ness of purpose, embracing discussions of questions of policy, data for the naturalist and historian, and systematic digests of studies in almost every department of scientific, literary, and political inquiry. Much of the significance of these papers is, however, lost, through the progress of events and the diffusion of knowledge. Orators have multiplied since his day, and many able legislators have won reputation in the same fields; yet these incidental writings are valuable for reference, and interesting as the literary exposition of a noble character. The Address before the Philosophical Society, the Discourse on the Iroquois, and the Letters of Hibernicus, are valuable illustrations of the habits of research, the intellectual tastes, the powers of observation, and the impressive style, of a man whose life was mainly occupied with executive duties, and whose fame is eminently that of a practical statesman. It is delightful to cite, after the lapse of fifty years, his eloquent defence of literature and science as elements of a wise policy, to hear him glory in the memories of Hunter and Burnett, the educated provincial governors of his native State, advocate the need of a knowledge of the past, in order to reap the fruits of the present, and designate the advantages, both natural and civil, offered in this country to the votary of science and letters. It is equally pleasing to follow his ethnological investigations of the savage tribe that once possessed the fair domain around him, and to share the patriotic zest with which he examines its soil, forests, and waters, to fix the nomenclature of their varied products. He anticipated, by hints of projects such as De Foe's famous essay bequeathed to posterity, many of the subsequent victories of practical science, when he declared that "here the hand of art will change the face of the universe, and the prejudices of country will vanish before the talisman of merit;" that "it will not be debated whether hills shall be perforated, but whether the Alps and the Andes shall be levelled; not whether sterile fields shall be fertilized, but whether the deserts of Africa shall feel the power of cultivation; not whether rivers shall be joined, but whether the Caspian shall see the Mediterranean, and the waves of the Pacific shall lave the Atlantic shores."* During the summer of 1827, Mr. Clinton made a tour of the New England States, where he met with the heartiest welcome from the inhabitants, who honored him not only for the position he held as governor of the State of New York, but on account of his eminent, long-continued, and successful public services. Near the close of the same year, while residing at Albany, New York, he was seized with a disorder, so slight in its early stages, as to cause no anxiety, but which terminated his life, on the eleventh of February, 1828. His death produced the deepest sorrow among all classes of his fellow-citizens. and his memory continues to be cherished with growing esteem and respect. NAVIGATION OF THE MISSISSIPPI. The following speech on the resolutions of Mr. Ross, relative to the navigation of the Mississippi river, was delivered by Mr. Clinton, in the Senate of the United States, on the twenty-third of February, 1803 :t MR. PRESIDENT, The extraordinary manner in which the subject, now under consideration, has been introduced; the extraordinary manner in which it has been treated, and the extraordinary nature of the proposition itself, would justify a latitude and severity of remark, which, * Essays, Biographical and Critical; or, Studies of Cha racter, by Henry T. Tuckerman. See the speech of Gouverneur Morris, and note at page 475, ante. | however, I am not disposed to indulge upon this occasion. I know that I address myself to dom and patriotism of my country: I will, a very respectable portion of the collected wistherefore, leave the honorable members from Pennsylvania and Delaware, Mr. Ross and Mr. White, in the undisturbed possession of their inflammatory appeals and declamatory effusions, and will manifest a becoming respect for the high authority to which I have the honor to speak, by moving on the ground of argument and of fact. To prevent losing myself in so spacious a field, I will consider the subject under three distinct heads: first, the injuries alleged to have been committed on the part of Spain; second, the nature, character, and tendency of the remedy proposed; third, its justice and policy. The importance of a free navigation of the Mississippi has been duly appreciated by the government; and a constant eye has been kept apon it, in our negotiations with foreign powers. An attempt was, indeed, made, under the old confederation, to barter it away for twenty-five years, which, however, was efficiently controlled by the good sense and patriotism of the government. By the treaty of peace with Great Britain, in 1783, by the treaty of amity, commerce and navigation with her, in 1794, and by the treaty of friendship, limits and navigation with Spain, in 1795, the right of a free navigation of the Mississippi is recognized, and