PRIZE COURTS, 64. This principle is not applicable, however, where the title has vested in the neutral buyer before shipment. Thus when enemy goods were consigned to a neutral buyer as his property and at his risk, they were not confiscated. The Herman, 4 Rob. 228. Similarly, enemy goods shipped to a neutral buyer by an agent representing him in the enemy country have been held to lose their enemy character. See The San Jose Indiano and Cargo, 2 Gall. 267, 291. This was held true even when an enemy firm acted as agent or shipper for the neutral buyer. See The Portland, 3 Rob. 41-44. Perhaps all decisions as to goods from a belligerent country with title in a neutral are not entirely reconcilable. See 7 MOORE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 88 1183, 1184, 1185. But it would seem that a doctrine concerning the passing of title to ships and goods on ships in transitu can hardly support the confiscation of goods title to which is claimed to have passed before shipment.

INTERSTATE COMMERCE - DISCRIMINATORY RATE — BURDEN OF PROOF. — Shippers of the town of Rockport, Illinois, filed a complaint before the Interstate Commerce Commission alleging that the defendant's rate on certain goods from Rockport to St. Louis was "unduly discriminatory in violation of sections 2 and 3" of the act to regulate commerce. The rate was increased shortly after the filing of the complaint. Held, that the burden is on the defendant to show that no unjust discrimination exists. Burson Knitting Co. v. C. M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 42 Int. Com. Rep. 739.

At common law there is no underlying principle which will enable one to determine in a given issue on whom the burden of proof shall fall other than the general one of fairness based on experience. See 4 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 2486. The Commerce Commission follows the courts in this matter. See JUDSON, INTERSTATE COMMERCE, 3 ed., § 440. Were the act to regulate commerce silent on the question, fairness would seem to demand that the carrier on increasing its rate should not be called upon to show that no one or no locality of possible hundreds was discriminated against. It should not have to prove a general negative. Even if a specific locality complains of such rate there is no reason why the complainant should not be left to establish its case. There are no presumptions arising from the long standing of the previous rate. People ex rel. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co. v. P. S. Comm., 215 N. Y. 241, 109 N. E. 252. Nor is there any presumption of wrong arising from a changed rate. I. C. C. v. Chicago Gt. Western Ry. Co., 209 U. S. 108, 119. The practice of the Commission itself has been in accordance with these holdings. Holmes & Co. v. So. Ry. Co., 8 Int. Com. Rep. 561. See JUDSON, INTERSTATE COMMERCE, 3 ed., § 440. But the amendment of 1910 of section 15 of the Act expressly provides that the burden of showing an increased rate is "reasonable" shall be on the carrier. But it would seem that "reasonable" must be distinguished from "discriminatory." For that the word "reasonable" has not a scope sufficiently broad to include discrimination appears from the classification and division of objections to rates in section 1, providing against "unreasonable" rates, section 2 providing against "discriminatory" rates, and section 3 providing against "preferential" rates. Wickwire Steel Co. v. N. Y. C. R. Co., 30 Int. Com. Rep. 415, 420. LEGACIES AND DEVISES UNCERTAINTY DEVISE TO UNBORN BASTARD OF SPECIFIED FATHER. The testator in a codicil set aside a share of his estate "in case he should leave any other male child by the said Mary Ann,” with whom he was unlawfully cohabiting. There was a male child en ventre sa mère at the testator's death. Held, that the bastard does not take. In re Homer, 115 L. T. R. 703.

A gift by deed or by will to future bastards of either the donor or a third person has in the past been held void. Medworth v. Pope, 27 Beav. 71; Metham v. Duke of Devon, 1 P. Wms. 529. See Blodwell v. Edwards, Cro. Eliz. 509, 510. The reason seems to be the policy against the encouragement of

immorality. See Lord St. Leonards in In re Connor, 2 Jo. & La T. 456, 459-60. But at least one exception has since been established in the case of a testamentary gift by the putative father, on the ground that since the gift dates from death the begetting of bastards is not encouraged. Occleston v. Fullalove, L. R. 9 Ch. App. 147, 162; In re Hastie's Trusts, 35 Ch. Div. 728. Here a difference was taken upon another ground. If the bastard was described as the child of the mother only, it was ascertainable and could take. Gordon v. Gordon, I Mer. 141; Evans v. Massey, 8 Price 22. But, if the description specified the father as well as the mother, it was said that the child must show a reputation as begot by the particular father. Wilkinson v. Adam, 1 Ves. & B. 422. For without such reputation the child was filius nullius and the law would not inquire into the scandal. See 2 JARMAN, WILLS, 6 Eng. ed., 1765. Hence, if the child is en ventre sa mère at the testator's death the gift would fail, since a child must be in esse during father's life to acquire the necessary reputation. Earle v. Wilson, 17 Ves. 529. See Blodwell v. Edwards, Cro. Eliz. 509, 510; Gordon v. Gordon, 1 Mer. 141, 152. Contra, In re Connor, 2 Jo. & La T. 456, 460. See Occleston v. Fullalove, L. R. 9 Ch. App. 147, 164. However, the fiction of filius nullius is in these days an unstable pediment for any doctrine. The result should rather be rested on the practical difficulty of proof, a question of degree to be determined in each case. See Occleston v. Fullalove, L. R. 9 Ch. App. 147, 158. But this difficulty assumes that the testator desires such proof. Usually however he states his paternity simply as matter of belief and not by way of limitation. See 2 JARMAN, WILLS, 6 Eng. ed., 1770, 1781.

