they had in mind the accommodation party's other equitable defenses, or any of his equitable rights as against the holder, or that these, any more than his rights and remedies as against the accommodated party, of which there is no pretense that the Act deprived him, are impliedly excluded by the failure to include them? Such interpretation we can justify only by assuming that the Uniform Act is an attempted codification of the whole body of the "law merchant," by implication repealing whatever it omits. It is true that some of the decisions quoted by the conference hint at such assumption.40 A more logical view, however, Section 196 of the Act itself suggests: "In any case not provided for in this act the rules of the law merchant shall govern."" On its face this provision is compatible neither with the theory that the Act codifies the entire "law merchant," nor with the assumption that it necessarily sets aside or changes such rules of the "law merchant" as it fails specifically to mention. The commonsense view of it is not that it is an attempt to codify the entire law of commercial paper, or anything more than an effort in the direction of uniformity in commercial transactions, leaving matters not covered by it to the operation of the general "law merchant.” Properly speaking, the rule expressio unius cannot apply to it at all. Even Mr. Chief Justice Rugg's remark, in discussing the purpose of the Act, that "it does not cover the whole field of negotiable instruments law," 42 bears out this view. 40 Brophy v. Wilson, 45 Mont. 489, 124 Pac. 510 (1912); Wisner v. Bank, 220 Pa. 21, 68 Atl. 955 (1908); Walker v. Dunham, 135 Mo. App. 396, 115 S. W. 1086 (1908); Trustees v. McComb, 105 Va. 473, 54 S. E. 14 (1906); Wirt v. Stubblefield, 17 App. D. C. 283 (1900). 41 AMERICAN UNIFORM COMMERCIAL ACTS, p. 184. 42 Union Trust Co. v. McGinty, supra. This is also the view of the leading critics of the Act. See the quotation from Professor Brannan's work on the Act, supra ; also his suggestions for amendments to it. 26 HARV. L. REV. 588-600. See also the discussions of the Act by Professor Street, 11 LAW NOTES 105; Professor McGehee, 12 LAW NOTES 122; Professor H. H. McMahon, 80 LAW REPORTER 25; Professor McKeehan, 41 AM. L. REG. (N. S.) 437, 499, 561. The subject receives some attention, also, in the Ames-Brewster debate (14 HARV. L. REV. 241; 10 YALE L. J. 84; 14 HARV. L. REV. 442; 15 HARV. L. REV. 26; 16 HARV. L. REV. 255; BRANNAN, NEG. INST. LAW, 162 seq). His earlier suggestion in the same opinion, as to the elimination of suretyship, therefore goes too far. So also does the conference report above quoted, for which his suggestion was a precedent. The Uniform Act does not codify suretyship out of the "law merchant," any more than it codifies a "law merchant" in which suretyship never belonged. On the contrary, it leaves such rules of suretyship as the "law merchant" has by analogy adopted, still operative in those cases involving commercial paper, to which the analogy applies.43 As at least one court has suggested, the abrogation of the defense of extension of time may perhaps be justified not only by the terms of the Uniform Act, but also by the fact that such defense has always been at best a technical one, seldom based upon any real injury to the accommodation party." Not so of surrender of security or release of funds or other acts of the holder with knowledge constituting positive neglect or wrong. To abolish the equities of the accommodation party's suretyship, therefore, is to ignore both the fundamental nature of his contract and the purpose of the Uniform Act. Such abolition the rule expressio unius, applied to the Act, alone justifies. The same reasoning which regards extension of time as a merely technical defense must condemn that rule, so applied, as also too technical for consonance with the spirit of equity which permeated the "law merchant" and which the Uni "Bean, J., in Hunter v. Harris, 63 Ore. 505, 513, 127 Pac. 786, 789 (1912), an action between accommodation parties. "In the examination of this question it is worthy of note that a surety on a negotiable instrument is not mentioned in the negotiable instruments law. This law provides that, in any case not provided for in the act, the rules of the law merchant shall govern." The late Dean Ames, discussing subsections 120-5 and 6 of the Uniform Act, said: "There seems to be no sufficient reason, on the one hand, for inserting these doctrines of suretyship in a negotiable instruments code, or, on the other hand, if they are to be inserted, for omitting other doctrines of suretyship of equal importance." 