didn't interfere as ministers; but in the present case, not to lay any stress on the country he belongs to, it would never be borne, and he for one would never consent to lend a helping hand to make him one.' (Devonshire House MSS.)

But when it was proposed that Bute should be drawn out into the open as a responsible minister, then it turned out that Pitt would never have anything to do with Lord Bute as a minister, and that he would not go on if he could have no access to the King but through Lord Bute.'

The thanks of the reader, and of all students, are specially due to Lord Stavordale, whose knowledge and pains have cleared an easy way through the allusions with which the letters are thickly set. At one point only —and that a small one-he seems to go astray. Lord Stavordale accuses Walpole—who relates that Lady Sarah used to appear in the garden at Holland House 'in a fancied habit making hay,' in order to be seen by the King as he rode by-of a love of gossip and a disposition to be smart. This is almost as if one were to complain that Socrates had a tiresome habit of asking questions; for all those-and they are most readers of English-who love Walpole's gossip, will exclaim, felix culpa; while to say that he had a 'disposition to be smart' is to admit the least of the truth. Walpole undoubtedly aimed at being witty, but it is also true that he generally hits. Among those that sparkle deliberately and by profession, he draws a blank as rarely as any; and we only regret that his awful example should so effectually have deterred Lord Stavordale from sharing the risks of the same attempt. Pending a denial from those who should know, we see nothing unlikely in the incident, and we confess that the lengths to which Leigh Hunt's disposition carried him seem to us far more outrageous; for he did not scruple to suggest that Lady Sarah was the original Lass of Richmond Hill, and that George III wrote the ballad.

The two volumes have been lavishly adorned with photogravures, most of them, it is true, from familiar pictures; but of the company of Sir Joshua's ladies, with their old-world air of breeding and grace, we never tire.

Art. XIV. THE WAR AND ITS LESSONS.

1. South Africa Despatches (1901). (March 8, May 8, July 8, August 8, September 8, October 8.) London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1901.

2. The Great Boer War. New edition, completed to October 11, 1901. By A. Conan Doyle. London:

Smith Elder, 1901.

3. Impressions of a Doctor in Khaki. By Francis E. Fremantle. London: John Murray, 1901.

4. A Retrospect on the South African War. By Lieut.-Col. E. S. May. London: Sampson Low, 1901.

5. Words by an Eye-witness. By 'Linesman.' Edinburgh and London: Blackwood, 1901.

6. Notes and Reflections on the Boer War. By Maj.-Gen. H. M. Bengough. London: Clowes, 1900.

IF the South African War be not the most important conflict in the history of England, it is assuredly the one which has produced by far the largest literature. To the flow of books dealing with it there is seemingly no end. Nor is this anything but an unmixed good. Much of the war literature possesses high merit, and, studied with discretion, it should enable the nation to obtain an intelligent idea of the task which its soldiers have been called upon to accomplish, and to pronounce a discriminating verdict on the army's performance. Not that we can look for the inner history of the campaign as yet, or that any of the presentations of events now before us can be regarded as final. The war cannot be fully understood, nor the obstacles to British success thoroughly comprehended, until more light has been shed upon the political direction at home, and until the relations of War Ministers and Cabinets to the various Commanders-in-Chief have been accurately detailed.

The groundwork of any history of the war in its later phase must be the despatches from the Commander-inChief. In his 'Great Boer War,' Dr Doyle has made use of this material, supplementing it from the letters of newspaper correspondents and officers. The merit of the earlier editions of his work has been generally recognised; and the enlarged edition gives an outline of events up to a recent date, which is as accurate as such an outline can

be made with such material as exists, and which is at the same time written with picturesqueness and spirit. If we want psychological details of the conduct of our troops in the face of danger and death, Dr Fremantle and 'Linesman' can supply them. The Doctor's work in the hospitals and ambulances enables him to give evidence with authority as to the good behaviour of the private soldier, and incidentally to lay bare certain flagrant defects in the Army Medical Corps, while to his own profession it will prove of the highest value as a record of a surgeon's experiences in the field. 'Linesman's' work is of a different character; it deals almost entirely with the soldier in battle, in bivouac or on the march, and that mostly in Natal, during the earlier period of the campaign. But it is written with admirable fire and spirit, and from the purely literary point of view is one of the most striking works which the conflict has produced.