declared to exist, from its source to the ocean, in the citizens of the United States. By the twenty-have, indeed, been stated by the honorable second article of the treaty with Spain, it is declared, that "in consequence of the stipulations contained in the fourth article, his Catholic majesty will permit the citizens of the United States, for the space of three years from this time, to deposit their merchandise and effects in the port of New Orleans, and to export them from thence without paying any other duty than a fair price for the hire of the stores. And his majesty promises either to continue this permission, if he finds, during that time, that it is not prejudicial to the interests of Spain, or if he should not agree to continue it there, he will assign to them, on another part of the banks of the Mississippi, an equivalent establishment." The twenty-second article, granting the right of deposit, is, therefore, founded upon the fourth article recognizing the right of free navigation, and is intended to give full and complete efficacy to it. By a proclamation of the Intendant of the province of Lonisiana, dated the 16th of October last, the right of deposit is prohibited. The reason assigned for this daring interdiction is, that the three years, for which it was granted, having expired, it cannot be continued without an express order from the king of Spain. And, at the same time, no equivalent establishment is assigned according to the stipulations of the treaty. There can be no doubt but that the suspension of the right of deposit at New Orleans, and the assignment of another place equally convenient, ought to have been contemporaneous and concurrent; that the conduct of the Intendant is an atrocious infraction of the treaty, and that it aims a deadly blow at the prosperity of the western States; but it is extremely questionable whether it was authorized by the government of Spain or not. On this subject I am free to declare, that I entertain great doubts, which can only be cleared up by the course of events, or perhaps it will ever be enveloped in darkness. On the one hand, the terms of the proclamation, indicating a misunderstanding of the treaty, the remonstrances of the governor of the province, whose authority does not extend to commercial and fiscal affairs, over which the Intendant has an exclusive control, and the prompt and decided assurances of the Spanish minister near the United States, would induce House, on the resurrection of that ardent zeal in favor of their oppressed countrymen, which has so long and so soundly slept over British and French enormities. 66 As to the nature, character and tendency of the remedy proposed, there can be but one opinion. It proposes to enter the country of a foreign nation, with a hostile force, and to seize a part of its territory. It is not preceded by a formal declaration, and cannot, therefore, come under the denomination of a solemn war; but it partakes of the character of a war not solemn. It answers to the definition of war, by Burlamaqui, a nation taking up arms with a view to decide a quarrel;" to that given by Vattel, who represents it to be, "that state in which a nation prosecutes its right by force." A state of general hostilities would as necessarily follow, as an effect would follow a cause: no nation would submit to the irruption of a hostile army, without repelling it by force: the proud Castilian, as described by the gentleman from Delaware, would revolt at the insult; the door of negotiation would be effectually closed, and | as the appeal would be to arms, in the first instance, so the controversy must be finally decided by the preponderance of force. It would, therefore, not only have impressed me with a more favorable opinion of the honorable mover's candor, but also of his decision and energy as a statesman, if he had spoken out boldly, and declared his real object. War is unquestionably his design-his wish. Why then mask his propositions? Why then combine it with considerations connected with negotiation? Why not furnish the American people, at once, with the real and the whole project of himself and his friends? If it is bottomed on patriotisin, and dictated by wisdom, it need not shrink from the touch of investigation; it will receive their approving voice, and be supported by all their force. The resolution is, then, to be considered as a war resolution; in no other light can it be viewed; in no other light ought it to be viewed; and in no other light will it be viewed by the intelligence of the country. In this point of view, I will proceed to consider its justice and policy, its conformity with the law and usage of nations, and the substantial interests of this country. I shall not attempt to occupy your attention by threadbare declamation upon the evils of war, by painting the calamities it inflicts upon the happiness of individuals, and the prosperity of nations. This terrible scourge of mankind, worse than the famine or pestilence, ought not to be resorted to, until every reasonable expedient has been adopted to avert it. When aggressions