ing to a man, this is Brown or Smith, or pointing to a city, that it is York, we do not, merely by so doing, convey to the reader any information about them except that those are their names1." This view of proper names is contended against by Professor Jevons. "The connotation of a name," says he, "is confused with the etymological meaning or the circumstances, which caused it to be affixed to a thing. Surely, no one who uses the name England and knows what it denotes, can be ignorant of the peculiar qualities and circumstances of the country, and these form the connotation of the term 2." Thus, according to Professor Jevons, all proper names, such as John Smith, Dartmouth, De Morgan, France, Socrates, Plato, &c., are connotative, signifying directly things, and implying the attributes or qualities belonging to them and distinguishing them from other individuals. Neither Professor Jevons nor Mill stands alone in his view of proper names. Each has predecessors and followers in the same view; and the student ought to note the difference of opinion among logicians in regard to the true meaning of proper names. According to one school, they are non-connotative, being merely meaningless marks put upon individual things, while according to the other, they are connotative, denoting individuals and connoting qualities belonging to those individuals. The question is a philological and a psychological one, and cannot be discussed here. Mill's view is true if a proper name always means what it does, when it is first used as a symbol or sign for an individual thing. At that stage no attribute is associated with the name. But as our knowledge of the individual thing increases, we associate its attributes with the name, which suggests afterwards not only the individual thing, but also the attributes. A proper name would, therefore, appear to be at first without any connotation or signification of attributes, but it seems to acquire this signification as our knowledge of the individual becomes Mill's Logic, Vol. 1. pp. 36-37. 2 Jevons's Lessons, pp. 42-43. more and more definite, as its name becomes associated in our mind with its attributes, and as the attributes become a means of distinguishing that individual from others belonging to the same class or species. If a term has more than one connotation, it is ambiguous. It is then really equivalent to two or more terms, and should be treated as such; the terms 'thing,' 'substance,' 'right,' 'thought,' 'foot,' 'church,' 'faith,' 'feeling,' 'form,' 'government,' &c., having more than one signification, are ambiguous, and each of them is really equivalent to more than one term. For example, the term 'thing' means popularly a body, something tangible and visible, or an object of sense; but, in a wider sense, it means also a mind, any substance, mental or material, as when we speak of mind as a 'thinking thing'; and, in a still wider sense, it means attributes and phenomena as well as substances, as when sensations, ideas, feelings, hopes, joys, sorrows are spoken of as 'mental things.' The term 'substance' is also ambiguous, signifying popularly a thing consisting of attributes, and philosophically a substratum or basis in which all the attributes of a thing are inherent, or which forms an inexplicable tie or bond among them. § 8. All the above described divisions of terms are based on the following general aspects of things. The fact that there are individual things, gives rise to the Singular Term. The fact that the same attribute or collection of attributes is found in many individual things, gives rise to the General Term. The fact that many individual things may sometimes be taken together and regarded as constituting a whole, gives rise to the Collective Term. The fact that one attribute may be spoken about and treated of apart from others with which it exists in an individual thing, gives rise to the Abstract Term; and the fact that it really exists in combination with others in an individual thing or substance, and cannot exist by itself, gives rise to the Concrete Term. The fact that certain attributes and things are necessarily connected with one another, and imply each other, gives rise to Correlative Terms; and the fact that others are not so connected and do not imply each other, gives rise to the Absolute Term. The fact that our knowledge of things is progressive, that we first come to know one attribute of a thing or of a group of things and then another, gives rise to the Connotative Term; or rather the fact that the name given to a thing or a group of things comes with the progress of our knowledge of the thing or things, to be associated with this additional knowledge, and becomes afterwards a sign for it, gives rise to the distinction of Connotative and Non-connotative Names. The Negative Term shows that things may be named not only by the attributes which they actually possess (as in the case of Positive Terms), but also by those which are absent in them; that names may be applied to things in virtue of the absence of some as well as of the presence of other attributes; that