whom they might prefer, yet, in the case supposed, (of the larger States giving a considerable portion, though not exactly an equal number of votes to the two candidates, whom they have determined to support,) the smaller States will at least have it at their option to choose between the two candidates, and by giving him their votes, insure the election of that one of them against whom they have the fewest objections, and who sensible that the preference given him in the election ultimately turned on their votes, and possibly not being taken from the very largest and most powerful States, would probably feel less inimical to their interests, and in fact have it less in his power

to injure them.

The third and last case is that in which the large States, in order to secure the election of the individual they wish to the office of President, unite in giving one of the two votes to which each Elector is entitled exclusively to him, and throw away the other. The obvious and necessary consequence is, that the Vice Presidency remains completely at the disposal of the small States, and they make whom they please Vice President-a point of far more importance than gentlemen seem to suppose, or are perhaps aware of. It is in the first place to be recollected, that as the person who will usually be thought most worthy of being raised to the office of Chief Magistrate will most probably be advanced in years, there must be more than the common chances of his demise in the course of the term for which he was elected, and of the heir apparent, the Vice President, consequently succeeding to his station, and becoming himself in fact the President. Exclusively, however, and waiving this consideration, let it be moreover recollected, that the Senate have a part of the treaty-making power, participate in the appointment of the Judiciary, and of the other public officers, and form in short, to a certain degree, a portion of the Executive branch of the Government. Now all the States have an equal vote in the Senate, and the Vice President is ex officio President of the Senate. He enjoys therefore all the influence necessarily attached to such an office, and to the character of heir apparent; and he has, in addition, the peculiarly important right of giving the casting vote in all cases of an equality of votes in the Senate, an assembly composed of so very few members. Such then is the importance of the Vice Presidency, and such the influence and protection which in every point of view the indiscriminate mode of electing the two first officers in our Government affords. And is all this nothing, sir? Does the alteration proposed really constitute a proposition so plain, so self-evident, so unencumbered with anything like a difficulty or doubt, as not to require a moment's thought, or be worthy of the least investigation or discussion? Is it possible that any one within or without these doors will deny, after what I have just stated, that we are about to make a serious and important innovation in the vital principle, the very essence of the Constitution? Are we not in fact and in truth acting upon the maxim, "that from those who have not, that

H. oF R.

which they have shall be taken away, whilst to those who have, more shall be given?" Shall we not by this alteration lessen the chances of the smaller States, and take from them one of the most effectual checks, one of the most essential safeguards, in respect to the election of the Executive branch of the Government, which was secured to them by our national compact; and add, at the same time, to the preponderating and overweening influence which the larger States have heretofore possessed, the evident means and moral certainty of disposing at pleasure of the whole Executive department? These must necessarily be the consequences of the proposed alteration in the Constitution; and for my own part, I must say, that it appears to me to give a death-blow to that portion of the State sovereignties which has been reserved to the several States, and that we thereby take a monstrous and more than a gigantic stride, towards that very consolidation of the States against which gentlemen have been wont of yore so bitterly to exclaim. For we may boast as much as we please; we may say what we will of our moderation, sincerity, and political virtue; we may give every security which can be devised upon parchment or upon paper, and endeavor to render it more sacred by seals, and even by oaths; still, so long as human nature remains human nature-where power exists on the one side and weakness on the other-there ever will arise ambition, and the inclination to obtain additional power on the part of the most powerful; and consequently, in proportion as you add to the means of encroachment already possessed by the large, and lessen those of defence and self-protection heretofore given to the small States, in the same proportion do you throw the latter at the mercy, and invite the aggression of the former, and thereby carry us further from a federative, and draw us nearer to a consolidated government.

I am perfectly aware, Mr. Speaker, that the ground I take is not the popular one of the present day. I well know that the principles for which I contend, and upon which our national compact was originally formed, have no longer the same influence on the public feelings, nor are they regarded in the smaller States with that degree of interest with which they were wont to be at the time the Convention met and the Constitution was adopted. The prosperity we have enjoyed for fourteen years past, under the auspices of the General Government, has happily done away State jealousies in a very considerable degree. The occurrences which have since intervened, the new interests which have sprung up, and the different shapes which parties have assumed, have all contributed to lessen the impressions and obscure the grounds and basis upon which the great bond of our Union was framed and bottomed. This happy and natural effect of the successful experiment we have made in our political association, must give pleasure to every friend of his country; and so long as the original compact which unites and forms us into a band of brothers continues to be held sacred, and no attempt is made to innovate upon and alter the principles

