of the other twelve,) without making the Constitution a nudum pactum; without destroying the very basis of the Confederacy. I look forward, sir, with fearful apprehension to the consequences, should this resolution be adopted. It will create the greatest dissatisfaction in the States injured by the alteration. It will furnish arguments to the enemies of this Union, which may effect its destruction.

An honorable gentleman from Tennessee (Mr. CAMPBELL) has founded his argument principally upon the position that the proposed amendment will carry into effect the public will; that it will prevent a contingency, which, under the present mode of election may occur, viz: the person intended by a majority of the Electors for President may be supplanted by the person intended by them for Vice President, and will fill the second office in the Government. This argument has also been urged by other gentlemen.

It is scarcely within the compass of possibility that, with the experience already had, an equal number of votes, and a majority should be given to two candidates for the Presidency. But it is demonstrable that whenever the right of choosing a President shall, under this amendment, devolve upon the House of Representatives, the danger that the person intended by the Electors for President will be excluded, not only from the Presidency, but also from the Vice Presidency, will be increased in a tenfold ratio. For, under this amendment, as adopted by the Senate, the House of Representatives may choose the President not only from five candidates, as under the present mode, but from among the candidates who may have either of the three highest numbers. The number of candidates, therefore, is almost unlimited. Every State candidate, every ambitious man who can secure a few votes, will offer himself for the office, and knowing that his only chance of success will be in the House of Representatives, it will be the object of all his supporters to prevent a choice by the Electors. The Vice President will be impelled by the most powerful inducements to prevent a choice, because by this amendment, "if the House of Representa'tives shall not choose a President whenever the right of choice shall devolve upon them, before 'the fourth day of March then next following, 'then the Vice President shall act as President, as ' in the case of the death or other Constitutional 'disability of the President." If the Vice President shall be elected by the Senate, the influence of the Senators may be added, to prevent a choice by the House, for they will naturally prefer that the man of their own choice should act as President. Thus, to the clashing interests of States, and of numerous candidates, may be added the influence of the Vice President and of the Senate, all tending to prevent a majority of States from uniting in one candidate. Under the present mode, if, by possibility, the choice should devolve upon the House of Representatives, the responsibility for all the evils of an interregnum must operate as the most powerful inducement to make an election; but, under this amendment, the hor

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rors of anarchy will not be dreaded, because in case of no choice the Government will be administered by the Vice President. It is fairly to be calculated that no election will be made by the House of Representatives. What is the consequence? A man who, from the nature of the choice, will probably be unqualified for the office, (as has been very clearly shown by my friend from Connecticut,) a man who had not one vote for President, succeeds, in fact, to that office. Thus the choice may be virtually tranferred from the popular to the federative branch of the Government.

The gentleman from Tennessee tells us that this argument, drawn from the omission of the House to elect a President, implies corruption. This cannot be admitted, for men will naturally disagree in their opinions of candidates, and may very honestly adhere to the dictates of their judgments and consciences. But, sir, if it did imply corruption, it would not destroy the force of the argument. With the growth and opulence of our country, we must expect corruption; with the progress of our Government we must calculate upon intrigue.

To prevent the difficulties and dangers of a contested election in the House of Representatives, we hold out by this amendment to the large States the strongest inducements, we almost compel them, by the principles of self-interest, so to combine that the right of choice shall not devolve upon the House of Representatives. As a few States may so combine as to secure to themselves the election of President and Vice President, to the total exclusion of the other States, the greatest evils are generally to be apprehended from such exclusive combinations.

What, let me ask, sir, are the evils, the great, the impending evils, which will induce us to brave all the dangers of this hazardous experiment? The worst that can be apprehended from the present mode of choice is, that two of the first citizens in the United States, each having a majority of votes-voted for by the same Electorsif it should happen that they have an equal num ber of votes, the one preferred by the majority of Electors for President may chance to fill the second office in the Government, while the candidate intended by a majority of the Electors for the second office, may, by the votes of a majority of States, be chosen President.

The gentleman from Tennessee conceives that the minority can have no share in the election but by counteracting the will of the majority. Let it be remembered, sir, that it requires a majority of the Electors to make a choice. All that is left to the minority, under the present mode of election, when they have any share in the choice, is, to vote for one of the candidates offered by the majority. Is there to be a line of demarkation drawn between the parties by the Constitution itself, which will render the Chief Magistrate of the Union the mere instrument of a party? Is this calculated to secure the equal rights of the minority?

