ness, though Hamilton's loudest note-a note loud, indeed, only, so to speak, to the deafening and stunning out of all opposition-cannot surely be worth much, seeing that, maugre all the mighty things so defiantly ascribed to it, not only the analysis of philosophy is still necessary, but precisely that to and on which consciousness directly testifies and expressly reports remains 'incomprehensible,' 'incognisable,' 'unknown,' 'zero!' And secondly, that, if it is the business of philosophy to analyse and discriminate the elements of this same object of the testimony and report of consciousness, philosophy must be hardly yet fit for its business, not only because what it pretends to analyse and discriminate is admitted by itself to remain, all the same, incomprehensible, incognisable, unknown, zero, but because the actual analysis to which, despite this foregone conclusion of impossibility, it yet very strangely commits itself, is in itself so contradictory, unsatisfactory, and equivocal.

Of this analysis, for example-to dwell here a single moment there are two different estimates actually given in! One is that the external reality is 6, the organ 3, and the mind 3; while the other, retaining the external reality and the organ, though at the new values of 4 each, substitutes for the mind all that intervenes between the reality and the organ-the air presumably—and at a value also of 4! Now, the two estimates differing, we may reasonably conclude that the thing is, as the phrase goes, not quite reliable yet. But how different all this is to the standard of common sense which Hamilton himself sets up-how different

to his own express and most emphatic allegations elsewhere! How different to all his own 'natural convictions of mankind!' Common sense believes the book it sees just to be the book, and Hamilton asserts existence and cognition to be convertible-asserts the external reality itself to be only one object, and this only one object to be the only one object of perception. Yet here we find that when philosophy is put to ‘its business' by Hamilton, it results that, of the total object perceived, the external reality constitutes only a half, perhaps only a third! Again, we are told that the perceptive object is no modification of the ego, that it is only the non-ego: yet here the business of philosophy actually declares the ego to form a fourth, a third, or even a half of this same object! Philosophy, to be sure, only says this-philosophy cannot do this. Or, indeed, is any such power still retained among the initiated of the master? Will any descendant of the prophet kindly show us either the 6 or the 4 of the external reality-say the book? Either will satisfy us; we shall be quite contented with the 4. That being given us, we cheerfully promise not to say one word of either organ or mind-that being given us, indeed, we cheerfully promise to be silent even on the air! What was so emphatically declared one is now, indeed, triple, even quadruple; but this, too, we shall pass in silence-give us but the external reality itself, be it 6, be it 4, be it 1. If, on the other hand, it should appear that this cannot be done that the external reality itself, the substantia nuda, cannot be shown-unless the book itself, the whole book, and

nothing but the book be this-then will it be too much for us to say that, to declare a thing impossible, next, nevertheless, to call this thing the business proper of philosophy, and, lastly, to claim to perform this business, exhibit this thing, but in such manner as only to restore the initial impossibility-on all this it will be enough to say nothing.

Then, again, as regards consciousness, what, after all, are we to think of it? It is a small matter that this so autocratic and infallible consciousness stands in need still of the analysis of philosophy; but surely Hamilton himself would admit that the one and only object of the testimony-of the report of consciousness is the book and nothing but the book; surely he would admit that consciousness as consciousness-for it is to philosophy, and not to consciousness as consciousness (which is common sense, or 'the natural conviction of mankind'), that he attributes the analysis and discrimination-knows not that there is a 3 of the mind, a 4 of the air, or a 3 or 4 of the organ-knows not that what is truly external is, as estimated by Hamilton himself, but, or even, perhaps, but of what it discerns-knows not that this which it discerns is really 12! Surely this is so. But, if this is so, then consciousness errs. In assuming the whole 12 to be the external reality, which it most undoubtedly does, it errs by at least, and by at most! But, in such arithmetic, can either error be considered insignificant? Is it at all unfair to suggest, then, that, if consciousness errs in assuming or to be external reality which is not external reality, consciousness

may err also in the remainder of the sum, be it or be it only ? And, in such a case, may we not say, then, with Hamilton himself and the saying is an argument to which he wholly trusts himself ' if consciousness be confessed to yield a lying evidence in one particular, it cannot be adduced as a credible witness at all,-falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus?'

It may be said that these analyses are only supposititious, only illustrative. We willingly grant the former epithet-we hardly see the pertinence of the latter. Illustrative! Well, it is illustrative of what we shall have perpetually before us throughout the whole of the present inquest-Hamiltonian contradiction, Hamiltonian futility;—this within, while without, guns, drums, trumpets, gesticulation, and assertion proclaim the advance of an athlete that is to throw a Kant, that is to fling a Hegel. But, grant it to be only an illustration, this illustration, referring to an alleged analysis, must constitute, surely, with the analysis, a legitimate object of discussion. Or if the analysis, indeed, is naught, why the illustration?—or why any talk of it at all?

But let us tear ourselves away from these endless subordinate contradictions, and consider, at last, the question before which we, in effect, stand:-Why has Hamilton, at the same time that he holds all our knowledge to be phenomenal only, unequivocally asserted presentationism as well? This question may be put more fully thus:-What were the reasons which, though unexpressed, were so present to

Hamilton's mind that he perceived no contradiction in, and was never led to offer any apology for, the opposed assertions, now that things in themselves were incomprehensible, incognisable, unknown, zero, and now that they were immediately, intuitively, and face to face, known? Or at shortest:-Why did Hamilton, without sense of contradiction, as it seems, assert at once knowledge and ignorance-of things in themselves?

Now, as already intimated, the answer here is to be found in our last two extracts but one, and we may state it to run (as if Hamilton spoke) thus:-I do perceive the non-ego, and therefore I am a presentationist; but I only perceive it phenomenally, and therefore I am a phenomenalist. Further, first, I know that I do perceive the non-ego, both by the testimony of consciousness and the analysis of philosophy; and, second, I know myself to perceive only phenomenally, 'Because,' as I say elsewhere, '1°, Existence is not cognisable absolutely and in itself, but only in special modes; 2°, Because these modes can be known only if they stand in a certain relation to our faculties; and, 3o, Because the modes, thus relative to our faculties, are presented to, and known by, the mind only under modifications determined by these faculties themselves.' (Meta. i. 148.

To take the last point in this answer first, or the modality, relativity, and modifiedness of existence as known-this Hamilton merely asserts. He assumes it to be a fact, an ultimate fact, which, to be admitted, needs only to be understood. He condescends to no rationale: he never dreams of dispute. Relation, mode,