of the Treaty of 1839. For the student of the international law question raised by the invasion of Belgium, this volume is negligible. Professor de Visscher's is a book of a very different sort. The ablest book on the subject that has yet appeared (with perhaps the exception of Dr. Dernburg's), it is obviously the work of a trained lawyer and a skilled logician. The basis of Belgium's neutralization, the treaties of 1831 and 1839, is explained lucidly and accurately enough, with the very important exception that the author does not state, indeed inferentially denies (p. 70), that the Treaty of 1839 failed to "textually insert" the "garantissent" articles of 1831. The neutrality of Greece is treated with perhaps not absolute fairness. The German arguments of necessity (notrecht) and self-defense against France (notwehr) are effectually disposed of upon the facts; but the author is discreetly silent as to similar theories held by English writers at least as late as 1914. Professor de Visscher disposes of the Belgian-British-French intrigues as skilfully as is possible. As he accurately states, Germany was bound by the Hague Convention (5) of 1907 on the morning of August 4, 1914, when Belgium was invaded, since it was not at war with a non-contracting power until II P. M. of the same day. A narrow gap of time, but a sufficient one. There can be no question that the Germany of to-day is a party to the treaties of 1831 and 1839; the question is, did these treaties, coupled with subsequent events, deprive Germany of the power to declare war against Belgium (as she did), and hence make the invasion of Belgium an invasion, not of a belligerent, but of a neutral? Only in that event can there have been a violation of the Hague Convention. This fact Professor de Visscher fails to realize adequately (see pp. 146 et seq.). These are the defects most apparent in M. de Visscher's work. Frequent citations of American authorities are pleasant, as perhaps they were designed to be. The book is a reasonably fair as well as an able one, restrained throughout. It is a pity that some American writers upon the invasion of Belgium, ex-assistant attorneys-general and men of even higher ex-official rank, cannot learn both international law and moderation from this professor of Ghent. RAEBURN GREEN. HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS. By William L. Clark, Jr. Third Edition by I. Maurice Wormser. St. Paul: West Publishing Co. 1916. (Hornbook series.) pp. xiii-803. In 1897 Clark on Corporations was made part of the Hornbook series. The HARVARD Law Review (10 HARV. L. REV. 530) called Mr. Clark's work "above the average" in the student text field. So great has been the development in Corporation Law since the work of Mr. Clark, that a new edition of the text became essential. Mr. Wormser of the New York Bar, and professor of law in Fordham University Law School (also author of Wormser's Cases on Corporations), undertook the task of revision and reconstruction. In fact he has had to completely revise the text throughout in order to bring it up to date - abreast with the authorities. The "Hornbook" idea has been preserved in the topical arrangement of the subject matter. Ample notes, replete with authorities (including those reported in 1916), add greatly to the weight of the text. Two chapters are distinctly valuable - VIII, The Corporation and the State; and XV, Foreign Corporations showing the relation between Corporation Law and Constitutional Law and Conflicts respectively. The chapters on Membership, Liability on Contracts by Promoters, and Powers are praiseworthy. Throughout Mr. Wormser is sound and accurate, possessing two virtues not too often attained by "handbook" authors. It is particularly pleasing to find a clear and accurate definition of the well-worn phrase Ultra Vires. Quot ing from the opinion of Depue, J., in Camden & A. R. Co. v. May's Landing, etc. Co., 48 N. J. L. 530, 7 Atl. 523, he says of Ultra Vires: "In its legitimate use, the expression should be applied only to such acts as are beyond the powers of the corporation itself," and not loosely applied, as many courts often do, to mere excessive use of authority by the members, directors, or officers, or to acts which do not conform to charter requirements (pp. 202-04). It is such preciseness of thought and language that makes this work valuable to the student. DALE M. PARKER. INTERNATIONAL REALITIES. By Philip Marshall Brown. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1917. pp. xvi, 233. Says Professor Brown: "Since the Great War began I have been conscious with many others, of the urgent necessity of a thorough reconstruction of the law of nations in accordance with the big facts of international life. I have set myself the task of endeavoring to ascertain the fundamental values in international relations." What these big facts, these fundamental values, are, we never learn. The function of international law, the author insists, is not to regulate war - such a conception is conception is "essentially paradoxical and unsound." He then proceeds to explain (p. 3) that wars must be waged "with due respect to the rights of humanity," and that neutral interests must be protected. After spending several pages wondering whether international law is law, he finally decides that it is, apart from its status as municipal law, because the Supreme Court of the United States has said so (p. 20). This conception of the Supreme Court's power is most interesting. There is one great principle, ruled our first Chief Justice in a case too famous to be unknown to Professor Brown, "that all the members of a civil community are bound to each other by compact. The compact between the community and its members is, that the community will protect its members. . .' ." Here is Contrat Social pure and simple, and by the Chief Justice of the United States; yet Professor Brown, in his chapter entitled "Nationalism," dismisses the Social Compact with a scant line, as the speculation of a theorist. Apparently he believes that a United States court can make one star to shine, but not another. The truth is, that no court of the United States has, or ever has had, jurisdiction to adjudicate any question of international law as such, much less to declare international law's validity as law. This chapter "Nationalism" contains elaboration at length of such profound truths as that "geographical location frequently has much to do with the formation of States." So also, "the existence of a common enemy has served . . . to foster a national community of interest." Professor Brown wholly fails to understand criticisms of nationalism; indeed, he makes no attempt to comprehend, but unhesitatingly distorts and condemns. Arbitration Professor Brown would restrict to causes too trivial to quarrel over; every question of importance should be settled by diplomacy or by war. Arbitration, even by a super-national court, can settle nothing finally; while war, he says, can and does so settle. To Mr. Norman Angell is here (p. 75) attributed the curious statement that "there never was a good war or an honorable peace." Whenever Professor Brown desires to clinch his arguments against pacifism, he knocks down Mr. Angell for a "materialist," and quotes a new form of this statement always inclosed in quotation marks, which Professor Brown apparently intends as a warning of more than usual inaccuracy. 1 Trial of Isaac Williams, 2 Cranch *83 a; WHARTON, STATE TRIALS OF THE UNITED STATES, 652, 653. 2 Cf. 2 WESTLAKE, INTERNATIONAL LAW, 2 ed., 317, 318. Democracy should not supplant diplomacy, the author holds, since diplomacy is far more competent. This superior competency is proved, first, by the fact that America has in the past possessed some able diplomats. Professor Brown would no doubt be astonished at the idea that the more efficient its agents are, the more dangerous may diplomacy be as a means of transacting international business. The second proof is, that American democracy, by showing restraint and by reposing confidence in the President in times of international stress, has "confessed its own sense of incapacity to handle foreign affairs." The third proof is that democracy's feeling would run so high, at critical times, that unnecessary wars would be precipitated. Professor Brown opposes the establishment of a super-national court, as has been intimated. He likewise severely criticises the work of the newly formed American Institute of International Law, which has endeavored to formulate the rights of states, and, more recently, has produced the Code of Maritime Neutrality. Opposing as he does both the rational codification and the supernational interpretation of international law, it is natural that Professor Brown should likewise oppose any proposition (such as that of the League to Enforce Peace) to enforce it. His faith is placed in the trinity of war, diplomacy, and the somewhat vague "complete, just understanding between the nations." The book impels one to a belief in some relentless law of diminishing deserts, that operates upon the reputations of American writers upon international law. The present preponderance of shallow thinking concerning international relations is the most dangerous phase of national unpreparedness. RAEBURN GREEN. HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS. By H. Gerald Chapin. St. Paul: West Publishing Co. 1917. pp. xiv, 695. DIGEST OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES AND TERRITORIES, with annotations. 1916 Supplement, revised to November 1, 1916. New York: Workmen's Compensation Publicity Bureau. THE PUBLIC DEFENDER, a Necessary Factor in the Administration of Justice. By Mayer C. Goldman. New York and London: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1917. THE ELEMENTS OF JURISPRUDENCE. By Thomas Erskine Holland. Twelfth Edition. New York and London: Oxford University Press. 1917. pp. XXV, 454. BLOCKADE AND CONTRABAND. By A. Maurice Low. Washington. pp. 16. MANUALS OF EMERGENCY LEGISLATION: DEFENCE OF THE REALM MANUAL. Edited by Alexander Pulling. Second Enlarged Edition. London: H. M. Stationery Office. 1916. pp. vii, 282. BETTER CITY PLANNING FOR BRIDGEPORT. By John Nolen. With a Report on Legal Methods of Carrying out the Changes Proposed. By Frank Backus Williams. 