Mr. Speaker, several gentlemen in the majority

have told us that the people call for this "amendment." My colleague (Mr. TAGGART) has been accused of speaking disrespectfully of the people. I understood him simply to say, that public opinion is mutable, and that the opinion of the people respecting this "amendment" has not been ascertained. How, sir, do gentlemen know the opinion of the "people" upon this question? By what evidence does it appear? It is said, that some of the State Legislatures have expressed a wish in favor of the "amendment." I know that two or

three Legislatures, at different times, have passed a vote in favor of the designating principle. But, sir, no State Legislature has ever expressed approbation of the various other alterations in this

resolution.

If the State Legislatures had expressed their approbation of this resolution, will gentlemen say that it ought to be obligatory upon the members of this House? We certainly are under the strongest obligations to give an independent vote upon the question, controlled only by the dictates of our own consciences. The Constitution has, in this instance, made each House of Congress and the State Legislatures a check upon each other; else, why are two-thirds of both Houses of Congress, and the Legislatures of three-fourths of the several States, required by the Constitution to concur in an amendment? If the opposite doctrine be correct, it would have been better to have decided estions respecting Constitutional amendments by the State Legislatures alone, than to have assigned to Congress a part in such a political farce.

In the course of this debate, various and repeated allusions have been made to party distinctions. We have, I believe, for the first time in this House heard the terms federal and republican applied to members of this House, and contradistinguished to each other. I have long seen these distinctions in newspaper publications, but I feel great regret that they should be introduced here, more particularly upon a question which demands of us to divest ourselves of all partial considerations, and to investigate this subject with candor and with coolness. What can gentlemen intend to effect by this denunciation? Is it intended to cast a reproach upon the name of federalist? Do they recollect whence was derived the honorable distinction of federalist? Do they not know that it is derived from an early and warm attachment to the Federal Constitution? If gentlemen claim the title of republicans, let them not claim it exclusively. Let them remember that we are all bound by oath to support the same Federal Republican Constitution.

Mr. Speaker, my mind is deeply impressed with a sense of the vast importance of rejecting this resolution. We are not discussing an ordinary, a party, or a local question, but it is proposed to adopt a material change in a fundamental principle of the national compact; an alteration which will affect the whole Union, which will influence the condition of millions long after the present distinctions of party shall have passed away, and we shall have passed away with them. While

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we endeavor to render the present principle of the Constitution as operative and beneficial as possible, let us beware lest, under the plausible pretext of "amendment," we introduce principles destructive of the compact itself. On former occasions, extracts have been read from the speeches and from the writings of eminent statesmen. Permit me to quote a few sentences from an authority which once had great influence in this House. I trust it will now have an effect:

"Towards the preservation of your Government and

the permanency of your present happy state, it is requisite not only that you steadily discountenance irregular oppositions to its acknowledged authority, but also that you resist with care the spirit of innovation upon its principles, however specious the pretext. One method of assault may be to effect, in the forms of the Constitution, alterations which will impair the energy of the system, and thus to undermine what cannot be directly overthrown. In all the changes to which you may be invited, remember that time and habit are, at least, as necessary to fix the true character of Government, as of other human institutions; that experience is the surest standard by which to test the real tendency of the existing Constitution of a country; that facility in changes upon the credit of mere hypothesis and opinion exposes to perpetual change, from the endless variety of hypothesis and opinion."

These sentiments are from the Farewell Address of that most illustrious statesmen and patriot who presided in the Convention which formed this Constitution.

Mr. Speaker, I have been greatly gratified by the various motions which have been made, some of them by gentlemen of the majority, to recommit this resolution for the purpose of amendment. It is evident that some of the expressions are so extremely ambiguous and obscure, as to admit a great variety of construction. Such a variety of constructions have, indeed, been given in this House to some of the most important clauses, and so just have been the criticisms upon the phraseology of this resolution, that the necessity of amendment must be obvious to the friends of the resolution. It certainly cannot be necessary to adopt it precisely as it stands. If it must be sent to the State Legislatures, I hope we shall so far respect the reputation of the House as at least to make the resolution intelligible.

Some gentlemen wish so to amend this resolution as to make it conform to that which passed this House, and of which gentlemen were, at that time, so tenacious.

