minate ultimately in the appointment of a different person to an office, than the one originally intended for it by a majority of the Electors, cannot be said to be such complete expression of the public will. When one person is intended for an office and another person actually obtains it, such election, if indeed it can properly be called an election, is not conformable to the will of those by whom it was made. No sir, it is contrary to it. The effect resulting from the act of the majority, in such a case, would be completely at variance with the will of that majority in performing the act. Such an event would indeed exhibit a case in which the will of the majority would be defeated by the act of the majority in the very exercise of its elective franchise. I think, sir, I can prove that such a consequence may result from the present mode of choosing the President and Vice President of the United States. I think I can prove it in the following manner: I will suppose that four persons, A, B, C, and D, shall be held up for candidates. I will then suppose that ninety-five Electors shall prefer A for President, and vote for him with the intent to elect him to that office, and that the other eighty-one Electors shall prefer B for President and accordingly vote for him. I will suppose also that, of the ninetyfive Electors, who prefer A for President seventyfive shall also prefer C for Vice President, and give him their votes with that intent, and that the other twenty Electors shall prefer D for that

OCTOBER, 1803.

have stated as a possible, and, perhaps, a probable result, from the present mode of choosing the President and Vice President of the United States, must be a serious evil. In no point of view can I contemplate it, in which it does not present itself as an evil of considerable magnitude. For. sir, however respectful the public attention might have been towards the person who thus becomes Chief Magistrate of the Union, contrary to the intention of the Electors, contrary to the public sentiment, contrary to the public will, it cannot be expected that with the acquisition of the office, under these circumstances, he will receive the public confidence. It is not the nature of Governments as purely elective as this Government is, to produce a spirit altogether acquiescent in elections of this sort. It is not in this country, where the elective principle is so highly revered, warmly cherished, ed, and so dearly valued, that

SO

we are to look for a disposition in the public mind to feel itself satisfied with the introduction. of agents into office, who are not the objects of its choice. Even in respect to departments of inferior consideration, this disposition is not to be found; much less can it be expected to appear and display itself, should the great and important duties of the Chief Executive Magistrate, by an appointment thus brought about, be devolved on a person not contemplated for that station. It is, indeed, the nature of elective representative Governments to produce a very different spirit, a spirit

one Electors who prefer B for President, twentyfive shall also prefer C for Vice President, and accordingly vote for him; and that the other fiftysix shall prefer D for that office. Now, because seventy-five of those ninety-five Electors who prefer A for President and twenty-five of those who prefer B for President, are also willing that C should be Vice President, and vote for him with that intent, Cactually becomes President with one hundred votes, not one of which was given to him for that purpose. Thus the will of ninety-five, who compose a clear decided majority of the whole number of Electors, is defeated by seventy-five of their own votes, together with the other twenty-five votes given to C; that is to say, the will of the majority is defeated by the act of the majority, in the very exercise of its electoral capacity. But, Mr. Chairman, if the proposed amendment should be adopted, this anomalous effect cannot then result; for, as each of the candidates would then be designated for the particular office for which he was intended, ninety-five votes would be given to A for President; eightyone would be given to B for President; one hundred to C for Vice President; and seventy-six to D for Vice President. So that A would then be elected President, according to the real will and intention of ninety-five Electors, by a majority equal to the difference between eighty-one and ninety-five; and C would be elected Vice President agreeably to the will and intention of one hundred Electors, by a majority equal to the difference between seventy-six and one hundred.

Mr. Chairman, such an event as that which I

more properly may it be said, sir, that in all such Governments there is a spirit coeval in existence with the Governments themselves, which disposes the people rather to withhold their affection from public functionaries, than to bestow it upon them, when introduced into office after this manner. It is inseparable from the people of all countries, where the elective system prevails in any degree. Its influence and activity, ever commensurate with the degree of perfection which pervades that system, proportionably diffuse themselves through the great body of the people. Wherever genuine rational liberty most abounds (and I believe, sir, that so far from abounding, it cannot exist at all, where election and representation do not exist,) there this spirit abounds in like degree; there it 1S to be traced through all the departments of life; there it animates the mass of the community; there it spreads. It extends and enlarges its sphere of action through the whole circle of society, and that influence is exerted to a degree of prevalence in proportion as the principles of that liberty actuate the public mind. It is not the spirit of a wild and furious licentiousness, thirsting for the destruction of law and of order. It is not a spirit which aims to loosen the bands of society, or to weaken the sanctions of law. No, sir, it breathes quite a different wish. It believes that the strength of the one and the efficacy of the other of these essential means of human happiness are best secured in the agency of those organs of public authority whose creation springs from the public will; and, believing this, wishes that the elective principle in its practical operations may be directed

