art and science of them all, government, man's unquenchable passion for dignity and self-improvement may make him impatient of the slow gait of democracy. The successful blending of democracy and efficiency, therefore, becomes the most urgent and important problem of the morrow. Can such a blend be effected? Or does every increase in administrative efficiency withdraw just that much of democratic flavor and freedom?

The problem, as I see it, is how to inculcate a greater respect for representative government into the holders of administrative power, "the efficiency boys," and at the same time to inject more administrative efficiency into popular assemblies, "the political boys." One of the hard-learned truths that we tend to forget, because of blurred perspectives, is that representation is the essence of the democratic process. The health of popular government is measured by the efficiency of the popular assembly-be it Congress, State legislature, or municipal council-and the degree of confidence people have in it. Tested by this criterion, therefore, we have reason to be disturbed about our center of political gravity, the legislative assembly. One of the most able men in Congress confided to me, shortly before I left Washington, that he hated to admit in a corner drug store that he was a Congressman. His sensitivity was not atypical. Why this inferiority complex? Partly, I think, it is due to the uncomplimentary remarks found in the press and among one's constituents. Among some Congressmen, this one included, it is partly a reflection of dissatisfaction with Congress' institutional shortcomings, which, fortunately, a growing number are determined to correct. In no small part it is the natural reaction of an elected representative who sees the increasing power and prestige of the executive. Whatever the cause, this collective inferiority complex bodes ill for democracy, if allowed to continue, and must, therefore, be got rid of.

We public administrators can contribute to a sounder outlook on the part of elected representatives if we will only consider our own unthinking attitudes and take the necessary steps to change them. Business executives and Government officials alike suffer from a delusion which is due to insufficient perspective. One of the significant and disturbing things I learned in the course of a study of big business organization and management a few years ago, is that our country's top executives apparently believe in a benevolent but unbridled rule. Our corporate boards of directors have become typically officer boards instead of the traditional representative boards composed primarily of owners and public representatives. These executives are apparently satisfied that first-hand knowledge of the company's affairs qualifies them for policy making and decisions as it does not businessmen from related walks of life. Said one, "Officer boards are here to stay. If the public can't trust us, they can't trust anyone. But with few exceptions, they can trust us." How familiar this theory of benevolent rule sounds to the student of political history and instituions. If more businessmen possessed historical perspective, they would see the errors of so arrogant a complacency. Let them read the Federalist. Let them consult the founders of our political system, who learned the hard way that unbridled power is ultimately abused, that democratic checks are

Bureaucracy and Trusteeship in Large Corporations, Temporary National Economic Committee, vol. XI (Government Printing Office, 1940).

everywhere necessary, that policy making and execution should be parceled out among different sets of officials, that democratic control is the price we must pay for freedom and the private ownership of wealth. We have not learned, apparently, that the essence of free enterprise is trusteeship, a trusteeship by public representatives and not by salaried officials.

Unless we are careful, we governmental executives run the danger of making the same mistake. The conditions are the same. The executive branch has a first-hand experience with laws, the legislature does not; the executive has the research staff which can provide him with the knowledge that is power; the legislature has a totally inadequate staff; administrative establishments have superior personnel and facilities for drafting legislation. The result is that administrators become impatient with the slow-moving legislature and secretly contemptuous of its poorer facilities. Legislators soon learn of this. Their retaliative instinct is to put the bureaucrat in his place and, as a rule, he deserves to be slapped down.

But, taking another view of the matter, what the legislator needs most is to restore the center of gravity to his own institution by acquiring the organization, the coordination, and the personnel to do for himself what the administrator is otherwise forced to do because he has the facilities which the legislature lacks. That is why I say it is a two-way proposition: the administrator must change his attitude, the legislator improve his techniques.

II

In 1934, just 10 years ago, W. F. Willoughby wrote his Principles of Legislative Organization and Administration. It is not a scintillating book such as Woodrow Wilson's Congressional Government or James Bryce's Modern Democracies, but it is a sound and scholarly work. In this comprehensive treatise, based upon years of first-hand observation in Washington, Willoughby applied the principles and techniques of public administration to the organization and functioning of our National Legislative Assembly. A program for restoring to Congress its self-esteem and efficiency is contained in it.