upon which it was formed, I should rejoice as much as any man at this union of sentimentthis mutual confidence among the members of the Confederacy; but when I see (it matters not whether intentionally or from inadvertence) that advantage is about to be taken of this circumstance, that in the moment of party irritation and party zeal, and at a time when it may be truly stated that the influence and interests of the larger States are completely triumphant, and many of the smaller States, unconscious of danger, are enlisted from various causes under their banners; that at such a moment a proposition is brought forward to alter the Constitution in one of its most important features, and, under the plausible pretext of giving effect to the will of the people, the small States are at one blow to be deprived of the checks and safeguards secured to them by the Federal compact in the election of the Executive, and this important branch of the Government is henceforward and forevermore to be put entirely and exclusively into the hands of the larger States; when I see and behold all this, I acknowledge that I do feel the most serious alarm, and feeble and unavailing as my voice may be, I still deem it a duty incumbent on me, as one of the immediate citizens of a small State, no less than as a member of this House, and consequently a sworn guardian of the Constitution, to raise that voice, and loudly to protest against the innovation which it is contemplated to effect in the fundamental and vital principles of the compact which unites these States together.

I am not ignorant, however, that a very different turn has been given to this business; that the proposed alteration in the mode of electing the President and Vice President has been presented under a very different aspect to the public view. A respectable member from Pennsylvania (Mr. GREGG) has indeed undertaken to give us the whole history of the amendment, as he terms it, and infers from thence, that such an alteration in the Constitution has been long contemplated and wished for by all parts of the Union. He tells us that a former member from South Carolina, the State I have the honor at this time to represent, had brought forward a proposition to the same effect; that a similar one had once originated in New Hampshire; that the State of New York had two years ago submitted to the consideration of Congress a resolution proposing in substance the very alteration now about to be adopted, and that it had been before us during both of the last sessions. All this, sir, is no doubt true, but I draw a very contrary inference from it to that of the honorable gentleman. He has proved to be sure that certain individuals, some parts even of the Union, have at different times, for party and local purposes, or from whatever cause, proposed and perhaps been desirous that an alteration of this kind should be made in the Constitution. He has proved however at the same time, and not less evidently, that the great body of the Union have always been opposed to any such change; that the public mind has not heretofore been ripe for it: and even at this moment, sir, I feel the most

OCTOBER, 1803.

perfect conviction, that if the people had time and could take a correct and temperate view of the real merits of the question, if the irritation of the moment, the party feelings of the day, could be laid aside, the small States in particular could never become so wantonly felo de se-to commit such evident self-murder-if I may be allowed the expression-nor could the Constitutional majority in the two Houses of Congress, still less the Constitutional number of States, ever be found to ratify so great, so all important an innovation and change in the fundamental principles of the Federal compact. The chance of ultimate success depends, I am confident, even now, upon the party feeling and party zeal of the times, and the irritation which was excited and has been so industriously kept up since the late contested election of the President. I was myself, as you know, sir, one of the actors in that scene, and I may venture to say, that, from the peculiar situation in which I was placed, I had it in my power to judge more cooly and dispassionately of the occurrences of that day than almost any other individual in the United States. It is well known to every one who knew anything of me at the time, that I was a warm, sincere, and zealous advocate of the two gentlemen who were understood to be the Federal candidates. The majority of the Electors, however, having given the votes to the two candidates who were brought forward and supported in opposition to them, and they having been found to have equal votes, it devolved upon the House of Representatives to fix upon the one of the two characters who should fill the office of Chief Magistrate. In this state of things, it is no secret, that although we afterwards voted by ballot, that I separated from my political friends, and those of my colleagues who were on the floor, and performed the painful task of acting in direct opposition to them; I consequently voted invariably for the candidate who ultimately prevailed, and now fills the office of Chief Magistrate of the United States, until the last ballot, when I withdrew into an adjoining committee room, in order to facilitate a decision of the contest. Situated as I was, therefore, it may well be imagined that I could not be over zealous, or feel any very peculiar interest in the success of either of the two candidates who were opposed to each other. I had acted according to the best of my judgment, and in compliance with the dictates of my conscience, in voting for the one; while my political friends gave a preference to and supported the other. I could consequently take a perfectly dispassionate view of the subject, and must say that the zeal and violence of party appeared to me to give much more importance to the contested election than it was intrinsically entitled to. I showed, by my vote, my own opinion and wishes to be in favor of the person who was elected; and inasmuch as I believed that he would be more acceptable to the majority of our fellow-citizens out of doors, and more especially to those in that portion of the Union from whence I came, and of whose opinions and feelings I could judge most correctly; insomuch, I acknowledge, that I should have re

gretted and deemed it a misfortune if the election had terminated differently.

