CHAPTER VI.

THE OBSTACLES WHICH DIMINISH THE NUMBER OF

CANDIDATES.

Necessity and right of electors to the most extensive range of choice-Principle of the Commons' resolution of 1783 relating to Wilkes-Impediments to candidates-I. Expense of elections --Educated classes not the most wealthy-National disposition for public labours-Parliamentary services not venal-Parliamentary and contemporaneous professional and other labours not inconsistent-Wealth not a security for charaeter or ability or conscientious action-Its demagogism-Burke-The selection of the worthiest the interest of all—Proposed law abolishing the liability of the candidates for booths and clerks-Bribery-Causes of its tempting and virulent character in elections-Hardship of exposing to it the poorer voters-Bribery extinguished or reduced to its minimum-Exertions at elections voluntary and disinterested-II. Introduction to constituents-Canvassing— Its demoralising character-Suppression and counterfeiting of opinion-Contrast in the concurrence of free sympathiesIII. Incapacities created by law-Official persons-Debate on the Indian Council-Exclusion only justified by strong necessity-Proposed law abolishing disabilities in respect of any office held at the time of election-Persons in holy orders-Absence of reason for their exclusion-Proposed law repealing the statutes excluding priests and deacons-Returning officers-Proposed law enabling them to appoint substitutes-Presumptuous character of all legislation on matters exclusively of individual judgment.

IN forming an assembly, consisting of nearly seven hundred of those persons in whom the people "may discern that predominant proportion of active virtue and wisdom, taken together and fitted to the charge, such as in the great and inevitable mixed mass of human imper

fections and infirmities is to be found," every element of society requires to be laid under contribution. The State cannot afford to reject the services of any class, especially of any highly instructed class, amongst its sons. Able observers of the progress of society have remarked that the more general expansion of literature and diffusion of knowledge, invaluable as they are, do not enlarge the proportionate number of men of great eminence; and that, in the production of such men, nature vindicates her exclusive prerogative. Civilisation multiplies in a vast degree those who read and deliberate, whilst it does not produce any greater number of leading minds. It should be a fundamental principle that all possible facilities should be given to persons of every class to offer themselves as candidates for the representation of any portion of their fellow subjects. This principle is the foundation of the resolution of the House of Commons, which, on the 3rd of May, 1783, expunged from the journals all the declarations, orders, and resolutions relating to the election of Mr. Wilkes, and declared the previous resolution of the 17th of February, 1769, that had "affirmed his incapacity to sit in that Parliament, subversive of the rights of the whole body of the electors of the kingdom." The expurgatory resolution has been supported on the technical ground of the omission, in the resolution of 1769, of the imputed criminality which was the cause of the expulsion;* but it does not rest on so narrow a basis. Every law which prevents the electors of the kingdom from choosing any

* Blackstone's Com., vol. i. book i., cap. 2, p. 163, Christian's Ed., n. (16).

man whom they may consider the most fit to represent them, is in effect the adoption of a principle antagonistic to and subversive of their rights. It may possibly be justified by expediency; but the cases in which that justification can be established are very rare, and would almost entirely disappear under such a system of representation as is here contemplated, in which every member would be chosen by about two thousand of his countrymen, those two thousand having, at the same time, almost a boundless field of choice.

The impediments in the way of candidates, and which, to an extent that cannot be calculated, diminish the number from amongst which representatives must be chosen, may be classed under three principal heads: First, pecuniary, or obstacles interposed by the expenses, which are either lawful and inevitable, or otherwise indispensable to success; secondly, those occasioned by the peculiarities and difficulties of the manner of communication between the candidate and the electors; and thirdly, the grounds of exclusion created by positive law.

It may be stated, without much apprehension of denial, that there exists in this country large numbers of persons qualified for political life by their studies and habits of thought, and yet possessing small or very moderate fortunes. Of these many would be found, who would not only willingly, but eagerly, devote themselves to parliamentary and legislative labours, without remuneration or reward. No country in the world is so rich as this in the classes willing to bestow their time and attention on public business. It is one of the wholesome fruits of our civil institutions, which, from par

liament to the magistracy, and the jury, have called upon every order of the people to perform their several parts and duties in the business of the State. It is a remarkable proof of the extent to which we must have departed from those natural habits that adapt, with such wonderful accuracy, the means to the end, when not only is there small sign of any endeavour to call into activity all the latent energy and talent in the country, but rejecting and throwing aside, with a careless indifference, the materials which are ready to our hands, there are classes amongst us which seek to convert political labours into a trade, and seriously propose the payment of members of parliament by stipends from the State. Whether cases may not at a future time arise, of the possession or supposed possession of special qualifications by individuals who are personally in circumstances which incapacitate them from devoting their time to such public labours without some remuneration, and whether in such cases the constituency which they serve may not with propriety contribute to their support, is a different question.* Such a payment would be scarcely distinguishable from those cases in which the public have paid the debts, or provided for the permanent maintenance, of the families of distinguished public servants. Wholly different in principle and effect, would be any system calculated to make all parliamentary duties venal. There is great reason to apprehend that it would deteriorate the character of the

* In an able article in the Westminster Review, on "Party Government," the writer does not appear to go farther than such a case as that above supposed, vol. xiii. N.s. p. 427. See Parl. Deb. vol. cxlix. p. 1034.

representative body, as well as diminish the respect with which it is viewed by the public.*

The performance of parliamentary duties is proved not to be inconsistent with the contemporaneous prosecution of the most laborious avocations. The vigorous performance of the general business of life imparts earnestness to every occupation, and it is as belonging to that business that parliamentary duties are best executed. The constant meddling of a body of men, paid for making laws, and acting under the notion that they are bound to do something for their salaries, would in this country be intolerable. That professional labours of the most unremitting kind may be prosecuted without neglecting the duties of Parliament, is shown by the example of lawyers in extensive practice, and is proved by the amount of work-legislative, judicial, and of other kinds—which men like Lord Eldon, and others before and since his time, have been able to accomplish. Few men would be found, whose services are of any value to the State, who would not be able to afford them without abandoning their other business and occupations.

If, on the other hand, the nation be served by its representatives without pecuniary reward, it should not require from them any pecuniary sacrifices which a prudent or an honest, and, it may be added, a comparatively poor man, is not in a condition to make. The representative house is the House of the Commons. The Commons are composed of all classes, rich and

* The rejection of the Bill which proposed the payment of salaries to certain peers, for the performance of their judicial duties in the House of Lords, was regarded with much (and not unreasonable) satisfaction by many, on similar grounds.