Recently the movement for congressional reform has received new momentum, due in no small part to the work of the committee on Congress of the American Political Science Association, under the able chairmanship of George Galloway. Roland Young has supplied penetrating analyses and practical recommendations in his book, This Is Congress, published in 1943. It begins to look as though administrative reform might really take place, for in the Seventy-eighth Congress no less than 50 proposals were advanced by Members of that body looking toward better staffing, simplification of the committee system, improving the liaison between Congress and the executive branch, and more effective criticism and control over the administrative establishments.

Applying the principles and precepts of public administration to Congress, these are some of the measures that seem indicated: First, any institution must define and constantly redefine its objectives. As

This committee, originally appointed in 1941, met frequently for 3 years with Members of Congress and influential members of the press. See Galloway's article, On Reforming Congress, in the June 1944 issue of Free World.

applied to Congress, this means that it must define its functions more precisely. It must put first things first if it is to be effective-this is the law of success in all fields of endeavor. The two most important functions of the legislature are to make laws, which involves factfinding and deliberation, and to exercise systematic surveillance over the work of the executive agencies. The Legislature itself should not attempt to administer its own laws, for, as John Stuart Mill so convincingly argued, it is not equipped for this task either by composition or aptitude. If the Legislature is to be the center of governmental gravity, it must rigorously unburden itself of all delegable and less essential duties and concentrate upon those which are indispensable. The time-consuming settlement of private claims, the government of the District of Columbia, and private bill legislation should be transferred to special procedures or to self-governing agencies. Something analogous to the British "provisional order" procedure would take care of a substantial part of it.

After the jurisdiction of Congress has been redefined the next step is to organize in such a way that each major function will be taken care of by an appropriate and simple mechanism. Congress is splintered at present because of the multiplicity of its committees-80 in all, not to mention the special investigating committees which at times number almost as many. The committee system should be consolidated with the following considerations in mind: First, major fields of public policy should be determined, such as defense, foreign relations, social services, agriculture, and business-possibly a dozen in all; then there should be a complete correspondence between the committees of the two Houses, which cannot be said to exist at the present time; and, finally, the committee structure should correspond as closely as possible with the major functional divisions of the executive departments and establishments.

The next major step is coordination, the integration of component parts into a smoothly operating and responsible mechanism. Congress at present is bewildered because its parts are so scattered. Each Senator, on the average, is supposed to serve on no less than six separate committees.

The House

said Woodrow Wilson in Congressional Government

has as many leaders as there are subjects of legislation. goes its own way at its own pace.

Each committee

The best solution that has been thought of is to coordinate the committees, once their number has been reduced to a workable size, through a legislative cabinet. A joint steering body, composed of committee chairmen, would prepare and initiate legislation. This plan would give us one of the best features of the cabinet plan. Moreover, it would help to protect the country against the raids of special interests, for, as Woodrow Wilson pointed out, the multiplicity of existing committees opens the way to the power and manipulation of lobbyists.10 It is encouraging to note that since 1931 eight States have created "legislative councils" similar to what is here recommended.

8 Congressional Government, pp. 60-61. Cf. Congressman: A Case History-A Report on How Congress Works, and How It Might Be Made To Work Better, Fortune, April 1943, p. 183. Roland Young, op. cit., pp. 247-256.

10 Op. cit., p. 190.

Coordination would be further strengthened if both major political parties would return to decision by caucus on all major legislative issues. The political party introduces an element of responsibility into our Presidential system which is badly needed; but when neither the majority nor the minority acts in concert on important matters, but members of both parties feel free to jump party fences whenever the spirit moves them, we are left with a hopelessly confused situation bordering upon the anarchic. It is upon such situations that the lobbyists thrive.