But, sir, I could not then suppose, nor do I yet think, that the salvation and political happiness of the Republic depends so entirely on the election of any one man as President, however great or good he might be; nor could I persuade myself that it would be so monstrous and terrible an event, in an elective yet complicated government like ours, if, of two individuals brought forward by precisely the same description of Electors, to fill the two first offices under the Government, that one of them, whom they were supposed to hold up for the second office, (and consequently in case of accident to the other to supply his place, and be to all intents and purposes Chief Magistrate,) should have been preferred by their political opponents, and through their means have in the first instance been constitutionally elected to the highest office. I well know that of the two federal gentlemen whom I had originally advocated, although I should no doubt have given a preference myself to the one, yet I should have been perfectly satisfied to see either of them put at the head of the Government, had they had the majority and equal votes; for, I repeat it again, I cannot persuade myself that the political salvation of the Republic depends upon the election of any man as President. To me indeed it appeared, during the whole course of the election, that there was one result far more to be deprecated, and which might have given rise to consequences beyond the ken of human foresight. I frequently shuddered at the idea, that it might possibly happer, from the enthusiasm of party zeal, the violence of party prejudices, and the irritation of the moment, that neither side would give way, and the country might be left in a sort of interregnum, without executive officers, or perhaps any Constitutional means to obtain them; and it has often struck me as a peculiarly fortunate circumstance that the contest was between two individuals originally brought forward by Electors of the same political description, and not between the favorite candidates of the two opposite parties, each supported by his immediate party friends. In my humble opinion, the great desideratum, the only thing necessary to be done, is to make some provision, which would insure, in such or any other case in which the election of the Executive devolved on the House of Representatives, that a selection of one or other of the candidates should take place before the House separated, or its political dissolution took place; or that, if an election did not take place, one of the candidates, in consequence of superior age or whatever other cause of preference might be deemed most eligible, should of course be the President. I have not however touched upon the late contested election, in the intention of discussing the pro and con with respect to the relative merits of it, neither is it my intention to deny the abstract proposition, that the will and the wishes of the people ought to be consulted in elections. I wish only to show that this alteration-even allowing it for a moment to be desirable, yields but a partial remedy, to a partial and comparatively speaking trivial and temporary

H. OF R.

inconvenience, whilst we leave a most awful and very possible event unnoticed and unguarded against.

My further object has been, to recall to the recollection of this House, and, as far as my feeble voice avails, of the nation at large, that our Government is not only Republican but Federal; that the provisions of the Constitution are of a very complicated nature; that they have been formed upon the general principles of free government, so modified as to comport with those of a federative alliance; and at the same time to quiet the fears, jealousies, and apprehensions, and to compromise the clashing interests and opposite pretensions of therespective States which compose this great and flourishing Union. I beg of gentlemen therefore to pause and reflect, and then decide, whether it be really correct and agreeable to the dictates of sound sense and good policy to alter or rather totally annihilate one of the great and leading features of an original compact, in order to obviate, at the most, a momentary inconvenience. For I trust I have gone far enough to prove, whilst I venture to foretell, without pretending to the gift of prophecy, that a case similar to the one which has lately taken place will never again happen; yet that if such an event should again turn up, and of two individuals who had an equal number of the votes of all the Electors appointed, the one should be made President, (by the selection of the House of Representatives voting by States,) and in consequence of the present indiscriminate mode of election, who might not perhaps be the most immediately acceptable to the majority of all the inhabitants of the Union, taken in the aggregate, (and the inhabitants of the large States must of necessity form such a majority,) yet I say, should such an event take place in the course of things, I have I trust gone far to prove that it is at worst, but a partial, temporary, and very restricted evil, arising necessarily out of a peculiar form of government, the natural consequence of our territorial divisions and the political provisions and modifications advisedly adopted to compromise our various interests, foreseen at the time our national compact was formed, yet adopted as a minor and necessary sacrifice to prevent far greater evils; and as presenting the best, perhaps the only mode of compromising the jarring interests, of satisfying the opposite pretensions, and of quieting the jealousies, fears, and apprehensions of the various members, so unequal in size, power, population, and riches, who are at this time so happily united in one great confederacy.

