CHAPTER V. THE SELECTION OF REPRESENTATIVES. Vastness of political science-Traditional method of selecting legislators now unsuitable-Legal and practical obstacles to candidates-Contrast between the former and present mode of choice-Former responsibility of political leaders-The Reform Bill and its necessity-Anarchic side of the principle of personal representation-Montesquieu-Principle of order to be sought and evolved-State of society in the masses of the people-Activity and combination of the vicious elements, and misleading of the rest-Electioneering agents and middle-men -Encouragement and facility afforded to the lower class of candidates-Helplessness of the more upright and intelligent electors-Demoralising character of election contests-National and individual effects worse under the new system-Greater evils which may be impending-Aggregate action of men always by the guidance of master minds-The ballot proposes to treat the symptom and conceal the disease-Individual conscientiousness of electors indispensable-Restoration of the principle of personal responsibility-A corporate conscience nonexistent-Proposed laws for bringing the names of all the candidates before the electors in gazetted lists, and for the order of insertion-Example of part of a gazetted list-Expiring traditions to which the better part of the present House is owing. IN forming the representative body, to which, co-ordinately with the other branches of Parliament, is committed the power of government and legislation, it is undeniable that it would be wise to invite by every suitable inducement, and to gather together with every possible diligence and care, all such minds as are by constitution, experience, or study, fitted to deal with the subjects which, at this day, come within the range of political action. The election confers no quality that the elected did not before possess,-none other than "nature and education, and their habits of life, have made them. Capacities beyond these the people have not to give. Virtue and wisdom may be the objects of their choice, but their choice confers neither the one nor the other on those upon whom they lay their ordaining hands. They have not the engagement of nature,-they have not the promise of revelation,—for any such powers." mena. "If Political science is, perhaps, of all studies, the most difficult, from the boundless variety of its phenoThe apparent simplicity of much that is upon the surface leads us to think that we comprehend it; and the depth and complexity of what is beneath and behind, which eludes our sight, seems to mock our attempts to penetrate its secrets. there be not a true understanding of what constitutes social development, there must necessarily be grave mistakes made in checking these changes and fostering those. If there be lack of insight respecting the mutual dependence of many functions, which, taken together, make up the national life, unforeseen disasters will ensue from not perceiving how an interference with one will affect the rest. If there be no knowledge of the natural consensus at any time subsisting in the social organism, there will, of course, be impossible attempts to achieve ends which do not consist with its passing phase of organisation. Clearly, before any effort to regulate the myriad multiform changes going on throughout society can be rationally made, there must be an adequate comprehension of how these changes are really caused, and in what way they are related to each other, how this perplexed web of phenomena hangs together, how it came thus, and what it is becoming. That is to say, there must be an adequate acquaintance with social science, the science involving all others,-the science standing above all others in subtlety and complexity, the science which the highest intelligence alone can master."* Well may we say, who is sufficient for these things? It is but too obvious that the traditional method of filling the House of Commons,-suitable as it was in earlier times, when a few master minds directed all public affairs, and the people came together, not to reason, but simply to confirm what their leaders had done, or proposed to do, is unsuited to this day. The subjects which now arise, and in which the public both feel and take the deepest interest, are almost infinitely various, and require to be approached with great preparatory knowledge. The growth of populous cities-the conquests of science in the material world, the activity of commercial intercourse, the progress of mental development,-all tend to create, daily, new questions and new problems, which it requires more than merely empirical knowledge to solve. On one side, it is proposed that political science should be systematically taught, and a measure of proficiency distinguished by a diploma.† Others turn from the task in despair, and conclude that the vast * Westminster Review, vol. xii. N.s. p. 469. range of the study places it, as a whole, beyond the intellectual grasp of any single mind, and that it is, therefore, vain to seek for greater qualities than we find in our daily path.* All, however, will probably agree that the country should collect the best materials which it possesses in the construction of its great representative assembly. Instead of this being attempted, the House of Commons, though nominally open to every subject, is yet surrounded by barriers, practical and legal, which tend, in their general character, to exclude the greatest number of those whose aid upon that principle it would be desirable to invite, and to facilitate the admission of those whom it would be desirable to exclude. The obstacles are of a character which may be described as both practical and legal; practical, inasmuch as the cost and manner of elections impose difficulties which many, probably far the largest number, of those who possess the highest qualifications, are unable to overcome, and conditions to which they are naturally unwilling to submit; legal, inasmuch as large numbers of persons are disqualified by the arbitrary restrictions of positive law. It is proposed in this chapter, after pointing out the circumstances in which our present methods of selection differ from those of former times, and remarking on the necessity of introducing a governing principle of a better nature, to treat of the increased facilities which may be provided, for obtaining in the House of Commons the services of the most highly qualified persons, and thereby * Blakey, Hist. Pol. Lit., vol. i. p. 299. Lond. 1855. giving effect to such better principle; and in the next chapter, to suggest the abolition of the practical and legal obstacles in the way of all such persons, of whatever class. The difference, or rather, as it may not incorrectly be termed, the contrast between the position of the country, with reference to the election of members of the House of Commons at the present time, and that in which it formerly stood, ought to be considered with much attention. The natural process in a rude age would be the selection in every borough of persons in the town or neighbourhood, known to the burgesses, and willing to undertake a business which usually involved, of necessity, much expense and inconvenience. It is found, in fact, to have been very frequently avoided. As the institution advanced in importance, the great men of the county or locality became accustomed to point out to the freeholders and burgesses the persons whom they should choose, and their recommendations were commonly attended to. These leading men were themselves a part of, or intimately connected with, the higher aristocracy. They felt a personal responsibility in making the selection,—a responsibility which increased with the importance of the office. It was not a responsibility to the people, but to the party, or perhaps the faction, in the country with which they were connected or identified. They were answerable for the judicious exercise of this, as of all other influences which they possessed. Unwise or unskilful conduct in the business of his party would then, as now, cost a man some portion of its respect and attention. Responsibility is |