Objectives defined and organization and coordination strengthened, we come next to the question of adequate staffing for the lawmaking function. Consider the situation as it exists today. During the first session of the Seventy-eighth Congress a total of 384 laws was enacted, of which 219 were public and 165 were private measures. The House passed 795 bills and resolutions, the Senate 702. During this same period, appropriation bills totaling 114 billions in direct appropriations were enacted into law. This enormous task was accomplished by legislators overburdened with as many as 7 committee assignments, assisted by 278 clerks and messengers, average salary $2,625, representing a total expenditure for clerk hire by the 80 committees and 531 Members of well under $5,000,000. When Congress starves itself by underpaying a wholly inadequate administrative staff, is it any wonder that its fact-finding, lawmaking function suffers and that, increasingly, legislation originates in the executive branch, where personnel is adequate and salaries comparatively better? The point has been graphically driven home by Senator La Follette :

One of the traditional powers of Congress over the executive is supposedly control over the purse strings. Obviously, that control cannot be exercised intelligently unless Congress has the facilities and the expert staff to appraise and evaluate appropriations just as the Budget Bureau does. Yet the annual appropriation for the staff of the Bureau of the Budget is 13 times as large as the appropriations for the staff of the Senate and House Committees on Appropriations combined."

The remedy is clear: Get a sufficient, well-paid and well-qualified staff, and organize it around the important committees and the Legislative Reference Service. Knowledge is power. Lack of knowledge is dependency.

Finally, in our list of administrative topics as applied to Congress we come to control, which is most simply defined as checking up on results and holding people responsible. This is the second of the major functions of Congress, but its controls have never been adequately organized or regularized. Congressional investigations, one of the legislature's principal weapons, was aptly characterized by Woodrow Wilson as a fishing expedition, sweeping the dirty corners, locking the barn door after the horse is stolen. Congress must develop a technique whereby executive officers, from Cabinet members down, can be brought before it, asked for information, and allowed to give explanations whenever it sees fit. Nothing would do more to alleviate the current legislative-executive jealousy and rebuild the self-esteem of Congress. And it would be good for the Executives as well. If they revealed an inability to get along with the public, which Congressman Ramspeck says is an indispensable characteristic of an Executive, they would soon have to develop it. Congressman

11 A Senator Looks at Congress, Atlantic Monthly, July 1943, pp. 91–96.

Kefauver's resolution proposes a workable solution, a question period similar to that found in the British Parliament but without membership in the legislative body.

If even this minimum reform were adopted by Congress, it would go far toward tightening up the loose joints and making the process of legislation more efficient. But would it be as democratic? Yes, I am confident that it would, for democracy is not disjointedness and sprawling cumbersomeness. It is rationality and competence. How else can the difficult adjustments within our national economy and in the orderly relations among nations be brought to a sure and speedy solution? For every task there is an appropriate mechanism. If the mechanism fails, then the plan fails and we are pitched into a dangerous impasse.

III

The executive branch not only needs a deep and abiding respect for the people's elected representatives but it must further strengthen its own administrative efficiency. Weaknesses in the organization structure of the popular assembly are not as serious as weaknesses in the administrative mechanism, for the latter must carry the brunt of the operating load. An imperfect law can often be repaired by resourceful administration, but poor enforcement will render ineffectual the best of legislation.

Most of the faults which have been noted in the legislative branch are found also in the executive establishment. Despite marked improvements in recent years, a further sharpening of objectives and elimination of nonessentials is needed; inadequate coordination is the chief weakness of all; staffing has been improved but is still unsatisfactory in strategic areas; while adequate supervision and control could and should be widely strengthened. Though there is reason to be encouraged because of what has been accomplished in Federal administration in recent years, we would be inexcusably complacent if we were to gloss over remaining deficiencies. Our national administration carries a heavier managerial load, because of its_variety and complexity, than the country's largest corporations.12 Just as Congress must dispose of minor and unessential duties before it will be free to concentrate upon the central needs, so also the administration must lighten its burden by turning back to State and local authorities any functions which can be managed with social effectiveness at that level. The number of such possibilities may not be great, but the resulting benefit would be surprisingly large from the standpoint of Federal manageability. Even greater potentialities inhere in regionalization and decentralized Federal administration. Executive Washington should make and control policy and delegate to field enforcement as much of its actual execution as possible. The principle applicable here is analogous to the rule which applies in the case of Congress. In the techniques of devolution, Washington can learn much from such corporate governments as the American Telephone & Telegraph Corp. and General Motors.

Congress is suspicious of organization theory; public administrators sometimes lack discrimination in applying it. Here again efficiency and democracy must be combined in the right proportion to get

12 Cf. the author's article, Executive Responsibilities: The Span of Control in the Federal Government, Advanced Management, vol. III, No. 1 (January 1938). pp. 22–28.