Such, Mr. Speaker, is, in my humble opinion, the true point of view in which this and every other proposition to alter our national compact ought ever to be considered-such is the point of view in which the subject now under consideration has presented itself to my mind. I have therefore complied with my sense of duty and obeyed the dictates of my conscience in opposing the alteration to the Constitution, which it is now proposed to make. I know full well the popular feelings and sentiments are against me on this question, and that what falls from a gentleman on

H. OF R.

OCTOBER, 1803.

things, not very favorably received out of doors, and for the most part attributed merely to party feelings and party opposition. In the present instance, however, I can in honor and with truth declare that I act from no party motive or party considerations whatever. My objections and opposition to the resolution on your table, are the result of a sincere conviction in my own mind, after the most dispassionate and attentive consideration I have been able to bestow on the subject; and I most fervently pray that whilst we are endeavoring to extricate ourselves from a dilemma of secondary importance, necessarily growing out of our peculiar mode of government. and to provide a remedy against a partial inconvenience, we may not inadvertently place ourselves in a labyrinth of difficulties and expose our posterity to a multitude of evils, more fatal to the peace and happiness of this Union, than we are any of us at this time aware of.

Mr. HASTINGS.-Mr. Speaker, I do not rise for the purpose of going into an elaborate discussion upon the subject of the proposed amendment to the Constitution, (for that has been already very fully debated,) but merely to state some of the reasons which will influence me in voting against it. I have always believed, sir, that the Federal Constitution was as much the result of compromise and mutual concession, as of great deliberation and wisdom; and that alterations in this charter of our national union ought to be made with extreme caution. In respect to the amendment proposed, I have understood that in the Convention of delegates that framed the Constitution, variety of ways for electing President and Vice President were proposed and all rejected, until the new Constitutional one was offered, which was agreed to; with this mode of electing a President and Vice President, I am satisfied. I believe many advantages result from it; by the present mode, the Electors in giving their votes for two persons to be President and Vice President, will be induced (from the uncertainty which of the two voted for will be elected President) to give their ballots for two persons, either of whom shall be well qualified to discharge the important powers or duties of First Magistrate of the nation. But, if the proposed amendment prevails, will not the office of Vice President, in all future elections, be considered as a mere sinecure? And though the person voted for to fill the office may be well qualified to perform the duties incumbent upon him as President of the Senate, yet he may be wholly unqualified to fill the office of President of the United States, and a person in whom the American people would have no confidence as such: but by the proposed amendment, upon such unfit person-in the event of the removal of the President from office, death, resignation, or his inability to discharge the duties and powers of the officewill devolve all the duties and powers of First Magistrate. Another advantage that I conceive may be the effect of the existing Constitutional mode of electing a President and Vice President, is, that it may be the means of checking and mod

of controlling and putting down faction, by the election of a President who may be agreeable to the wishes of the minority, and thereby produce an equilibrium of power between contending parties. Besides, sir, I fear, if the amendment obtains, that it may give a weight and influence to the large States in the Union, in the election of a President and Vice President, that they ought not to possess; and though I have the honor to be a Representative from a State of some consequence in the Union, on account of its population and resources, still I cannot wish that Massachusetts, in this or any other way, should acquire any undue advantage or improper influence over the smaller States.

In fine, the reasons and arguments that I have heard in this House in the course of the debate, particularly those offered by the honorable gentleman from South Carolina, last up, (Mr. HUGER.) have convinced me that the proposed amendment ought not to made. I will not say, Mr. Speaker, that the Constitution is perfect in all its provisions; there is a particular part of it, in article first, section second, and third paragraph, that fixes the rule of representation, which I wish to see altered in due time. I wish to see this part of the Constitution altered, because I wish to see upon the floor of this House an equal representation of free citizens, and of free citizens only. As the Constitutional rule now is, the representation is made unequal. But this it will be said was also the effect of a spirit of accommodation and compromise. It was a compromise, however, by which one part of the Union has obtained a great, and in my opinion, unjust advantage over other parts of the Union. A compromise, sir, by which the Southern States have gained a very considerable increase of Representatatives and Electors, founded solely upon their numerous black population. I hope, sir, that in the year 1808, an alteration will be made in this part of the Constitution, and that the representation, by being proportioned only to the number of free persons, will be rendered equal and just. I hope, also, that those gentlemen who now advocate the proposed amendment to the Constitution, will then, if members of this House, be also the advocates for altering and amending this part of the Constitution-the friends and advocates of an equal representation, founded upon the population of free persons only. I will not occupy the attention of the House with further observations, or repeat what has already been said by gentlemen against the amendment: I will only say that, in my opinion, it is neither necessary nor expedient to make the proposed alteration in the Constitution, and that I hope it will not be made.