14 HARV. L. REV. 241, 254; BRANNAN, NEG. INST. LAW, 175. He favored the dropping of these subsections, and the adding of a subsection providing for the release of the accommodation party if the holder with knowledge of the accommodation releases or gives time to the accommodated party. Hon. Amasa D. Eaton, former president of the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, addressing the conference in 1907, expressed agreement with the critics who contend with Professor Brannan, that the Act can be so construed as to harmonize with the established rules of suretyship. 31 REPORTS OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, 1154, 1164. See also the discussion of the Act by Professor Crawford D. Hening, 59 U. OF PA. L. REV. 532, 542. "Mason, J., in First National Bank v. Livermore, 90 Kan. 395, 398, 133 Pac. 734, 47 L. R. A. (N. S.) 277 (1913). 45 form Act, designed to remove minor differences and technical inequalities without changing general rules, ought to strengthen rather than destroy. OMAHA, NEBRASKA. Anan Raymond. 45 Mr. Chief Justice Winslow, in State Bank v. Michel, 152 Wis. 88, 139 N. W. 748, 749 (1913). Similar views are expressed in Columbian Banking Co. v. Bowen, 134 Wis. 218, 114 N. W. 451 (1908); Campbell v. Bank, 137 Ky. 555, 126 S. W. 114 (1910); and by Mr. Chief Justice Rugg in Fourth Nat. Bank v. Mead, 216 Mass. 521, 523, 104 N. E. 377, 52 L. R. A. (N. S.) 226 (1914); and Liberty Trust Co. v. Tilton, 217 Mass. 462, 466, 105 N. E. 605, L. R. A. 1915B, 144, 148. HARVARD LAW REVIEW Published monthly, during the Academic Year, by Harvard Law Students SUBSCRIPTION PRICE, $2.50 PER ANNUM 85 CENTS PER NUMBER Editorial Board CHARLES BUNN, President DONALD E. DUNBAR, Note Editor G. HERBERT SEMLER, Case Editor CHARLES P. CURTIS, JR. CHAUNCEY H. HAND, JR. WILLIAM C. BROWN, JR., Treasurer STANLEY MORRISON THORPE D. NESBIT THE LAW SCHOOL.-The registration in the School on November 15 of each of the last twelve years is shown in the following table: Of the students now registered all but five are college graduates,* and of those five, three are graduates of other law schools. There are now in the School representatives from one hundred and Fifteen men who have completed all the work necessary for a degree but who have not actually received their diplomas are reckoned as graduates. fifty-five colleges and universities, as compared with one hundred and forty-four last year and the same number the previous year. The following table shows the Geographical source from which the twelve successive first year classes have been drawn: In the present first year class one hundred and seven colleges and universities are represented as follows: Dartmouth, Brown, 10; Boston College, Grinnell Bucknell Univ., Univ. of Harvard, 78; Yale, 35; Princeton, 20; Washington & Jefferson, 7; Cornell Univ., 6; Coll., Univ. of Michigan, 5; Amherst Coll., Illinois, Oberlin, Wabash, Williams, 4; Univ. of California, Univ. of Cincinnati, Clark, Colby, Indiana Univ., Univ. of Minnesota, Univ. of Missouri, Trinity Coll. (Conn.), Univ. of Wisconsin, 3; Bowdoin, Carleton, Univ. of Chicago, Davidson College, Franklin & Marshall, Univ. of Georgia, Georgetown Univ., Holy Cross College, Univ. of Kansas, Lake Forest College, Univ. of Nebraska, Univ. of North Carolina, Northwestern Univ., Univ. of Oregon, Univ. of Pennsylvania, Pomona College, Utah Agricultural College, Wooster Univ., Illinois Coll., Coll. of Charleston, Reed Coll., 2; Univ. of Alabama, Univ. of Arkansas, Beloit Coll., Carroll Coll., Colgate, Colorado, Univ. of Colorado, Columbia Univ., Cornell Coll., Fordham Univ., Franklin, Hamilton, Haverford, Howard, Johns Hopkins Univ., Kenyon Coll., Knox Coll., Lafayette, Leland Stanford Jr. Univ., Lincoln Univ., Miami Univ., Middlebury Coll., Ohio State Univ., Ohio Wesleyan Univ., Oxford Univ. (England), Rutgers Coll., Shurtleff Coll., Univ. of South Carolina, Syracuse Univ., Univ. of Tennessee, Univ. of Texas, Union Coll., Univ. of Utah, Washington & Lee Univ., Western Reserve Univ., West Virginia Univ., Wofford Coll., Washington, Univ. of So. California, Wm. Jewell Coll., Va. Union Univ., Mt. St. Mary's Coll., Univ. of Mississippi, Roanoke Coll., McMaster Univ., Coe Coll., Wake Forest Coll., RandolphMacon Coll., Univ. of Washington, Carthage Coll., City College (N. Y.), McGill Univ., Mercer Univ., Rice Institute, Hobart Coll., Whitman, Mt. Union Coll., Mt. Allison Univ., Alabama Polytechnic Institute, Lehigh Univ., Collegiate Institute of Havana, I. THE HARVARD LEGAL AID BUREAU. — The increasing difficulties of the administration of justice in a modern city make the work of the |