I sincerely hope that two-thirds of this House will never adopt the various alterations of the Constitution, contained in this resolution. If disappointed here, the State Legislatures will, I trust, perceive, that the important right guarantied to them by this Constitution, once relinquished, can never be regained; that, by defacing the fairest feature of the Constitution, they sacrifice the rights of other States, they hazard the peace, the existence of the Union.

Mr. THOMAS. - A number of gentlemen opposed to this amendment, and particularly the gentleman last up from Massachusetts (Mr. THATCHER,)

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appear to lay great stress on exceptions to the phraseology of the resolution. In the first paragraph, they contend that it is absurd, because it reads: "which when ratified by three-fourths of the Legislatures of the several States." I agree with the gentlemen that it would have read better, to my mind, had it said: "which when ratified by the Legislatures of three-fourths of the said States;" and it would have been nigher the phrase made use of in the Constitution. But, as on all occasions like this, when there are precedents, as to form, we generally adopt them; the Senate appear to have done it in this instance. I wish gentlemen to examine a resolution of the first Congress, under this Constitution, proposing a number of amendments to the State Legislatures. They will find, in that resolution, it is thus expressed: "which when ratified by three-fourtus of the Legislatures of the said States." Now, I ask, what is the difference in the phraseology of these two resolutions? One says: "when ratified by three-fourths of the Legislatures of the several States." The other, which I have ave just read, says: "when ratified by three-fourths of the Legislatures of the said States." For my part, I can see no difference between these two; besides, in my opinion, it is altogether unimportant whether any thing is said in the resolution about its being ratified by three-fourths, all, or any of the State Legislatures. I believe it sufficient that the bare proposition go out from Congress, and when it has received the ratification of the Legislatures of three-fourths of the States, the Constitution itself, which is paramount to anything we can say on the subject, declares it to be a part of that instrument. And I ask the gentleman from Massachusetts, or any other gentleman on this floor, whether this is not correct? Whether what is said on the resolution, or what we could say, in relation to its ratification by the State Legislatures, can possibly affect its validity? It cannot; therefore, all that has been said about that part goes for nothing.

With respect to the criticism of gentlemen as to the wording of the second paragraph, I wish they would read the exceptionable sentence, and then compare that with the one on the same subject in the Constitution. [Here Mr. T. read the two, and then said: To my mind it appears plain, and properly enough expressed; and I do consider that the objections to the phraseology of that part are equally preposterous with the other.

Mr. Speaker, (said Mr. T.,) I am in favor of the resolution as it now stands, and shall give it my decided support. I, however, acknowledge that I should like it better myself, without the provision made by the Senate, that the Vice President should act as President, in case no election should be made by the House of Representatives previous to the fourth of March, when the choice devolves on them; and as several gentlemen have expressed a desire that a trial should be made to effect this alteration. I wish the Speaker to inform me whether if the House should amend the resolution, and the Senate should not concur in the amendment, when it comes down again to this

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House, a majority cannot rescind the amendment, or whether it will require two-thirds? Because, although I have heretofore voted against a recommitment, if the Speaker is of the opinion that a majority can rescind, I am willing to make the trial, and shall, in that case, move to recommit the resolution to a Committee of the whole House for that purpose.

The SPEAKER Said, he considered it improper to give an opinion on a question of order relating to a subject not immediately before the House. He said, on all incidental questions, he considered a majority sufficient.

Mr. R. GRISWOLD.-I feel no disposition to protract the debate to any considerable length. Nor can I flatter myself that any remarks which I shall make wilt convince a single member of the House, whose opinions have been formed in favor of the resolution, of its pernicious tendency. But upon a question of so much importance, I must be permitted to state, in a concise manner, some of those considerations which will induce me to give my decided negative to the measure.

The election of a President is a transaction of vast importance to the United States. In the hands of this officer is deposited the Executive power of the Government; the Constitution having expressly declared that "the Executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America." On the execution of this power depends, in a great measure, the character and prosperity of the country. The President is entrusted with the execution of the laws. He appoints, with the consent of the Senate, the Judicial and Executive officers. He forms, and with the advice of the Senate concludes, treaties, and in his hands is virtually lodged the peace and safety of the country. Even the right of declaring war, although nominally confided to the Legislature, must be substantially controlled by the acts of the Executive; because it must generally happen that the necessity of war will depend on the management of our foreign relations by the President, t, and the power of terminating a war by treaty rests with him. In a period of war the President is the Executive to conduct it, and in a time of peace he is the guardian of our neutral rights. A power so important and extensive must necessarily carry along with it vast patronage and influence; and a President may at all times become emphatically a blessing or a scourge to the community.