NATURALIZATION - FILIPINOS. A native Filipino applied to be made an American citizen under R. S. XXX, § 2169, as amended in 18 STAT. AT L. 318, and under the Act of June 29, 1906, 34 STAT. AT L., c. 3592, § 30. Held, that the petition be granted. In the matter of Marcus Solis, U. S. Dist. Ct. for Hawaii, Mar. 25, 1916.

A native Filipino applied under the same provisions to be made an American citizen. Held, that the petition be denied. In the matter of Alfred Ocampo, U. S. Dist. Ct. for Hawaii, Dec. 30, 1916.

Section 2169, which was in force prior to the Act of June 29, 1906, limits the provisions for naturalization to "aliens being free white persons and to aliens of African nativity and to persons of African descent." But § 30 of the Act of June, 1906, provided that "all applicable provisions of the naturalization laws

shall apply to and be held to authorize the admission to citizenship of all persons not citizens who owe permanent allegiance to the United States." As the petitioners come within the description, they are entitled to citizenship unless the former section modifies this provision. Being neither expressly repealed nor inconsistent with the Act of June, it must, by the rules of statutory construction, be still in force. Bessho v. U. S., 178 Fed. 245. See I LEWIS' SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, 2 ed., 461-64. It has been argued, however, that as § 30 does not refer to aliens, and as § 2169 only refers to aliens, it cannot be considered an "applicable" limitation. The wording of the statutes certainly justifies such an argument. But the history of § 30 shows that its purpose was to avoid the difficulty of admitting Porto Ricans to citizenship because they were not aliens,'could not renounce allegiance to a foreign sovereign, and were not, therefore, within the Act. To extend the rights of citizenship to all emigrants of our insular possessions regardless of race was clearly not the intention of Congress. So it has been held concerning the limitation of § 2169 on other clauses, with wordings similar to § 30. In re Alverta, 198 Fed. 688; In re Lampitoe, 232 Fed. 382.

PATENTS PROCEDURE - WHAT CONSTITUTES AN INTERLOCUTORY DECREE. - In an action on two separate patents, a decree was in favor of the plaintiff as to one patent, with an order for an accounting, but in favor of the de

fendant as to the other. Section 129 of the Federal Judicial Code provides that appeals from interlocutory decrees must be taken within thirty days. The plaintiff appeals from the part of the decree adverse to him more than thirty days after its entry. Held, that the decree was interlocutory and the appeal is barred. Stromberg Motor Co. v. Arnson, 56 N. Y. L. J. 1599 (Circ. Ct. of App., 2nd Circ.). When the judgments in an action are absolutely unconnected, there may be partial appeals. Hall v. Bank of Virginia, 14 W. Va. 584, 614. So the appeal, in the principal case, can only be barred if the decree appealed from is considered interlocutory. An interlocutory decree has been defined as “an adjudication or order, made upon some point arising during the progress of a cause, which does not determine finally the merits of the question or questions involved." See 1 BOUVIER, LAW DICTIONARY, 3 rev., 805. The question of what constitutes an interlocutory decree is especially difficult when various issues are raised in the same suit. It has been held that a decree which decides the merits is final, even though an accounting not asked for in the pleadings and merely incidental to the relief is still necessary. Forgay v. Conrad, 6 How. (U. S.) 201. So a decree which dismisses the action as to some parties, so that they have no further interest in the action, but retains the case as to other parties, is so far final as to allow a separate appeal. Hill v. Chicago & Evanston R. Co., 140 U. S. 52. However the weight of authority is in accord with the principal case, that a decree dismissing some claims in an action and giving relief by an accounting as to others, but dismissing none of the original parties, is entirely interlocutory. Western Electric Co. v. Williams-Abbott Electric Co., 108 Fed. 952; Ex parte National Enameling Co., 201 U. S. 156. Contra, Historical Pub. Co. v. Jones, 231 Fed. 784. Under the previous federal statute which allowed appeals from interlocutory decrees only when an injunction was granted or continued, a decree denying an injunction was treated as final, in order that there need not be a separate accounting, if it was reversed. Scriven v. North, 134 Fed. 366. The present statute removes the necessity for such construction by allowing an appeal from an interlocutory decree if taken in time. But when the period for appeals is as short as in the Judicial Code, this uncertainty as to what constitutes an interlocutory decree is a cause of great hardship; and it seems that the term should be more accurately defined by statute, or that the courts should be given power to allow appeals, in their discretion, after the time has expired.

