American plenipotentiary would consent to the terms of the proposed preliminaries; for indeed I do not know that I am founded in that opinion with respect to either, but still I believe it of both. But what can a private person do in such a case, wishing to be a mediator for peace, having access to both parties, but equally uncertain of the reception of his mediation on either side? I must hesitate to take any public step, as by a proposition in parliament, or by any other means to drive the parties to an explanation upon any specific proposals: and yet I am very unwilling to let the 4session pass without some proposition, upon which the parties may meet, if they should be so inclined, as I suspect them to be. I have been endeavoring to feel pulses for some months, but all is dumb show. I cannot say indeed that I meet with any thing discouraging, to my apprehension, either as to equitableness or practicability of the proposition for preliminaries. If I could but simply receive sufficient encouragement that I should not run any hazard of obstructing any other practicable propositions, by obtruding mine, I should be very much satisfied to come forward, in that case, with mine, to furnish a beginning at least which might lead to peace.

There is nothing that I wish so much as to have an opportunity of seeing and conversing with you, having many things to say to you; but if that cannot yet happen, I have only to say, that whatever communication you may think proper to make to me which may lead to peace, you may be assured that I shall be most strenuous in applying it to that end. In all cases of difficulty in human life, there must be confidence somewhere to enable us to extricate nations from the evils attendant upon national disputes, as they arise out of national passions, interests, jealousies, and points of honor. I am not sure whether the extreme caution and diffidence of persons in political life, be not the cause almost as frequently of

the unnecessary protraction of the miseries of war, as of the final production of any superior good to any state. Peace now is better than peace a twelvemonth hence, at least by all the lives that may be lost in the mean while, and by all the accumulated miseries that may intervene by that delay. When I speak of the necessity of confidence, I would not have you to think that I trust to all professions, promiscuously, with confidence: my thoughts are free respecting all parties; and for myself, if I thought it necessary for the end of attaining any additional confidence in your esteem to enable me to co-operate the more effectually towards the restoration of peace, there is nothing that I would wish you to be assured of but this: that no fallacious offers of insincerity, nor any pretexts for covering secret designs, or for obtaining unfair advantages, shall ever pass through my hands. Believe me truly to be, not only a lover of my country, but a sincere friend to peace, and to the rights of mankind; and ever most affectionately yours, D. HARTLEY.

Lord North consented to Mr. Hartley's proposition for endeavoring to procure from the American plenipotentiary or plenipotentiaries some opening that they would be willing to commence a parley, on propositions of peace between Great Britain and America, and supposed the terms which Mr. Hartley had in view would be something like a tacit cession of independence to America, with a truce for a certain term of years, to serve as a basis for a general treaty of accommodation and final settlement.

This last application (which was made on the 20th of April, 1779,) of Mr. Hartley's to Lord North, after several previous conferences on the subject, is the ground of the present confidential communication with Dr. Franklin, on the part of Mr. Hartley, who states to Dr. Franklin, as he

did to Lord North, that an auspicious beginning of a negociation is dimidium facti.

Mr. Hartley's ideas of the probable course of the negociation, would be to the following effect.

Five commissioners (or any three of them) to be appointed on the part of his Britannic Majesty to treat, consult, and agree upon the final settlement and pacification of the present troubles, upon safe, honorable, and permanent terms, subject to ratification by parliament.

:

That any one of the aforesaid commissioners be impowered to agree, as a preliminary, to a suspension of all hostilities by sea and land, for a certain term of five or seven years.

That any one of the aforesaid commissioners be impowered to agree, as a second preliminary, to suspend the operation and effect of any and all acts of parliament respecting America, for a certain term of five or seven years.

That it is expected, as a third preliminary, that America should be released free and unengaged from any treaties with foreign powers, which may tend to embarrass or defeat the present proposed negociation.

That a general treaty for negociation shall be set on foot as soon as may be after the agreement of the foregoing preliminaries.

N. B. A doubt seeming to arise from Lord North relative to the probability of any explanatory communication on the part of Dr. Franklin, Mr. Hartley expressed he thought it possible, that as a known friend to peace, he might be considered by Dr. Franklin as a depôt of any communications which may serve from time to time to facilitate the terms of peace which therefore prevents this communication being considered as any direct overture from Lord North to Dr. Franklin, or from Dr. Franklin to Lord North, but as it is, merely a mediatorial proposition of Mr. Hartley as a private person, for the purpose of bringing the parties to a parley.

TO DAVID HARTLEY, Esq. M. P.

DEAR SIR,

Passy, May 4, 1779.

I received your several favors, viz. one of April the 10th, one of the 20th, and two of the 22d, all on the same day, but by different conveyances.

I need not repeat what we have each of us so often repeated, the wish for peace. I will begin by frankly assuring you, that though I think a direct, immediate peace, the best mode of present accommodation for Britain as well as for America, yet if that is not at this time practicable, and a truce is practicable, I should not be against a truce; but this is merely on motives of general humanity, to obviate the evils men devilishly inflict on men in time of war, and to lessen as much as possible the similarity of earth and hell. For with regard to particular advantages respecting the states I am connected with, I am persuaded it is theirs to continue the war, till England shall be reduced to that perfect impotence of mischief, which alone can prevail with her to let other nations enjoy "peace, liberty, and safety." I think, however, that a short truce, which must therefore be an armed truce, and put all parties to an almost equal expense with a continued war, is by no means desirable.

But this proposition of a truce, if made at all, should be made to France at the same time it is made to America. They have each of them too much honor as well as too much sense, to listen separately to any propositions which tend to separate them from each other.

I will now give you my thoughts on your ideas of a negociation in the order you have placed them. If you will number them in your copy, you will readily see to which my observations refer, and I may therefore be more concise.

To the first. I do not see the necessity or use of five

commissioners. A number of talkers lengthen discussions, and often embarrass instead of aiding a settlement. Their different particular views, private interests and jealousies of each other, are likewise so many rubs in the way; and it sometimes happens that a number cannot agree to what each privately thinks reasonable, and would have agreed to, or perhaps proposed if alone. But this as the parties please.

To the second. The term of 21 years would be better for all sides. The suspension of hostilities should be expressed to be between all parties at war. And that the British troops and ships of war now in any of the United States be withdrawn.

To the third. This seems needless, and is a thing that may be done or omitted as you please. America has no concern about those acts of parliament.

To the fourth. The reason of proposing this is not understood, nor the use of it, nor what inducement there can be for us to agree to it. When you come to treat with both your enemies, you may negociate away as much of these engagements as you can; but powers who have made a firm solid league, evidently useful to both, can never be prevailed with to dissolve it, for the vague expectation of another in nubibus; nor even on the certainty that another will be proposed, without knowing what are to be its articles. America has no desire of being free from her engagements to France. The chief is that of continuing the war in conjunction with her, and not making a separate peace: and this is an obligation not in the power of America to dissolve, being an obligation of gratitude and justice towards a nation which is engaged in a war on her account, and for her protection, and would be for ever binding, whether such an article existed or not in the treaty, and though it did not exist, an honest