resist guns far inferior to those carried in European ships. The first monitor had a total thickness of 5 inches of armour; and this also forms the protection of the vessels which did most service during the War. It probably does not exceed in shot-resisting power 3 or 4 inches of solid iron; but, in some cases, it is aided by narrow plank armour fitted into the backing. The enormous thicknesses of timber backing-3 or 3 feet of oak in some ships-admit of this being done without inconvenience; and this fact has led to great misconceptions respecting the strength of the armour. For example, Americans are very fond of referring to vessels, with "14 inches of iron" on their sides, which were laid down four or five years ago; but, on examination, it appears that 8 inches out of the 14 are made up of narrow armour planks, and that the remaining 6 inches are made up of two thicknesses. What the exact reduction in strength may be, it is impossible to say; but it is certain that a combination of such a character cannot be compared with the compactly constructed side of one of our latest monitors, with 12-inch solid plates and 18 inches of teak behind them; and it may be doubted whether it equals the waterline protection of the Hercules. In armour, therefore, our ships surpass all their rivals.

In guns our superiority is scarcely less marked. The French have favoured the breech-loading system for their heaviest rifled guns, and mainly on this account have failed to keep pace with us. Reports have at various times been in circulation of accidents on board their vessels; and, in spite of the secresy which is usually maintained on these matters, the opinion is widely spread that, sooner or later, radical changes will have to be made in the character of their naval ordnance. To make a comparison between their guns and ours is

difficult. Mr. Reed states that their heaviest guns, weighing a little less than 22 tons, is considered about equal in penetrating power to our 18-ton guns. If so, we have the 25-ton gun in reserve, as a far more powerful weapon. The Americans have gone on until quite recently casting enormous smooth-bore guns throwing spherical shot, and have been loud in their praise of the "battering power" of their ordnance. There is no necessity, however, for discussing the question now, because the most competent authority on the subject-the American Ordnance Committee-has strongly condemned the system in a report presented last year. In this report it is stated, roundly, that "to return to smooth-bores throwing huge spherical masses with low velocities, is to disregard all modern progress in the science of gunnery, and to go back to the arms in use two centuries ago." Our gun-makers, we need hardly say, have followed a different plan from both the French and the Americans. Having tried the Armstrong breech-loaders and found them wanting, they had recourse to muzzleloading rifled guns, throwing elongated projectiles at very high velocities. At present our most powerful broadside iron-clad, the Hercules, carries 18-ton 400-pounder guns; the turret-ships, Captain and Monarch, carry 25-ton 600-pounders; our new monitors are to carry 30-ton guns; and heavier guns are talked of. We need not hurry the construction of heavier guns, however, so far as we can judge; for experiments show that scarcely any foreign iron-clad afloat would be safe against our 25-ton guns at a range of two miles; and, within anything like a moderate distance, our 18-ton and 12-ton guns would probably suffice to penetrate them.

The great question of the present time respecting our guns is, not not so much their penetrating power as their endurance. The immediate cause of this discussion was the damage done to some of the 18-ton guns of the Hercules during gun-practice in January last, of which notices have appeared in the daily papers, and on which remarks have been made in the House of Commons. From Mr. Childers' statement it appears that the matter is not at all serious, and that the principal damage was caused by defective projectiles, which broke up before leaving the gun; so that the real powers of the guns themselves are not at all affected, and the recurrence of similar accidents may be prevented. Whether this will be the final settlement of the question, we do not profess to say; but of this we may be certain, that our guns are at present superior to those carried by any foreign ships.

On the question of the speeds of our own and other iron-clads, very few remarks must suffice. Mr. Reed has thrown the facts