1916. pp. xx, 159. CASES AND READINGS ON THE JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE OF THE FEDERAL COURTS. By George W. Rightmire. Cincinnati: W. H. Anderson Company. 1917. pp. xvi, 892. STATUTE LAW-MAKING IN IOWA. Edited by Benjamin F. Shambaugh. Applied History, Volume III. Iowa City: The State Historical Society of Iowa. 1916. pp. xvii, 718. CASES IN QUASI-CONTRACT SELECTED FROM DECISIONS OF ENGLISH AND AMERICAN COURTS. By Edward S. Thurston. American Case-Book Series. St. Paul: West Publishing Co. 1916. pp. xv, 622. • Published in full in THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, January 25, 1917. HARVARD LAW REVIEW VOL. XXX APRIL, 1917 No. 6 INSANITY AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY A TREATISE on the Criminal Responsibility of Lunatics published in England in 1909 begins with this statement: "The feud between medical men and lawyers in all questions concerning the criminal liability of lunatics is of old standing. More than one authority on either side has tried to bring about a reconciliation between the contending parties. But their endeavours have been crowned with very little success. For though it cannot be denied that the strife and warfare has of late lost much of its former bitterness, a modus vivendi satisfactory to both parties has not been found." 1 A year after this statement was made Professor John H. Wigmore, then president of the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology, believing that some agreement might result from the combined and coöperative labors of members of the two professions and that the difficult problem of determining the relation of insanity to criminal responsibility might be thereby to some extent solved, appointed a committee composed of four physicians and five lawyers.2 This committee, which has had a continuous existence since its original appointment, published yearly reports, 1 OPPENHEIMER, CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY OF LUNATICS, Preface. * Two members of the original committee resigned, and one vacancy thus created was later filled. Otherwise the committee has remained unchanged since its original appointment. It now consists of the following members: Albert C. Barnes, Judge of the Superior Court, Chicago. Orrin N. Carter, Justice of the Illinois Supreme Court. Edwin R. Keedy, Chairman, Professor of Law in the University of Pennsylvania. Adolf Meyer, Professor of Psychiatry in Johns Hopkins Medical School. William E. Mikell, Dean of the Law School, University of Pennsylvania. one of them being a compilation of the laws of all the states of this country relative to insanity and criminal responsibility. It also at various times suggested for discussion tentative proposals, some of which were finally recommended for adoption. In 1915 the committee presented a bill for the regulation of expert testimony in cases where insanity is set up as a defense to a criminal charge. This bill was approved by the Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology, and by the Conference on Medical Legislation of the American Medical Association. Last year the committee, having reached a unanimous agreement, presented to the Institute a bill providing a test for determining criminal responsibility when the defense of insanity is raised, and a method of procedure to be employed in such a case. This bill was approved by the Institute, which also at the request of the committee approved several sections of the expert testimony bill independently of the others. The two bills as finally approved are as follows: CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY BILL Sec. 1. When Mental Disease a Defense. No person shall hereafter be convicted of any criminal charge when at the time of the act or omission alleged against him he was suffering from mental disease and by reason of such mental disease he did not have the particular state of mind that must accompany such act or omission in order to constitute the crime charged. Sec. 2. Form of Verdict. When in any indictment or information any act or omission is charged against any person as an offense, and it is given in evidence on the trial of such person for that offense that he was mentally diseased at the time when he did the act or made the omission charged, then if the jury before whom such person is tried concludes that he did the act or made the omission charged, but by reason of his mental disease was not responsible according to the preceding section, then the jury shall return a special verdict that the accused did the act or made the omission charged against him but was not at the time legally responsible by reason of his mental disease. Sec. 3. Inquisition. When such special verdict is found, the court shall remand the prisoner to the custody of [the proper officer 3] and shall immediately order an inquisition by [the proper persons 3] to determine Morton Prince, Physician, Boston. William A. White, Superintendent Government Hospital for the Insane, Washington, D. C. • When this bill is introduced in the legislature of any state, the titles of the persons |