From this hasty sketch may be perceived the deep interest which every State has in the Presidential election.

The election of the first magistrate of a nation has always been considered the most difficult part of the science of government. The authority which the office necessarily confers, the respect which it creates, and the patronage which it gives, must render it the great object of ambition to aspiring men. The Journal of the General Convention shows that this subject created more difficulty than any other which fell under the deliberations of that respectable body. To organize the election in such a manner as to guard against popular cabals and corruption on the one hand,

and to secure a proper dependance on the people on the other; to prevent improper combinations of States or of individuals, and at the same time to give each State its due weight and influence in the election, was no easy task. They formed, however, the great objects which engaged the attention of the Convention; and after every project had received a deliberate consideration, that body agreed upon the plan under which we have successfully practised for fourteen years. It is now proposed to introduce an essential and radical change in this plan, and we are called upon to decide whether we will recommend the change to the States. Under these circumstances, it cannot be improper to caution gentlemen against precipitancy, and to request them to examine critically the nature of our Government, and to be careful that they do not, under the pretext of amendment and reform, violate one of the first and most important principles of the Union.

The Government of the United States is not a consolidated Government; it is strictly federal, and its friends are of course federalists. It is true, that this branch of the Legislature (the House of Representatives) bears many marks of a consolidation. We are the Representatives of the people of the respective States, and in this respect the principle of consolidation may be considered as existing in this House. But in the Senate, nothing but the federative principle is seen. In that body, each State is not only represented as a sovereign State, but the representation is equal; nor can the size, population, or wealth of a State, increase or diminish its rights or its vote on that ffoor. In the election of a President, the federative principle is likewise discernable. That officer is elected by Electors, chosen in such manner as the State Legislatures shall direct, and to consist of a number of Electors equal to the Senators and Representatives of each State. By this arrangement, the choice of President is controlled by the States; and although the large States have a greater influence in the election than the small States, yet this influence is not entirely regulated by population. The votes to which each State is entitled for its Senators increases the influence of the small States; and it is in consequence of this, that the State of Rhode Island now gives four votes for President, when, upon the principle of consolidation, she would be entitled to no more than two. The votes of Delaware, on the same principle, would be reduced from three to one.

There is not a feature of our Government more strongly marked than this of its Confederation, nor any to which the people are more strongly attached. And it would be impossible to submit any proposition which could create more alarm than a direct project of consolidating the States into one Government. The States always have, and probably will continue, to preserve with jealousy their sovereignty and independence. The present Government, it is well known, grew out of the old Confederation; in which form the States were, in every respect, equal-each State having one vote in the National Congress. The innovation which was made on the pure federative principle by the

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present Constitution was the result of necessity and compromise. But still, as has been already observed, the federative principle is distinctly preserved, and remains the great and leading feature of the Constitution.

It has been often repeated, that the Constitution of the United States was the result of compromise between the large and the small States. This is undoubtedly true, and the basis of this compromise ought to be considered as sacred-never to be shaken whilst the Constitution endures. After mutual concessions by the large and small States, (for both may be considered as conceding something.) the principles by which the influence of each State is balanced in the Legislative and Executive departments may be fairly considered as constituting the basis of this compromise. It results from this, that every attempt to diminish the influence of large States on the one hand, or to weaken that of the small States on the other, is sapping the foundation of our Confederacy. The power to amend the Constitution was not given to authorize the change of any radical principle in which particular States might be interested. This power, it is well known, was given for very different purposes.

I have made these general observations, because it has appeared to me that every proposal to amend the Constitution ought to be first tested by the nature and scope of the Constitution itself; and if it shall be found to interfere with the rights of States, or with any fundamental principle of the compact, it ought to be rejected, although it may promise some temporary advantages in the eyes of speculative men. It cannot be too often repeated, that in considering projects for changing the Constitution, we ought to consider what the Constitution is, and not what it ought to be, in the opinion of individuals. Our Government is in fact a Confederacy, and as such we are bound to respect the rights of each party to the compact.