through the channel of that public will. It believes that such direction of this great, this important, this inestimable principle is necessary to give full effect to the repres representative system, on which depends the attainment of all the great desiderata of a free Government-everything truly desirable in Government. And where, sir, does this spirit more abound than in America? Where does it so much abound? Is it not the pride and the boast of Americans? Sir, I believe it is. I believe, too, it is a laudable. an honorable pride. It is a great, leading, characteristic sentiment which pervades the American mind-which dignifies and adorns this country which constitutes the very germ of true American greatness. It is that which operates as the source of everything which spreads forth the lustre and the glory with which this nation is surrounded. It is the life, the soul, of the Republic. It is that vivid flame which warms and cherishes, and gives to the body politic its just and proper and natural impulse, and directs its course towards the true end of the social institution-the universal good. I believe, therefore, Mr. Chairman, it must be a consideration of primary importance that the modes of election be so established that in their event they may always secure a full expression of the public will, and the appointment of all public agents conformably thereto.

With these impressions on my mind, Mr. Chairman, and from the evident risk attendant on the present mode of choosing the President and Vice President of the United States, that the election of those high and important officers of the Government may terminate contrary to the public will, I am thoroughly convinced of the expediency of the proposed amendment to the Constitution, directing a designation of them in the electoral votes.

Sir, the case which I had the honor to state to the Committee as possibly, and perhaps probably, resulting from the present mode of election, is a case wherein a decided majority of the electoral votes shall have been given to one of the candidates, though not according to the intention of the Electors who gave them. But, sir, what can we expect to be the public sensation in a case wherein an equal number of votes shall have been given to each of two candidates, and this House shall finally decide the election by rejecting that candidate for the Presidency, who was intended for it by a majority of the people and of the Electors, and choosing the other candidate who was not so intended for that office? The first mentioned circumstance of such a case we have already witnessed; and, sir, should I mistake the circumstance, were I to say we had mournfully witnessed it? And what, sir, would have been the condition of these States, if, when assembled at this Capitol, by their Representatives, they had continued so divided in their votes that no actual election of a President had taken place, although the public sentiment had been clearly and unequivocally pronounced in favor of one of the candidates? There was every reason to believe, sir, that gloomy indeed would have been the prospect!

H. oF R.

A long train of evils incalculable in their consequences could hardly have failed to overspread the face of this delightful country! Indeed, sir, what would have been the ultimate issue it is not within the compass of human foresight to divine. This great, this flourishing country, which at this time pours forth innumerable streams of prosperity, displaying in vast and rich variety every means of individual happiness, every means of national happiness, and every means of true national glory, instead of exhibiting the present pleasing, animating prospect, before this period might have been enveloped in dark and dismal clouds of confusion, disorder, and political distraction! The bands of society being thus in a manner broken asunder, and all the angry turbulent passions incident to man left unrestrained, what fatal consequences might be expected to follow! What violence of party, what rage of ambition, what dreadful commotions, might be expected to agitate this then unfortunate country! And, sir, is there a single American living whose blood is so far chilled with indifference concerning the fate of this country, that he would not be stricken with awful alarm at the prospect of such an event an event tending directly to produce so complete a state of anarchy with all its concomitant calamities? No, sir, no! I would hope, I would persuade myself, Mr. Chairman, there is not one. Nevertheless, although the spirit of patriotism might have predominated over that of party in the case which has happened-determined the election, and determined it conformably to the public sentiment-yet, sir, have we infallible secur security that, in all future times, should any similar case occur, the same regard for the peace, the tranquillity, and happiness of this great community will retain the ascendency and arrest the evil? The mournful experience of ages, transmitted to us through the page of history, teaches an awful lesson that such security cannot be expected. I am seriously impressed with this sentiment, therefore, that it behooves us to let it be a work of the present day to guard against so great an evil by removing ving from the Constitution the means whereby it may be accomplished.

any

But suppose, sir, in the case alluded to, the election had terminated otherwise than it did, is there a single man in existence who believes that such election would have been hailed by the public voice with any degree of complacency? Innumerable, sir, and strong were the evidences of a contrary operation on the public mind; innumerable and strong were the evidences that such an event would have been very unfortunate-would have produced much more of the public indignation than of the public approbation-although it would have been better than no election at all. And there can be no manner of question, sir, that if, in any future election, a similar case should occur, and such should be the ultimate event, whoever might be the candidates, a very disagreeable effect would be wrought upon the public mind; that whenever such an event should happen, it would call forth the public indignation.