PRESUMPTIONS PRESUMPTION OF DEATH FROM SEVEN YEARS' ABSENCE WITHOUT NEWS SUBSTITUTION OF ACTUARIAL TABLE. - William died in 1915. Thomas, his brother, disappeared in 1872 at the age of thirty, and has not been heard from since 1894. Thomas' children apply for administration of his estate. If Thomas predeceased William, the petitioners will share per capita in William's estate as nephews and nieces; if Thomas survived William, they will take per stirpes from Thomas' share. Held, that from mortality tables confirmed by family longevity Thomas both survived William and is now dead, and that administration be granted. The Goods of Thomas Rowe, 56 N. Y. L. J. 1669 (Surrogates' Ct.).

The presumption of death after seven years' absence from home without news is nothing more than the cessation of the presumption of continued life at the seventh year. See THAYER, PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE, 323. It is based on two elements. First, the natural mortality of man in the lapse of time. Cf. Martinez v. Succession of Vives, 32 La. Ann. 305, 307. See SWINBURNE, TESTAMENTS, pt. 6, s. 13, 2. Second, the probability of continued communication from any one who is not dead. Cf. Traveler's Ins. Co. v. Rosch, 23 Ohio Cir. Ct. 491. Like any presumption it is rebuttable by explaining away its basic inferences. Thus the fact that the alleged deceased was a fugitive from justice might explain why he conceals his whereabouts. See Mutual Ben

efit, etc. Ins. Co. v. Martin, 108 Ky. 11, 18, 55 S. W. 694, 696; Sensenderfer v. Pacific, etc. Ins. Co., 19 Fed. 68, 69. And, likewise, as in the principal case, an unusual family longevity might rebut the first basic inference. But the use of the mortality tables does not explain away anything; it is rather a substitution of another presumption in which the period varies with the age of the alleged deceased. This is a more scientific application of the inference of death from old age, but it loses sight of the inference from non-communication. It is submitted that this latter is a constant, equally applicable to young and old, and hence that the actuarial tables should be applied only to shorten the period of seven years. Furthermore, the claim of the petitioners is not based merely on the fact that Thomas survived William, but necessarily also that William is now dead. If these claims are distinctly separate, the court is correct in claiming that the mortality tables can raise two presumptions: that Thomas lived to 1916, and that Thomas is now dead. But if the burden of proof were that Thomas died between 1916 and the present, that is, if this were one claim, then though the tables show that a majority of fifty-two year olds in 1894 will have survived 1916, but not the present, however only a very small minority will have died between those periods.

PROCESS - MANNER AND EFFECT OF SERVICE PRIVILEGE OF NONRESIDENT WITNESS FROM SERVICE AS OFFICER OF A CORPORATION. An officer of a corporation was served with process in a county through which he was traveling, in order to serve as a witness, in obedience to a subpoena. A statute provides that "a witness shall not be liable to be sued in a county in which he does not reside, by being served with a summons in such county, while going, returning or attending, in obedience to a subpœna.' OKLAHOMA REV. Laws, 1910, 5064. Held, that the service did not give jurisdiction of the corporation. Commonwealth Cotton Oil Co. v. Hudson, 161 Pac. 535 (Okla.).

The statute relates only to the question of venue, and does not mention the rights of a corporation. See Linn v. Hagan's Adm'x, 121 Ky. 627, 628, 87 S. W. ΙΙΟΙ. But by common law witnesses are privileged from service of process. Hicks v. Besuchet, 7 N. D. 429, 75 N. W. 793; Letherby v. Shaver, 73 Mich. 500, 41 N. W. 677. See Lamkin v. Starkey, 7 Hun (N. Y.) 479. See also TIDD, PRACTICE, 195; ALDERSON, JUDICIAL WRIT AND PROCESS, § 120; 23 HARV. L. REV. 474. This applies even where the witness attends the trial voluntarily. Chittenden v. Carter, 82 Conn. 585, 74 Atl. 884. If this privilege were in the nature of a reward for the witness's services, it might be arguable that it extended only to his personal capacity; but if it is considered a privilege of the court, it ought to cover the witness's official capacity as well. Authority supports this latter view. See Parker v. Marco, 136 N. Y. 585, 589, 32 N. E. 989. Cf. Holyoke, etc. Ice Co. v. Amsden, 55 Fed. 593. So, as the purpose of the privilege is to expedite the administration of justice, and as public policy demands that witnesses shall feel free to attend trials without being subject to service of process, it has even been held that service of process upon a witness constitutes contempt of court. Bridges v. Sheldon, 7 Fed. 17; In re Healey, 53 Vt. 694. It follows that the decision in the principal case is sound, and it is supported by the authorities. Sewanee, etc. Co. v. Williams, 120 Tenn. 339, 107 S. W. 968. Cf. Mulhearn v. Press Publishing Co., 53 N. J. L. 150, 20 Atl. 760. But see Currie Fertilizer Co. v. Krish, 74 S. W. 268, 269 (Ky.).