Mr. THATCHER.-Having waited in expectation of hearing the arguments of gentlemen in favor of the resolution, I feel great regret at the silence which they have thought proper on this occasion to observe. This course, though not entirely novel, was not anticipated upon a question of great national importance; a subject which invites, which demands investigation.

My colleague (Mr. Eustis) has stated to the House that, in the year 1797, the Legislature of Massachusetts voted to instruct the Senators and to request the Representatives of that State in Congress, to propose an alteration of the Constitution similar to that now proposed. A gentleman from New York (Mr. THOMAS) has informed us that a similar vote passed in the Legislature of that State. As these two statements are the only answers (if such they can be considered) to the various arguments which have this day been adduced in opposition to the resolution, and as the gentlemen who have made them appear to consider these votes of the State Legislatures obligatory upon the members of the House who now represent those States, I beg leave to state as succinctly as possible some of the reasons which will induce me to vote against the resolution.

H. OF R.

The situation of the States forming the Federal Constitution, and the nature of the compact itself, furnish strong evidence of the policy of the article under consideration. It was absolutely necessary that some of the rights of the individual States should be secured for the interest and safety of all. This Constitution, to use the language of the Convention who framed it, "was the result of a spirit of amity, and of that mutual deference and concession which the peculiarity of our political situation rendered indispensable." Upon no other principle is it possible to account for that article of the Constitution which provides for the representation of slaves. This article operates with peculiar inequality in the Northern and Eastern States.

The representation of slaves adds thirteen members to this House in the present Congress, and eighteen Electors of President and Vice President at the next election. Yet the whole of New England contains but thirteen hundred and thirtynone.

siders these different Assemblies as entirely independent of each other. They must act with perfect independence upon this subject, or this provision of the Constitution is virtually destroyed. Most certainly the resolution of a State Legislature, in 1797, ought not to control the votes of members of this House in 1803. It is, I conceive, not only their right, but their duty to decide upon this question with the most perfect independence of opinion.

It has been already urged t that the Constitutional mode of electing the President and Vice President is admirably calculated to disappoint intrigue and prevent corruption. Should an aspiring and dangerous faction obtain the ascendency in this country, this mode of election affords the means of counteracting its influence, of checking its control. For although such a party will make the greatest exertions to elect that leader who may chance to be the idol of the day, while the Electors are obliged to vote for two candidates, without designating which is intended, those Electors who are not devoted to the interest of the ruling faction will exercise a preference of great importance, they will select the candidate least exceptionable.

The article, which this resolution proposes to alter, has always been considered as the great barrier and shield of the smaller States against the encroachments of the large. By the present mode of election, provided it is effected by the Electors, each State has its due proportion of influence. If it be decided by the House of Representatives, the Constitution has put the States upon the ground of perfect equality. But, if the proposed alteration takes place, it will undermine the very basis of the Confederacy; it will throw the whole power, in this most important election, into the hands of a few States exclusively. With the present population five States may, by combination, exclude the other twelve from all participation in the choice. It will be totally impossible, by any precaution whatever, to prevent such a combination.

The New England States have submitted to this inequality, sensible of the extreme danger of tampering with the Constitution. But, if it is to be altered, justice requires that the article authorizing the representation of slaves should be the first to receive amendment.

Mr. Speaker, I know that the objections to the article proposed to be altered are plausible-they are popular; but I am confident that, upon close examination of the different modes of electing our First Magistrate which have been proposed, none will be found to combine so many advantages as that prescribed by the Constitution. The Journal of the Convention evinces that this was a subject of long discussion and mature deliberation. It was devised by a most illustrious assembly of sages and patriots; it was adopted at a time when the heat of party had not influenced the country; shall we then, at a time when party feeling animate all parts of the Union, shall we destroy one of the firmest pillars of our political fabric? I trust, sir, we shall not venture into the boundless region of hypothesis, that we shall not alter one of the fundamental principles of the Federal Constitution.

Mr. J. C. SMITH rose and observed, that the friends of the resolution had been so occupied with its details, he feared they had lost sight of its principle. And he was not a little confirmed in this this suspicion, from their profound silence on the present occasion. But as he felt so, he could not but express a faint hope that a Constitutional majority of the House would not be found to yield their assent to the proposition. Mr. S. said, it was worthy of remark that no alteration had yet been made in the national compact. Of the eleven articles subjoined to the Constitution as amendments, ten were mere declarations of certain rights, not materially affected by that instrument, and which had their origin in State jealousy, and the remaining one was intended only to settle the construction of an article in the Constitution which had before been considered of doubtful im