In respect to the resolution under consideration, the first principle I assume is, that it must necessarily diminish the influence of small States in the election of a Chief Magistrate, and, of course, that it is a direct violation of that spirit of compromise which produced the Constitution.

The effect of the proposed amendment upon the influence of small States, in the Presidential election, has scarcely been denied on the floor of the House. Indeed, after the very able and lucid exposition of this part of the subject, by the gentleman from South Carolina, (Mr. HUGER,) some days ago, it appears to be generally understood and admitted that the power of the small States, in this great point of electing a President, must be diminished. Under such circumstances, it can scarcely be necessary to repeat arguments or to support a position which has been so clearly sustained in the debate. But as this is a point of great magnitude, and (if well understood) must be felt in every small State, I will take the liberty of adverting again to some of the proofs on which the assertion rests.

If the proposed amendment is adopted, it will remain in the power of five large States to com

bine, and with perfect certainty to give a President and Vice President to the Union. As the electoral votes were distributed under the last census, this power may be exercised by Virginia. North Carolina, Pennsylvania, New York, and Massachusetts. To say that no such combination can be formed, is speaking without a knowledge of the human character. And although a combination of the particular States which I have named cannot at this time be formed, yet it is certain that a combination of large States, equally effectual, may at this moment be produced. Gentlemen deceive themselves, if they imagine that the large States can have no interest or inducement to form these combinations. We ought not to forget that our Government is a confederacy of States; that the office of President is vastly important, and that the State which can possess the Executive power in the person of one of its own citizens, is necessarily elevated above the other members of the Confederacy. Nor can we forget our own feelings as men. There is not a member of this House who does not feel particularly attached to the State to which he belongs-whose pride would not be gratified by seeing the State which he represents giving a President to the Union, and a tone to the Government-who does not believe that the interests of those with whom he is particularly connected would on many occasions be better, and on every occasion be as well secured under the administration of a President from his own State as from any other quarter. Whenever communities or individuals are stimulated by the powerful inducements of interest or ambition to form combinations, they will necessarily be created. And although at this time there is no State which can openly claim the exclusive right of giving a President to the Union, yet this right may be enjoyed in rotation by a few large States, in defiance of any combination which can be formed against them. We have already seen, upon one occasion, some evidence of a combination crumbling to pieces by the jealousies which the present peculiar mode of election has excited.

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of rotation agreed upon by the large States, and to create suspicions that the votes of a small State thus given to the successful candidate have been obtained by a secret combination with the State to which the candidate belongs, or with the candidate himself. In the same manner, the views of any particular State may be forever defeated by the small States; and such views will be defeated if any one of the States, from its local situation, its great extent, and its population, should arrogate to itself the right of giving a President. Gentlemen must be sensible that no combination formed under such circumstances can be lasting. Political combinations can only be lasting where the object for which they are formed is obtained with certainty, and where no jealousies are excited. But where the object is defeated, where jealousies arise, and more especially where the views of the most powerful and ambitious member of the combination are forever defeated, the combination can never endure.

The advantages resulting to the small States from the present mode of election is not confined to the power of defeating the combination of large States. It is certainly important to possess the power of selecting the least objectionable of two candidates. Although neither candidate may be the particular object of our choice, there may still exist, in our opinion, a wide difference in their respective qualifications for office. Whenever a candidate has been preferred to his rival, by the suffrages of his political opponents, he will entertain those sentiments towards them which every liberal mind must feel towards those who have granted a favor. He will be conscious that he is indebted to them for office. He will feel bound to treat them with respect, and promote their interests. Such are the sentiments which must be entertained by every man under similar circumstances such are the sentiments which the presiding officer of the House must always feel when promoted to the chair, in consequence of the division of his own party by his political opponents. This influence of the small States in the Presidential election will promote the harmony of the Union. The power of the small States, although circumscribed, may, under certain circumstances, become effectual. And as public bodies and individuals, in all political transactions, are caressed and respected in proportion to their power, the small States will be courted and respected by the large States, and the mutual dependence which they feel on each other must soften their passions, and in a great measure diminish those State animosities which endanger our domestic tranquillity. And will gentlemen tell me that these advantages are of no importance? In my opinion they are advantages which not only tend to harmonize the Union, but they form the strongest barrier for the small States in one of the most important transactions of the nation, against the overwhelming power of the large States. It is this peculiar mode of election which can render the votes of small States truly efficient in the choice of a President. Strip the Constitution of