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ecutive and judiciary. That of the former can neither be increased nor diminished, during the term of office; that of the latter can only not be diminished. This difference was induced, and the propriety of it seems to be fully sustained by the difference in the terms of service, and the fluctuations in the value of money, the mode of living, and numerous other such circumstances. What is liberal and sufficient at present, may in all probability so remain for the short period of four years; but in quarter of a century migh: prove penurious and inadequate. The compensation of the executive is, therefore, fixed-and, with equal propriety, that of the judiciary left open to be increased as circumstances may require. :!,,

Though this provision together with a permanent tenure of office, affords the most, ample security for the stability and independence of the judiciary, sufficient, precautions for their responsibility have not been neglected. While the constitution has sedulously endeavored to guard this department against the more powerful influences of the others, and by its wise arrangement enabled it to resist their aggressions, it has clothed it with no inviolability. On the contrary, for any corrupt violation of the important duties with which they have been entrusted, the judge, as "all civil officers in the U. States,” is liable to impeachment, and, on conviction, to removal from office. Thus, while ample provision has been made for firmness and independence in the administration of justice, fidelity has been secured by a responsibility no less complete.

With this we close our review of the organization of the judiciary, and thus conclude our labors on the Plan of the Union, and constitutional structure of its government. So far as regards books of re

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ference or means to obtain them, they have been performed under circumstances apparently disadvantageous. The want of them, however, has indeed resulted in more diligent consideration of the subjects, more original reasonings, and conclusions less biased by authorities. This last particularly considering that works on such subjects have usually been written by men of party attachments, and interests, is perhaps an advantage. It has at least produced the phenomenon of impartial expressions of opinion, and deductions favorable, opposed alike to the whims and opinions of every party. But, as has been intimated, it is not our intention either to offer apologies or indulge language of commendation. Our object is simply to solicit not only for the work, but for the subject, a serious, sedulous, and general consideration. Upon the information of the people in regard to these matters, it is obvious the continued success of our system materially depends. It will doubtless have been observed that it recognizes, at every step, the people rather than the government, as the ultimate depositories of political power. And let it not be forgotten that the political capacity of the people at the time of its adoption' was, as it still is, only as “people of the United States.” The first and chief object of the constitution was to form “the people of the United States,” rather than those of a united state, "into a more perfect union," and not to divest them of their sovereignty, but to recognize it as its sole support and foundation. If it was either its object or effect to divest them of sovereignty, the government or people generally must have been invested with it. If so, either the one or the other, as the case may be, are superior to the constitution, and able to alter or abolish it; because sovereignty is supremacy-complete and unrestrict

ed power. But it will readily be perceived, from the fifth article of the constitution, that neither the government nor people generally possess any such power. That belongs to the people only as people of the United States. It is clearly intimated in the first words of the

preamble, and article after article proceeds in accordance with it, until finally it is definitely and distinctly recognized by the very last in the original constitution. The theory then of State sovereignty is correct, and the opposite dangerous, and at variance with the very fundamentals of the Union-ihat Union which has preserved and improved for us the noble inheritance obtained for us by the toils, the sufferings and blood of our forefathers--that Union by which we have been raised from the low condition of petty States to the might and majesty of a free, virtuous and enlightened people, and elevated to the highest position in the great family of nations—that Union which secures to us the inestimable rights and privileges and the high distinction of American citizens --that Union which when it falls, we too shall all of us fall with it—and fall to rise no more. It becomes us, then, as citizens of the Union, to oppose both first and last this latter theory; and as we value the Union, to maintain the other with might and main.

In view of the high considerations which have urged us to the adoption of such a course in the prosecution of this work, it is to be hoped we shall not look in vain for the approval, nor without reasen fof the concurrence of our fellow-citzens.



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