have been committed by the sovereign or representatives of the will of a nation, negotiation ought, in all cases, to be first tried, unless the rights of self-defence demand a contrary course. This is the practice of nations, and is enjoined by the unerring monitor which the God of nature has planted in every human bosom. What right have the rulers of nations | to unsheathe the sword of destruction, and to let loose the demon of desolation upon mankind, whenever caprice or pride, ambition or avarice, shall prescribe? And are there no fixed laws, founded in the nature of things, which ordain bounds to the fell spirit of revenge, the mad fury of domination, and the insatiable thirst of cupidity? Mankind have, not only in their individual character, but in their collective capacity as nations, recognized and avowed, in their opinions and actions, a system of laws calculated to produce the greatest happiness of the greatest number. And it may be safely asserted, that it is a fundamental article of this code, that a nation ought not to go to war, until it is evident that the injury committed is highly detrimental, and that it emanated from the will of the nation, charged with the aggression, either by an express authorization in the first instance, or by a recognition of it, when called upon for redress, and a refusal in both cases to give it. A demand of satisfaction ought to precede an appeal to arms, even when the injury is manifestly the act of the sovereign; and when it is the act of a private individual, it is not imputable to its nation, until its government is called upon to explain and redress, and refuses; because the evils of war are too heavy and serious to be incurred, without the most urgent necessity; because remonstrance and negotiation have often recalled an offending nation to a sense of justice, and a performance of right; because nations, like individuals, have their paroxysms of passion, and when reflection and reason resume their dominion, will extend that redress to the olive-branch, which their pride will not permit them to grant to the sword; because a nation is a moral person, and as such, is not chargeable with an offence committed by others, or where its will has not been consulted; the unauthorized conduct of individuals being never considered a just ground of hostility, until their sovereign refuses that reparation for which his right of controlling their actions, and of punishing their misconduct, necessarily renders him responsible. These opinions are sanctioned by the most approved elementary writers on the laws of nations. I shall quote the sentiments of some of them. Vattel says: "Two things, therefore, are necessary to render it (an offensive war) just. First, a right to be asserted; that is, that a demand made on another nation be important and well grounded: second, that this reasonable demand cannot be obtained otherwise than by force of arms. Necessity alone warrants the use of force. It is a dangerous and terrible resource. Nature, the common parent of mankind, allows of it only in extremity, and when all others fail. It is doing wrong to a nation to make use of violence against it, before we know whether it be disposed to do us justice, or to refuse it. Those, who, without trying pacific measures, on the least motive run to arms, sufficiently show that justificative reasons, in their mouths, are only pretences; they eagerly seize the opportunity of indulging their passions, and | corroborated by the general usage of nations. of gratifying their ambition, under some color of right." It is subsequently stated by this admired writer, that "it is demonstrated in the foregoing chapter, that, to take arms lawfully, first, that we have a just cause of complaint: second, that a reasonable satisfaction has been denied us, &c." A demand of redress, before the application of force, has been almost uniformly practised by the most barbarous, as well as the most civilized nations. Instances may indeed be found to the contrary, but they are to be considered as departures from established usage. The ancient Romans, who were a military nation, and who Burlamaqui says, "However just reason we marched to empire through an ocean of blood, may have to make war, yet as it inevitably always demanded satisfaction from the offendbrings along with it an incredible number of ca- ing nation before they proceeded to war, and lamities, and often injustices, it is certain, that fixed upon a certain time in which the demand we ought not to proceed too easily to a danger- was to be complied with; at the expiration of ous extremity, which may, perhaps, prove fatal which, if redress was still withheld, they then to the conqueror himself. The following are endeavored to obtain it by force. It has been the measures which prudence directs sovereigns the general practice of the civilized nations of to observe in these circumstances: first, suppos- Europe to pron.algate manifestoes justificatory ing the reason of the war is just in itself, yet of their conduct, in resorting to arms. These the dispute ought to be about