The beginning of a new year affords a good opportunity to take stock, as it were, of the progress which has been accomplished since the date when, in November 1900, Lord Roberts laid down his command and returned home, in the full belief, which he did not hesitate publicly to express, that the war was over. It is with the events of the thirteen months which have elapsed since that date that we shall have principally to deal, and our endeavour will be to ascertain, if possible, the reasons why the struggle has been continued so far beyond the anticipations of our ablest British general. The period in question may be divided into the following sections, viz. (1) the South African summer, from Lord Roberts' departure (November 1900) to the failure of the peace negotiations (February 1901); (2) the winter, to September 15, the end of the period of grace fixed by the proclamation of August; (3) the recrudescence of Boer activity, from that date to the present time.

Before the date of Lord Roberts' departure, a considerable number of troops had been allowed to return. Among these were the City Imperial Volunteers, the Household Cavalry, a battery of horse artillery, and several of the colonial contingents. As the strength of the units remaining had not been fully maintained by constant strong drafts, the efficiency of the force had greatly

declined, while the want of remounts fit for hard work in that climate, which, though healthy to man, is unhealthy to horseflesh, had reduced its mobility to vanishing point. Nominally the strength of the British army was about 240,000 by official returns and assurances. Actually the force efficient did not in all probability exceed 150,000. The enemy's strength at this date was very variously computed. Optimists on the British side reckoned it at 15,000 to 17,000 men. The Boers themselves stated it at 20,000 to 25,000 men; and on the whole it is probable that their figures were not far from the mark. To this force has been added, during the year, an indefinite number of recruits from Europe and Cape Colony.

The month of October 1900 had witnessed a revival of the war in the south of the Orange River Colony. Small commandoes of the enemy appeared in this region and were at once joined by the paroled farmers. In a few weeks or months,' says Lord Milner, 'the very men whom we had spared and treated with exceptional leniency were up in arms again, justifying their breach of faith in many cases by the extraordinary argument that we had not preserved them from the temptation to commit it.' Jacobsdal, Fauresmith, Jagersfontein, and Koffyfontein were all attacked; districts which had been steadily settling down were unsettled; and, to find men to meet the bands of Boers who seemed to spring from the earth, the British headquarters were compelled to evacuate garrison after garrison. These withdrawals cannot but have fostered the idea-which we know from many sources was generally entertained by the Boersthat a great part of the army was being shipped to China. Concurrently with this recrudescence of the war in the Orange Colony came fierce fighting in the western Transvaal, proving that there also the pacification had been apparent only. Even in the eastern Transvaal, where a large British force was being employed, General French had encountered stubborn opposition on a march from Machadodorp to Heidelberg, and had found himself unable to make any real impression on the enemy. Meanwhile in all directions the railways were being cut and trains held up and destroyed. The losses of rolling stock and supplies must have greatly embarrassed the British commissariat.

Of the leading Boer generals, Botha at this date was in the east, holding the country near Ermelo with the pick of the burghers; De la Rey was in the Magaliesberg region with a formidable force; and to the south of the Vaal De Wet had just lost most of his guns and a number of his best men to Colonel Le Gallais, but was as full of fight as ever. Reports had reached the British intelligence department to the effect that the enemy intended a general invasion of Cape Colony, in which De Wet and De la Rey were to play a part, while Botha, it was rumoured, would attempt to carry out a diversion on the Natal frontier. There was general fermentation among the Dutch of Cape Colony, accompanied by what Lord Milner has justly described as a 'carnival of mendacity,' in the shape of abominable charges against the British troops. The signs, then, at the end of November 1900, were threatening; and there seemed little ground for supposing that the war was even 'virtually over.' From Capetown came urgent appeals to England to despatch strong reinforcements-appeals which met with no adequate response. It is true that the new Commander-inChief does not appear to have pressed for more men, but he scarcely could do so with decency immediately after Lord Roberts' pronouncements in Natal and Cape Colony. But in December it was realised that further reinforcements were absolutely necessary, and a small number of mounted regulars were sent out.

The first problem with which Lord Kitchener had to deal was De Wet's threatened invasion of Cape Colony. After his action with Le Gallais at Bothaville on November 6, the Boer general had retired to Lindley. There he seems to have had hidden stores of ammunition and buried guns. The next thing heard of him was that he was moving swiftly south towards the Orange. On November 17 he appeared at Dewetsdorp, which was held by a small British force, and attacked the place. Dewetsdorp lies only forty-five miles distant by road from Bloemfontein. Nevertheless no relief came to the garrison. After a week's siege, on the morning of the 23rd the white flag was hoisted, owing, it is said-for no official report of the affair has yet been published-to the failure of the water supply. Nearly five hundred men and two guns, neither of which had been disabled, with a large