of hunting, renewed the conversation with the assist ance of his ally, the vice-chancellor; but no impression was made on the venerable magistrate, whom John at length, though much pressed by his advisers to violent courses, dismissed with civility. The king was probably misled throughout this transaction, which I have thought fit to draw from obscurity, not only in order to illustrate the privilege of manifestation, but as exhibiting an instance of judicial firmness and integrity, to which, in the fourteenth century, no country, perhaps, in Europe could offer a parallel."* Besides this, the history of France is replete with testimony to confirm and corroborate the propriety of a permanent tenure for judicial offices. Anterior to the revolution the judges of the old parliaments, though appointed by the crown, held their offices for life. They resisted with the most determined independence the efforts of the crown against them, and gave effect and security to the laws, notwithstanding the power of all its immense prerogatives. Through all the fluctuations of opinion, during the desperate struggles of infuriate factions, and the reigns of arbitrary princes, they proved an ark of safety for the laws, and through all the tremendous tempests of popular fanaticism and royal rage, they bore them safe above the threatening flood of despotism. "They kept alive," says Burke, "the memory and record of the constitution. They were the great security to private property, which might be said (when personal liberty had no existence) to be as well guarded in France as in any other country." Louis XI., from whatever mo * Hallam. A tives, established this tenure in France, and though perhaps it was with him the result of that shortsightedness by which the tyrant is often entrapped, yet at this early period, it was quite generally regarded as essential to the honorable and independent discharge of the judicial office. In 1468 that monarch ordained that the judges ought not to be deposed, except for a legal forfeiture, previously adjudged and declared by a competent tribunal. This ordinance was subsequently sanctioned by his successors, and after the first excesses of the French revolution, received a public confirmation. The excellence of this principle, thus triumphantly attested by experience, has recommended its adoption by other nations of Europe, and it prevails at present in nearly all of our State constitutions. Notwithstanding, however, the favorable witness of so many ages and countries, it is painful as well as astonishing to observe that in some of these states it has lately grown into disrepute. It is gratifying, however, to perceive that even from so vast an experience, not one single instance has been, or can be, adduced unfavorable to the principle. Its abandonment, therefore, we imagine, was at best but a change for the sake of change, probably the result of party humor, or, to speak more appropriately, of a popular fanaticism, aroused and directed by demagogues for selfish purposes a fanaticism differing in naught inherent from that which originated and perpetrated the horrid excesses of the French revolution, but a fanaticism which experience gives us the consolation to hope is as fickle in its purposes, and as transient in its existence, as it is unreasonable and dangerous in its character. All that can be gathered of the flimsy and senseless murmurings (unworthy even to be nick-named arguments) against the principle in question, is that it gives the judiciary an independence of character which, though it contributes undoubtedly to its impartiality, removes it, at the same time, beyond the influence of the other departments. This we admit most fully; but while we regard it as utterly powerless against the principle in question, we urge it as one of the chief inducements for its adoption. The propriety of separating the powers of government (the legislative, executive, and judicial) has already been shown, and it is unnecessary to perplex by a repetition of argument to prove it. Indeed, it is almost universally admitted, and constitutes a fundamental principle not only of every other free government, but, also, of the federal and other constitutions of the United States. Now, as it is plain that all the ill effects of a union of the departments must also result from the control of either over the other, or the others over either, no such control should exist; for it would be, to all intents and purposes, tantamount to their union. Hence, as permanency of tenure removes the judiciary, as is contended by its opponents, beyond the influence of the other departments, it contributes to its separation from them, and upon the principle that they ought to be separate, (which will not be questioned,) this permanency of tenure is proper, and should be adhered to. But further; the opponents of a permanent tenure for judicial offices, without regard to it as a principle by which a separation of the departments is effected, found their objection to it chiefly upon the propriety, which they urge of a conformity to the popular will. But this argument evidently proceeds upon a fallacy. It supposes the will of the rulers and that of the people to be the same, when in fact they are not unfrequenly adverse. No one would for a moment deny that in a government like ours, the will of the people is and ought to be supreme. But it is the will of the people in their politically organized capacity-in their charac ter as members of a state, deliberately expressed. The will of the people, as declared and specified in the constitution and laws, and treaties made in accordance therewith. In this sense, without denial or doubt, it is and ought to be "the supreme law of the land." But is it for the will of the people in this sense that those opposed to the principle in question contended? No; but for the will of the people in their numerical capacity in their character as members of a dominant party, hastily and ambiguously intimated in their choice of rulers. Thus, if the rulers should differ from the judges in their constitutional opinions, it is contended that the former should be obeyed, because, as is alleged, they represent the opinions of the people. It is concluded, therefore, that the judges ought to be removable or appointed for short periods, so as to bring them within the influence of the rulers, or the will of the people expressed through them. But is it not evident that this would be a departure from the great American doctrine-that the supreme law of the land should be the will of the people, deliberately and definitely fixed and expressed by a written instrument ? Is it not evident that it would be in fact a subversion of, and a substitution of an unwritten, for the written con stitution-a subjection of its fixed principles to the mutable influences of party humors and caprices?— Would it not become, instead of a fixed and settled form of government, an instrument of changeable interpretation a mere oracle of dominant parties so ambiguous in expression as to admit of any and every meaning? What become of its well defined powers and restrictions, if the popular will, thus irregularly promulged, is to be regarded for the instant as the supreme law, or the authoritative exposition of it? If the will of the people is to be ascertained from ordinary elections, which sometimes result one way and at others differently, rather than from the constitution, and the solemn acts of the people in ratifying and amending it-where is the certitude?-Where the principles and stability, and, without these, the wisdom, justice, energy, respectability, and other excellences of the government? In a word, where, and of what utility is the constitution? If the opinions of temporary rulers are to prevail, who, in the name of reason, who are to be regarded? The rulers of yesterday, today, or to-morrow? Rulers and representatives are seldom, if ever, chosen with regard to their constitutional opinions upon more than one or two points. Their opinions in regard to so many, it is true, are sometimes expressed and discussed, and, together with a variety of other circumstances, such as individual character, personal popularity, matters of temporary expediency, local interests, and a host of others, may aid to sway the elections in their favor. Moreover, to-day one party triumphs and to-morrow another, and |