something of manifestoes contain a full statement of their great consequence to us; since it is better even wrongs, and almost always declare that they to relinquish part of our right, when the thing had previously endeavored by negotiation to is not considerable, than to have recourse to obtain a friendly adjustment of their comarms to defend it. Second, we ought to have at plaints. What is this, but a declaration, that least some probable appearance of success; for the law and the sense of nations demand this it would be a criminal temerity, and a real folly, course? What is it, but an appeal to the intuiwantonly to expose ourselves to certain destruc- tive sense of right and wrong, which exists in tion, and to run into a greater, in order to avoid every human bosom? The reign of the present a lesser evil. Lastly, there should be a real king of Great Britain has been emphatically a necessity for taking up arms; that is, we ought war reign. In 1760 he ascended the throne and not to have recourse to force, but when we can found the nation at war with France. Besides employ no milder method of recovering our his wars in the East and West Indies, almost rights, or of defending ourselves from the evils half of his reign has been consumed in wars with which we are menaced. These measures with this country, and some of the nations of are agreeable not only to the principles of pru- Europe. He has been three times at war with dence, but also to the fundamental maxims of France, three times with Spain, twice with Holsociability, and the love of peace; maxims of land, and once with the United States. The no less force, with respect to nations, than in- most strange events-events which have pleased dividuals. By these a sovereign must, there- and dazzled, astonished and terrified mankind, fore, be necessarily directed; even the justice have passed upon the theatre of the world in of the government obliges him to it, in conse- his time. The ordinary maxims of policy, and quence of the very nature and end of authority. the cardinal principles of action, have been reFor as he ought always to take particular care versed and prostrated. The world has seen the of the State, and of his subjects, consequently revival of the crusades, all the great powers of he should not expose them to all the evils with Europe in arms, and a destroying and desolating which war is attended, except in the last ex-spirit go forth, unknown to past times. Portremity, and when there is no other expedient left but that of arms." In addition to these great authorities, permit me to refer severally to the opinions of two more modern writers, Martens and Paley. The former says, that all amicable means for redress must be tried in vain, before an appeal to arms, unless it is evident that it would be useless to try such means: and the latter is of opinion, that the only justifying causes of war are deliberate invasions of right, and maintaining the balance of power. It is not necessary to decide upon the justice of the last observation, because it does not apply to the case before us. But can any man lay his hand upon his heart, and declare that he believes the present case a deliberate invasion of right by the Spanish government? Can any man say, that it would be fruitless to attempt amicable means of redress, and that the sword alone can restore us to our rights? The opinions of these celebrated writers are tentous as a portion of this reign has been, when a deviation from the established laws of nations might naturally be expected, and degraded as the power and condition of Spain is represented to be, I am willing to stake the whole controversy upon the reciprocal conduct of these governments to each other. Of all wars, one with Spain is the most popular in England, from the opportunities it affords for maritime spoliation and lucrative enterprise. For the same reasons it is anxiously deprecated by Spain; and it has even grown into a Spanish proverb, "Peace with England, and war with the world." Notwithstanding the preponderating force of Great Britain, the allurements of popularity and cupidity, her great and extraordinary acquisition of maritime power, and the martial temper which has marked her character during the present reign-we find the very power with whom we are now called upon to measure swords, meeting her propositions for negotiation or arms on the ground of perfect equality, maintaining a steady posture, and an erect attitude, passing through her collisions with unspotted reputation and unsullied dignity, and teaching us an instructive lesson, that while we ought never to bend into degrading compliances, we are not to expect that a nation, which has not yielded improperly to the power in the world most able to injure her, will tamely submit to the insulting and imperious measure recommended so earnestly to our adoption. Six controversies have occurred between Great Britain and Spain during the reign of the present king; three have terminated amicably by negotiation, and three have resulted in war. In 1761, when Great Britain was at war with France, a