Should it be objected, Mr. Chairman, that even if the proposed amendment should be adopted and become a part of the Constitution, it will not make such provision as would, in all future elections, secure a majority of electoral votes to be given to some one or other of the candidates, and thereby preclude the necessity of ever again resorting to a vote of this House for a final decision; it must be acknowledged that no provision whatever can be made so as to have that operation; but if, in any election. no person should have a majority of electoral votes, a Legislative decision in such a case cannot possibly be attended with the same disagreeable consequences as such a decision might be attended with in a case happening under the existing mode, similar to that which has been cited; for, if the amendment should be adopted, inasmuch as each of the candidates would then be designated by the electoral votes for the particular office for which he was intended, and consequently thus pointed out as being so far the objects of public choice, on whomsoever of them the ultimate election should fall, the successful candidate, I apprehend, would be more acceptable to the public mind than any person could be who had not been contemplated for President by any of the Electors. Such public approbation I consider, sir, as a circumstance of incalculable importance in such an election. I hope, therefore, the resolution will be agreed to, and obtain the sanction of a full Constitutional majority.

The Committee rose, and reported a resolution thereupon, which was twice read, amended, and agreed to by the House, as follows:

"Resolved, by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, two-thirds of both Houses concurring, That the following article be proposed to the Legislatures of the different States as an amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which, when ratified by threefourths of the said Legislatures, shall be valid, to all intents and purposes, as part of the said Constitution,

viz:

"In all future elections of President and Vice President, the Electors shall name in their ballots the person voted for as President, and in distinct ballots the person voted for as Vice President; of whom, one at least shall not be an inhabitant of the same State with themselves. The person voted for as President having a majority of the votes of all the Electors appointed, shall be the President; and if there shall be no person having such majority, the President shall be chosen from the highest numbers, not exceeding three, on the list for President,

by the House of Representatives, in the manner directed by the Constitution. The person having the greatest number of votes as Vice President shall be the Vice President; and in case of an equal number of votes for two or more persons as Vice President, they being the highest on the list, the Senate shall choose the Vice President from those having such equal number, in the manner directed by the Constitution."

THURSDAY, October 27.

Another member, to wit: ABRAM TRIGG, from Virginia, appeared, produced his credentials, was qualified, and took his seat in the House.

OCTOBER, 1803.

Ordered, That the resolution agreed to yesterday, in the form of a concurrent resolution of the two Houses, proposing an article of amendment to the Constitution, respecting future elections of President and Vice President, be recommitted to a Committee of the whole House to-day.

A memorial and petition of the Illinois and Ouabache Land Companies was presented to the House and read, praying that Congress will consider and ultimately decide on their memorial presented to this House on the eleventh of March, one thousand eight hundred and two, in such manner as may be deemed equitable and proper.

Ordered, That the said memorial and petition do lie on the table.

Ordered, That the Committee of Ways and Means, to whom was referred so much of the treaty and conventions lately negotiated with the French Republic as relates to "the payment by the United States of debts due by France to citizens of the United States," have leave to report thereon by bill or bills, or otherwise.

Mr. RANDOLPH, from the committee last mentioned, presented a bill making provision for the payment of claims of citizens of the United States on the Government of France, the payment of which has been assumed by the United States, by virtue of the convention of the thirtieth of April, one thousand eight hundred and three, between the United States and the French Republic; which was read twice, and committed to a Committee of the whole House to-morrow.

Mr. LYON observed that the country in which he lived had been for some time supplied with salt and lead from the Louisiana country, on which

articles considerable and burdensome duties are imposed. For the purpose of liberating the citizens from these duties, he moved a resolution, declaring it expedient that provision should be made for suspending the collection of all duties on articles imported into the ports of the United States from the territory ceded to the United States by the Louisiana convention, with the view of having it submitted to the Committee of Commerce and Manufactures.

