Nor can the Kud Khoda oppress them with impunity; he exposes himself to frequent complaints, and complaints in Persia are generally listened to with avidity. They certainly may become the instruments of tyranny; but we have yet to discover an institution that cannot be abused.

CHAPTER XVII.

Of the Police of Sheeraz.

Ir has been remarked, that the police of a despotic monarchy is infinitely superior to that in a free state. It is necessary that it should be so; for suspicion is the prevailing cause which directs the actions and councils of a despot.

The police of Sheeraz is admirably regulated; and I hardly think it possible for the middling classes of people to harbour any design against the government, which should not come to the immediate notice of the governor. The Darogha, or superintendant of the Bazars, holds his office from government; it is his duty to settle the disputes that may occur in the markets, and to hear the complaints of the people of the Bazar. If a shopkeeper refuses to execute, or violates his agreement, you make your complaint to the Darogha, who obliges him to perform it; or, if he should prove that he is totally unable, he grants him a certain time for its performance. The humanity of the Moosulman law rants a merchant an opportunity of recovering himself from unforeseen misfortunes. But if the person complained against is of an infamous character, a fine is imposed on him, and the Darogha orders him either to be punished or put in confinement.

The Darogha of the Bazar likewise superintends the morals of the people; and if he detects any of them drinking wine, or in the society of courtezans, he compels them to purchase his connivance at no small expence.

I remember Aga Ruza's receiving fifty Toomans (guineas) from an unfortunate Armenian, who was caught in the house of a prostitute; and he thought he conferred a favour on him, at allowing him to escape at so easy a rate. He has a large establishment under him, who are employed in preserving the peace of the markets, and in apprehending persons whom they detect acting contrary to the orders of the Darogha.

This appointment is considered to be very lucrative; for, in addition to the presents and bribes he is in the habit of receiving, the people of the Bazar furnish him with every thing he requires, that they may ensure his protection and favour.

The appointment of Meer Usus, or Uhdas, greatly resembles that of Darogha of the Bazar; the former is superintendant of the police during the day, the latter at night. It is his office to preserve the peace of the city, to take up persons who may be out of their houses at improper hours, and to prevent robberies. He has a number of people under him for this purpose, who patrole the streets, and keep watch on the top of the houses. Each shopkeeper in the Bazar contributes about two or three-pence a month to defray the expences of this establishment. If a house-keeper is robbed, the Meer Usus, or Kucheek-chee-bashee (the head of the watch), are accountable for the robbery, and are obliged either to produce the property stolen, or pay the amount. This rarely happens, for the Meer Usus is generally connected with all the thieves in the city, and can answer for their obedience to his orders. They rob, therefore, in places not under his protection; and, as it is. commonly supposed he participates in their plunder, they are connected with each other by a common interest.*

The Mohtusib is, I believe, subject to the orders of the Darogha

It is very well known, that the best method to secure your property, in many parts of India, is to employ a thief to guard it. Thieving in the East is an honourable calling; they pay a certain sum monthly for permission to follow their profession; and in all native camps there is a Bazar which goes by the name of the thieving-market.

of the Bazar; it is his business to regulate the prices of every article which is sold in the Bazar, and to see that the weights are of the proper standard. This duty is usually performed once a week; and if he convicts any person of using false weights, the punishment is often death.

Besides these officers, there are others who are stationed at the gates of the city, to prevent the inhabitants of any consequence from leaving the city without the governor's permission. These appointments are doubtless obnoxious to the grossest bribery; but, notwithstanding the evils which result from this system of corruption, they are at least equal to similar institutions in any European country.* People have, in general, been clamorous against the laws and ordinances of despotic monarchies, which, they conceive, like the source of a poisoned river, must necessarily infect all its branches; but with what propriety I shall leave those to determine who are acquainted with other states, where property is secured by the payment of a monthly tax of three-pence; and where merchandise is conveyed to the remotest parts of the empire without the smallest risk. It may be said, that in despotic monarchies, not only property, but life, depends upon the will of one man, and that. where the latter is uncertain, there can be little satisfaction in the enjoyment of the former. This is a maxim which may be disputed; for we have no reason to suppose that the life of either a soldier or a sailor is any ways more uncomfortable, than that of a merchant, remote from the probability or chance of dangers.

Men of rank or enterprise, who expose themselves by holding responsible situations to imminent hazard, gratify their ambition at the risk of their lives; but they are aware of this, and as they court. the danger which it would have been easy for them to avoid, they

• I know not but that this system of corruption is not a severer check upon vice, than the practice of prosecuting a criminal, or exposing him in the stocks to public ridicule. This relates of course, to trifling and petty offences; and it cannot be denied that the hope of gain will be a powerful stimulus with many persons.

can have no reason to complain if they fail in their pursuit. They can with no more justice lament their fate, than a minister of state can his being impeached. Far be it from me to become an advocate in favour of a despotic monarchy; yet there is, I think, some reason to doubt the relations we have of the wretchedness and misery of those who live under and are ruled by the laws of an arbitrary government.

That the Persians suffer greatly from the enormities and oppression of government no one will attempt to deny; nor will any person suppose that an inhabitant of a free country could live either happily or comfortably under the government of a Persian despot. I may, however, be excused doubting, whether the moral character of the Persians qualify them for a better government; or whether they may not attribute the tyrannical measures of their prince to the enormity of their own excesses.