voted away by a system of 'log rolling-they have seen great national resources wasted that might have been effectively used for public service. Instead of having a budget submitted by an executive who can be made responsible to the people for every item of past expenditure and for every proposal for future expenditure, as well as for devising ways and means that are acceptable, we have developed a system of 'pork barrel' finance; and in addition to being criminally wasteful, we have the most inefficient public institution that the world has ever known." ("Responsible Government," Municipal Research No. 69, Issued by New York Bureau of Municipal Research, Jan., 1916, pp. 7-9.)

And the principal obstacle in the way of a thoroughgoing executive budget is our principle of fixed terms for executive officers. Mr. Cleveland vigorously discusses this principle in these words:

the chief execu

"This brings us to the single executive tive type of organization. And initially it brings us to the consideration of the principle of a 'fixed term.' The principle of 'fixed term' for the executive was not adopted with a view to making this branch of the government more efficient; it was adopted to insure the successful operation of the principle of popular 'election'; it was directed against usurpation and the irresponsible use of power. The makers of our constitutions had before them at all times as the one great end to be achieved at any cost, the protection of the liberties of the people without resort to revolution. 'Frequent elections of officers for fixed terms' has been one of the many constitutional provisions adopted to insure this result. Another means of insurance was to take away from the executive powers of leadership. But when (with increasing demands made on the government for service) it was found that great waste and inefficiency resulted from lack of responsible executive leadership, the people did not dare to restore to the executive sufficient power to make leadership

effective. This was because their executives had fixed terms because, within the period of their terms, there would be no way of getting rid of one who acted arbitrarily, and who overrode the will of a majority, as expressed through the chosen representatives of the people."1 (Ibid, p. 17.)

Though there are at least apparent contradictions 2 to this statement in Mr. Cleveland's discussion of the budget, he has frequently reiterated it and emphasized it. On the basis of this incompatibility between an enforceable responsibility to the people and an arbitrary fixed term, he explains the defeat of New York's proposed new constitution:

"Another conclusion is supported not only by recent experience in New York but by the whole constitutional history of English speaking people, viz.: that so long as our chief executives are elected for fixed terms, without any means for prompt recall, fear of executive usurpation (the use of executive power in a manner to impair our personal, political, and civil liberties) will continue to make the people hesitate." (Ibid, p. 19.)

THE EXECUTIVE BUDGET AS A REMEDY FOR

EXECUTIVE IRRESPONSIBILITY

Irresponsibility being the fundamental trouble with the present machinery for considering and financing governmental needs, the remedy is obvious and simple. It is: Fix responsibility. But it is pertinently asked: Responsibility for what? In the first place responsibility for budget proposals. Since it is the duty of the executive to carry out the governmental program

1 Italics are ours.

2 Cf. another quotation from Mr. Cleveland on p. 56 of this chapter.

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for the ensuing fiscal period, " responsibility" for making the plan ought to be placed upon him. Moreover, since it is the legislative function to “ grant funds it is "incompatible that the proposer should also be the disposer of public funds." 1 Again, the proposals "should not reflect the interests of a single individual 2 or a single district but the interests of the whole community of associated interests which are composed in the state or nation." Since the legislators are representatives of small districts and the executive is representative of the state or the nation, the proposals should be prepared by him. The responsibility for budget proposals must obviously be placed in the executive. This is the way the argument is presented by the advocates of the executive budget plan. But no American scheme has proposed giving power over the legislative or judicial estimates to the executive, and hence in this particular the executive budget is a misnomer. He or a financial officer transmits these at the time the estimates of the executive proposals are submitted.

But in order that these proposals, after they have been presented to the legislature, shall have adequate consideration and intelligent defense, it is proposed that the executive and the administrative chiefs shall have the right to be heard during the legislative consideration of the budget, and it shall be their duty to appear before the legislature on budget matters when

1" Evolution of the Budget Idea in the United States," by Frederick A. Cleveland, in Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. LXII, No. 151, Nov., 1915, p. 18.

2 Is not this an argument also against giving the executive a preponderating influence in budget-making?

requested by the legislature. In countries whose experiences are used by way of analogy to show the desirability of the executive budget for the United States, the valuable supplementary power of interpellation is present in the legislature, but in none of the practical schemes proposed for America is this power authorized by the legislature. The interpellation gives power to individual members or minority groups in the legislature as distinct from majority groups to secure answers from administrative officers on subjects under their jurisdiction or about their own activities. Because it will help secure adequate consideration and because it will help secure general publicity, the budget proposals are considered in the committee of the whole rather than in standing committees.

But the advocates of the executive budget plan_do not permit the budget proposals to go before the legislature with freedom of action by the legislature. The legislature is limited either to reduce or to strike out items in the executive proposals for executive departments. If the legislature wants to add anything to the budget it must wait until after the executive proposals have been disposed of by the legislature. Then in the closing days of the session legislators may make their proposals, subject to executive veto. Incidentally these proposals require a larger vote than the executive proposals. After the budget has been passed, it will be an unusual thing to get the majority of all the members elected and it will be impossible to get the usual two-thirds to override a veto. The underlying theory is that the legislature is merely a ratifying agency and all legislatively initiated proposals

are to be discouraged and to be made difficult of passage.

If the legislative discussion should reveal serious omissions in the executive budget or inadequate support for state or national departments, the legislature is practically powerless. If the executive wishes he can make the change or revise his proposals at any time before final action by the legislature.

RESPONSIBILITY TO WHOM

But "responsibility" implies two questions: "Responsibility for what," which we have just considered, and "responsibility to whom," which we shall now consider. Whatever responsibility there is in the government must be fixed and enforceable. It can be enforced only when there is control vested somewhere. The responsibility of our government is to the electorate.

This responsibility to the electorate becomes important when there is a difference on an important question between the executive and the legislature. A budget system must provide somewhere for effective popular control. Without this control the aggrandizement of executive power would not be accepted by a democracy conscious of what it was doing. Executive and legislative action must be brought to the test of approval or disapproval by the electorate. This view is "the only one that is compatible with the evolution of constitutional law where 'control over the purse' has been effectively used to bring the institution and practices of a representative system into harmony