memorial was presented by the French ambassador at London to the English minister, which implicated some demands of Spain upon Great Britain, and which gave great offence to her ministry. A negotiation took place, which being attended with an insolent demand for a sight of a treaty concluded between France and Spain, and which being very properly refused, a war ensued. Notwithstanding the conduct of Great Britain in the course of this transaction was precipitate and unjust, negotiation was attempted before an appeal to arms: and the future disclosure of the real transaction furnished her with a salutary lesson; for it was afterwards found that the treaty did not refer to the existing state of the belligerent powers, but that the guarantee it contained was not to operate until the termination of the war. In the year 1770, the remarkable case of the Falkland Islands occurred. Six years before, a settlement was made and a fort erected by the British government on one of them, with a view to accommodate navigators in refitting their ships and furnishing them with necessaries previous to their passage through the Straits of Magellan, or the doubling Cape Horn. This settlement gave great umbrage to Spain, not only on account of its interference with her claim of sovereignty to almost the whole southern continent of America, and the adjacent islands, but also on account of the facility it would afford, in case of a future war, to an attack upon her South Sea territories. Ineffectual remonstrances were made on the part of Spain, and at last, notwithstanding the claim of Great Britain by discovery and occupancy, an armed force was sent, the fort was taken, the settlement was broken up, and the honor of the British flag violated by the taking off of the rudder of a king's ship, and detaining it on shore twenty days. What course did the British pursue on this occasion? In this case the insult was flagrant; the honor of their flag, the dignity of the crown, and the commerce of the nation were implicated. Was the sword immediately unsheathed, and the door to peace effectually closed? No: negotiations ensued: a convention was formed. Spain disavowed the violence, and engaged to restore the possessions, but with an express declaration, that the restitution should not affect the question concerning the prior right of sovereignty. The islands were also evacuated three years afterwards by Great Britain, in consequence of a secret agree| ment. In 1779, Spain declared war against Great Britain, alleging unredressed depredations on her commerce, and that she was insulted in an attempt to negotiate between France and Great Britain. It is evident that this step on the part of Spain was in pursuance of the family compact; and was not justifiable by the laws of nations. It appears, however, that previous to taking this measure, she had attempted to attain her objects by negotiation. In 1786, the long disputes, respecting the English settlements on the Mosquito shore and the coast of Honduras, were settled by negotiation. The English abandoned their Mosquito settlements, and many hundreds of families, who had inhabited them under the protection and faith of the British government, were peremptorily compelled to evacuate that country. The boundaries of the English Honduras settlements were enlarged, but in such a manner as to leave Spain in full possession of her territorial rights and exclusive dominion. In 1790, the controversy about Nootka Sound arose. Two years before, a settlement was made there by an association of British merchants, on land purchased from the natives with a view to carry on the fur trade. This interfering with the chimerical rights of Spain, a Spanish frigate was despatched by the viceroy of Mexico, which seized the fort, and captured the English vessels trading there. A negotiation took place, the vessels were restored, and the settlements agreed to be yielded back: but there was an express reservation, on the part of Spain, of the right of sovereignty for ulterior discussion. In 1796, Spain, in pursuance of a treaty of alliance offensive and defensive with France, declared war against Great Britain. un From this short narrative it will appear, that in almost every case negotiation was attempted, even when indignity and violence had been committed; that in many instances it was successful; that in two of the three cases, where hostilities were commenced, Spain was equivocally the aggressor; that in most of her adjustments she stood upon ground at least equal, and in some, superior to Great Britain; that in all of them she maintained a high sense of character and independence, and that, in points affecting the most delicate considerations of national honor, interest and right, and where occurrences of a very irritating nature had taken place, and more aggravated than the one of which we justly complain, the path of nego tiation was deemed the path of honor by two of the great nations of Europe. The practice of our government has been uniformly conformable with the principles I have endeavored to establish, and I trust Í shall |