TRADE SECRETS LIST OF CUSTOMERS: USE BY FORMER EMPLOYEE. The plaintiff was engaged in the business of supplying towels and aprons to factories and offices. The defendants were former employees. Plaintiff seeks to restrain them from soliciting for themselves the custom of those whom they had served while in his employ. Held, that he is not entitled to an injunction pendente lite. New York Towel Supply Co., Inc. v. Lally, 162 N. Y. Supp. 247 (Sup. Ct., King's Cty.).

The plaintiff alleged that he had built up a large patronage for himself as an accountant; that he had employed the defendant as his confidential manager; and that since his discharge the defendant has made use of information derived from plaintiff's list of customers to solicit the patronage of these customers for himself. The defendant demurred. Held, that the complaint sets forth a good cause of action and that an injunction issue. Goldschmidt v. Sachs, 162 N. Y. Supp. 323 (Sup. Ct., N. Y. Cty.).

If a servant on quitting his employer carry away with him a list of customers with which he had been entrusted, or a copy of such list, it is a breach of his "duty of loyalty," and he may be compelled to return or destroy the list so taken. Grand Union Tea Co. v. Dodds, 164 Mich. 50, 128 N. W. 1090. Some cases go further and restrain him from soliciting the patronage of any customer whose name appeared on the list. Stevens & Co. v. Stiles, 29 R. İ. 399, 71 Atl. 802. In a sense the more drastic decree is punitive. Yet it is obvious that the other would, in practice, often fail to afford plaintiff adequate protection. A more difficult problem arises when the former employee relies only upon his memory for the names communicated to him. Here no more definite test seems possible than whether, in the light of all the facts, the employer's list of customers may fairly be termed a "trade secret." Boosing v. Dorman, 148 App. Div. 824, 133 N. Y. Supp. 910. Thus, for example, if the customers did not deal exclusively with plaintiff and could readily have been located by any business competitor, the departing employee need not "wipe clean the slate of his memory," and no injunction will issue. Boosing v. Dorman, supra; Peerless Pattern Co. v. Pictorial Review, 147 App. Div. 715, 132 N. Y. Supp. 37. But if the customers are exclusive patrons, likely because of a system of trading stamps to continue their dealings with plaintiff, and whose names and patronage have been acquired by years of enterprise and advertising, the former employer is entitled to protection. Witkop & Holmes Co. v. Boyce, 61 Misc. 126, 112 N. Y. Supp. 874, affirmed 131 App. Div. 922, 115 N. Y. Supp. 1150; Witkop & Holmes Co. v. Boyce, 64 Misc. 374, 118 N. Y. Supp. 461. In each case the particular facts must control. On the one hand the fruits of business industry and perseverance must be protected in so far as is possible; on the other, the whole policy of the law demands that budding competition be not stifled, that employees be not arbitrarily deprived of the increased market value which is a legitimate perquisite of protracted service in any line of business. Both New York cases seem, therefore, sound and reconcilable.

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TRANSFER OF STOCK LIABILITY OF a Broker, AcTING FOR AN UNDISCLOSED PRINCIPAL, FOR CALLS ON STOCK. The registered owner of bank stock, subject to statutory double liability, sold to a broker at auction. The broker, unknown to the vendor, was acting for a principal. The certificates, assigned in blank, were turned over to the broker who paid for them. He then assigned them to his principal, and collected his commission. Subsequently, and before any change of name on the registry of the bank, there was a call on the stock, which the original vendor, as the owner of record, was forced to pay. He thereupon sued the broker for reimbursement. Held, that he may not recover. Richards v. Robin, 162 N. Y. Supp. 12 (App. Div.).

Under the law of New York, although a registered shareholder is liable to the corporation, the legal title to the shares nevertheless passes with delivery regardless of any rules of the corporation to the contrary. See 8 N. Y. CONSOL. LAWS, 1989, 1990. Surely, then, there must be recovery in quasi-contract from the title-holder of the shares when the call was assessed, for the payment by the shareholder of record. But such liability cannot extend to the agent in the principal case, for he was not the holder of the shares when the call was made. At common law, although the title to the shares did not pass, the vendee of