Ordered, That it lie on the table.

AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION.

Mr. J. CLAY, after observing on the proceedings of yesterday in respect to the future mode of election of President and Vice President, said he should move an amendment to strike out the word three, and insert the word fire.

Mr. Dawson said that a motion, in substance, to the same purpose, had been presented to the House yesterday, and rejected. He felt no anxiety whether the House, in case of equal votes for President and Vice President, was confined to three or five; but it was his wish that the least alteration possible should be made in the Constitution, as first framed. Under this consideration, the insertion of the word three was, in his opinion, the least of the alterations proposed. He thought that making the choice out of five, was guarding against what might perhaps never happen. He should, however, feel little difficulty in voting for either.

Mr. NICHOLSON declared that it was unnecessary to take up the time of the Committee. The gentleman who moved the amendment tells us that five is the least deviation. He could not agree to this. It did not in the least affect the choice of a Vice President.

Mr. SMILIE considered it a duty due to himself to assert that his sentiments through the whole of this business were uniform. He thought that he could discern that the Chairman was surprised at the deviation from the original opinion of some gentlemen. His present sentiments he had declared before the select committee, and to these he still adhered. He said he would vote in any way, so that an opinion might be had; and the less they deviated, the safer they were. He had no object in view but the public good. He was extremely tenacious in altering the Constitution, but, without the spirit of accommodation, they could never agree upon a number. If one gentleman, to indulge himself, persisted in the number three, and others of fire, he knew not when an opinion could be obtained.

Mr. ELLIOT said that he would engross the attention of the Committee but a moment, and he would not ask for that moment if he did not think that what he had to offer would facilitate an accommodation. Some gentlemen, he observed, were so tenacious of the number being five, that, unless they were indulged, they would never make an amendment. He would therefore vote for that number, in order to promote his desired accommodation.

The question was taken for inserting the word five-ayes 59, noes 47.

On motion. the Committee rose, and the SPEAKER resumed the Chair, when the question was again putand carried. It was then moved that the amendments be engrossed, and that a third reading be had to-day. Agreed to.

LOUISIANA TREATY

The House resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the bill from the Senate, entitled; "An act to enable the President of the United States to take possession of the territories ceded by France to the United States, by the treaty concluded at Paris on the thirtieth of April last, and for other purposes."

The bill having been read, by paragraphs, as follows:

H. OF R.

Mr. J. RANDOLPH said he was apprized that the bill was of such a nature as seemed to delegate to the President of the United States a power the exercise of which was intended to have but a short duration; he was also aware that some such power was necessary to be vested in the Executive, to enable him to take possession of the country ceded by France. But he could conceive no cause for giving a latitude, as to time, so extensive as that allowed by the second section, which says, that "until Congress shall have made provision for the temporary government of the said territories, all the military, civil, and judicial powers, exercised by the officers of the existing government of the same, shall be vested in such person or persons, and shall be exercised in such manner, as the President of the United States shall direct." If we give this power out of our hands, it may be irrevocable until Congress shall have made legislative provision; that is, a single branch of the Government, the Executive branch, with a small minority of either House, may prevent its resumption. He did not believe that, under any circumstances, it was proper to delegate to the Executive a power so extensive; but if proper under certain circumstances, he was sure it was improper under present circumstances. As he conceived it proper to deal out power to the Executive with as sparing a hand as was consistent with the public good, he should move an amendment to substitute in the place of the words "Congress shall have made provision for the temporary government of the said territories"-these words,

the expiration of the present session of Congress, unless provision for the temporary government of the said territories be sooner made by Congress." So that if Congress shall make provision for the government of the territory at any time during the session, the power of the President will cease, and at any rate at the expiration of the session. In other words, this amendment will compel Congress to take early measures for reducing this enormous power, delegated to the Executive, by the establishment of a government for the people of Louisiana.

Mr. R. GRISWOLD Moved to strike out the whole of the second section, which would supersede the motion of the gentleman from Virginia. He made this motion to obtain an explanation respecting the nature and extent of the delegated power. That section provides "that until Con'government of the said territories, all the military, 'civil, and judicial powers, exercised by the officers 'of the existing government of the same, shall be ' vested in such manner, as the President of the