things may be distinguished into classes by their negative as well as by their positive qualitics. $9. Exercises. In describing the logical characters of a term, the following method should be followed : : I. What is given is a word or combination of words. Ascertain its meaning, and see whether it is capable of being employed by itself as the subject or the predicate of a proposition. If it is not, then it is syncategorematic; if it is, then it is categorematic, that is, a term. II. In the latter case, proceed to describe the logical characters of the term in the following order1: i. Whether it is single-worded or many-worded. ii. Whether it is singular or general. iii. Whether it is collective and singular, or collective and general. iv. Whether it is concrete or abstract. 1 I have not given here the distinction of categorematic or syncategorematic as a logical character of terms, as it is applicable to words rather than to terms. Single words and combinations of words should be distinguished into categorematic and syncategorematic, and not terms. V. vi. Whether it is positive, negative, or privative. vii. Whether it is connotative or non-connotative. III. If it has more than one meaning, then describe its logical characters, first in accordance with the most obvious or usual meaning, and then in accordance with the other meaning or meanings in order of importance. Examples. 1. 'Man':-categorematic; single-worded; general; concrete; positive; absolute; connotative. 2. Mankind':-categorematic; single-worded; collective and singular; concrete; positive; absolute; connotative. 3. The Sun':-categorematic; many-worded; singular; concrete; connotative; positive; absolute. 4. 'Beautiful':-categorematic (according to some syncategorematic; because the complete term consists of the word 'beautiful' and a word understood after it, such as 'thing,' or 'person,' &c., for example 'that picture is beautiful': here the complete sentence is that that picture is a beautiful thing'); single-worded; general; concrete; positive; absolute (correlative, if 'beautiful' is regarded as implying 'ugly'); connotative. 5. 'Equal':-its logical characters are the same as those of 'beautiful,' except that it is correlative, i.e., it implies something that is equal to it. 'Larger,' 'greater,' 'upper,' &c., are also correlative. 6. 'Lame,' 'dumb,' 'blind,' have the same logical characters as 'beautiful,' except that they are privative. 7. 'Army':-categorematic; single-worded; collective, when it means some one army, i.e., in the sense of 'an army,' but general when it means different armies, and connotes the attributes possessed in common by them; concrete; positive; absolute; connotative. 8. 'Rational animal,' 'white man,' 'flowering plant,' 'metal conducting heat and electricity,'' animal living in water':-categorematic; many-worded; general; concrete; positive; absolute; connotative. 9. 'The figure of this body,' 'the luminosity of this flame,' ‘the smell of this rose':-categorematic; many-worded; singular; abstract; positive; absolute; non-connotative. 10. 'Quantity':-categorematic; single-worded; general; abstract; positive; connotative. 11. 'Humanity':-categorematic; single-worded; abstract; positive; absolute; general and connotative, if ‘humanity' admits of any variety or division; singular and non-connotative, if 'humanity' is something individual, that is, incapable of any variety or division. Sometimes it is very difficult to describe the logical characters of a term, the difficulty arising chiefly from difference of opinion as to the real nature of the thing signified by the term,-as to the real meaning or meanings of the term, &c. Take, for example, the term 'phenomenon.' It is general; connotative; concrete; positive; but is it absolute or correlative? According to some philosophers, it implies the existence of 'nöumenon,' and is, therefore, correlative, while according to others who do not believe in the existence of nöumena, it is absolute. Similarly, the term 'attribute' or 'quality' is either relative to 'substance' or absolute according as the existence of the latter is believed in or not. 'Cause' is evidently related to 'effect,' and 'effect' to 'cause.' 'Antecedent' to 'consequent,' and the latter to the former. Are 'time' and 'space' abstract or concrete, singular or general, absolute or correlative? The answer to this question will be given differently by different philosophers. Examples for Solution. Describe the logical characters of the following:— I. (1) Man, (2), good man, (3) human, (4) humanity, (5) humanitarian, (6) humanitarianism, (7) A man whom I saw yesterday. II. (1) Five, (2) fifth, (3) five attributes, (4) five bodies, (5) these five metals. III. (1) Good, (2) the good, (3) goodness, (4) goods, (5) the highest good, (6) a good quality, (7) great goodness. IV. (1) Book, (2) library, (3) a library, (4) Encyclopædia, (5) Encyclopædia Britannica. V. (1) Organ, (2) organic, (3) inorganic, (4) organism, (5) an organism, (6) organic being. VI. (1) Nation, (2) a nation, (3) national, (4) nationality, (5) nation alities. |