this business. You must see the advantage of an immediate renewal of intercourse, and from the candor of your dispositions I am sure you must likewise be convinced, that to give us some facility in the outset is the sure road to such an equitable arrangement for the future, as you must have at heart. The reasons which I have given in the memorial dated the first of June instant, appear to me to be cogent and convincing upon the natural alliance between our two countries; and when the intercourse has once begun, every thing will go on in its natural road. It is therefore of infinite consequence to begin that intercourse. Great Britain, by all public proceedings of repeals, proclamations, &c. &c. has made the first advances with warmth and confidence, and therefore I conclude, with the fullest assurance,, that you will meet those advances with cordial reciprocity.

I have the honor to be, gentlemen, with the greatest respect and consideration, your most obedient and humble servant, D. HARTLEY.

MEMORIAL, JUNE 1, 1783.

1 The proposition which has been made for an universal and unlimited reciprocity of intercourse and commerce between Great Britain and the American United States, requires a very serious consideration on the part of Great Britain, for the reasons already stated in a memorial dated May 19, 1783, and for many other reasons, which in the future discussion of the proposition will appear. To the American states likewise it is a matter of the deepest importance, not only as a proposition of commercial intercourse, which is the least part, but most principally as a political basis and guarantee for their newly established constitutions. The introduction of British interests into a communion of intercourse will bring forward an universal guarantee on the part of Great Britain,

in the future progress of political events, which may affect the United States of America in their national capacity. The proposition is fertile in future prospects to Great Britain, and America also may wisely see in it a solid foundation for her

self.

All circumstances are most fortunately disposed between Great Britain and the American states, to render them useful friends and allies to each other, with a higher degree of suitbleness between themselves than any other nations can pretend to. France cannot interchange reciprocities with the American states, by reason of numberless impediments in her system of government, in her monopolies, and in her system of commerce. France has the great disability of difference in language to contend with, and the institution of the present French manufactures has never at any time heretofore been trained or adapted to American commerce. The only particular and specific facility which France ever possessed for American intercourse has, for many years, been transferred into the British scale by the cession of Canada to Great Britain. The future commerce between France and America will chiefly be regulated by such conveniences as France can draw to herself from America, without much aptitude on the part of France to accommodate her manufactures and commerce to American demands. In short, an interchange of réciprocities between France and America would run against the stream on both sides, and all established habits, manners, language, together with principles of government and commerce, would militate against such a system.

Conformably to this reasoning it appears that France has not at any time entertained any systematical design of forming any union or consolidation of interests with America. She took up the American cause, as instrumental to her political views in Europe. America likewise accepted the alliance

with France for her separate views, viz. for the establishment of her independence. The alliance therefore is completed and terminated, without leaving behind it any political principle of the future permanent connexion between them. Occasional circumstances produced a temporary alliance. Similar circumstances may on any future occasion produce a similar event of a temporary compact. Dissimilar circumstances, ⚫ arising from any future political views of the court of France

in Europe, may without any inconsistency of principle throw the power of that kingdom into a scale adverse to the future interests of the American states. In such case therefore, where there cannot exist any permanent political connexion between France and America, and where the commercial attachments can be but feeble, it would be vain to expect inf the French nation any such ally, as newly established states ought to look out for, to give maturity and firmness to their constitutions.

As to Spain, every argument which has been stated respecting diversity of language, manners, government, monopolies, and system of commerce, from those which prevail in the United States of America, obtains in a superior degree. And much more to add besides; for Spain is not only incompe tent to interchange reciprocities with the American states, but likewise her own situation in America will at all times render her extremely jealous of her neighbors. The only activity which Spain has exerted in the war, has been to procure à barrier against the American states, by annexing West Florida to her former acquisition of New Orleans; thereby embra cing the mouth of the Mississippi, and by means of that river jointly with her landed possessions, establishing a strong and jealous boundary against any future progress of the American states in those parts: Spain therefore cannot be looked upen by the American states as a suitable object of their election to

become a permanent ally and friend to them. Portugal likewise labors under all the disabilities of language, manners, monopolies, government, and system of commerce. Her national power and importance would be likewise insufficient to constitute a strong and permanent ally to the American states. All these nations will undoubtedly be found to have many commodious qualities for participation in commerce, but the pre-eminent faculties necessary to constitute a firm and permanent ally to the American states will be found deficient in them.

As to the Italian states, or any other powers in the Mediterranean, they are certainly not adequate to any competition of political alliance with the rising states of America. They will also form very commodious links and connexions in the general circuit of commerce, but beyond these considerations they have no share in the present question. The several states of the Germanic body are in the same predicament.

As to the northern powers, viz. those in the Baltic, they are not favored either by vicinity or climate, for a frequent or facile intercourse of commerce with America. And even respecting several material articles of commerce, jealousies and competitions might arise. As to political alliances, there are no such in prospect from them to the American states, even if there were any superfluity of force in any of them, beyond the necessities of their respective domestic situations. The extreme distance would be conclusive against any possible application of such power as a political alliance favorable to the establishment and confirmation of the American states.

The only maritime state on the continent of Europe remaining to be discussed as a competent candidate for commerce or connexion with America, is the republic of the United Netherlands, commonly called Holland. In respect to American commerce, the Dutch have among themselves every facility

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combined, which the separate states of Europe possess distinctively in their own concerns, or nearly. Their industry, frugality, and habits of commerce may even carry them so far as to make them rivals to the Americans themselves, in the transportation of European merchandise to America. These faculties of commerce would have been of infinite importance to the American states, if the war had continued between Great Britain, and them. But upon the event of peace it becomes a matter of the most perfect indifference to America, whether each European state navigates its own commerce into the ports of America, which will be open to all, or whether the commercial faculties of Holland enable her to exceed in rivalship her European neighbors, and thereby to navigate European goods to America beyond the proportion of her national share. The faculties of a nation of carriers may be fortunate for the marine of that nation, but considered in themselves, and with respect to other nations, they are but secondaries in commerce. They give no ground of reciprocities or participation. That one nation should say to another, You shall navigate all our rivers, harbors, lakes, ports, and places, if we may do the same in yours, is a proposition of reciprocity; but that Holland should say to America, We will bring European goods to you, or you may be your own carriers, is neither concession nor reciprocity. Holland is not a nation of rivers, harbors, lakes, ports, and places for the distribution of goods and manufactures for internal consumption, and therefore her reciprocities must be very scanty. Holland is the market-place of Europe, and the Dutch seamen are the carriers appertaining to that market-place. The admission of American ships to that market-place, freely to import and to export, is undoubtedly an act of reciprocity on the part of Holland, as far as it goes, but in no degree adequate to the unlimited participation of American commerce,