I have been told and believe it, that they understood that Mr. Adams was (disgusted with the Dutch government) ready to accede to ours. Also that Mr.

at Ghent was already gained. This person they hurried off to America; and they gave instructions to General Carleton to open the ground of treaty in America. In short they tried any ground and every person except him who was excepted to. And when they found that they could not get in at any door in Europe, they affected to interpret this disappointment into a fact, "That the American ministers were either not impowered or not willing to treat; that the offer was now clearly a trap laid by a faithless and decided enemy."

When I first made my offer I was asked whether I would go to Ghent or Holland, which I peremptorily refused. I was then asked why I would not, I said I knew nothing of the person in Holland, and as to the person at Ghent, I would have no communications there. The only person I would have communications with, was him that I knew had powers, whom I knew to be, notwithstanding all provocations to the contrary, invariably consistent with his duty to his own country, a well-wisher and friend to this, whom from experience I knew to be a man of honor and good faith, whom I could trust, and who would trust me. This person and this line was rejected; I will not aggravate the colour of facts by saying how.

I was informed that during this period they were talking with Mr. Laurens as a more practicable man, as one who had by acknowledging himself amenable to the laws and courts of this country, and by the act of giving bail had by implication acknowledged (at least de facto), the sove reignty of Great Britain, and that the ministers of the States were criminals against this country. This gentleman therefore, and his surety Mr. Oswald, were fixed

upon as the persons through whom business might go. What was the nature of the matters of business on which they were communicated with, I do not know..

Notwithstanding the change of the ministry which took place at this period, there were some in the new composition of ministers, who partook of the spirit and influence of the old ones, and the same line of motion, and the same persons, were in like manner, as before, adopted for treaty.

The memorial, January 1, 1782, (p. 22,) declares spécifically and definitively what was the proposition I made, viz. to open a "negociation for 'the purpose only of settling such a truce with the Americans, as a preliminary measure, in order the better to treat of peace in future, either separately, or in any general Congress of the powers of Europe." And this on a ground of uti possidetis, both as to rights as well as territories possessed, which I explained an acknowledgment of the independence of America, with a sauf d'honneur to the British sovereign, and a removing of all obstacles from the way of such other sovereigns in Europe as had not yet brought themselves to acknowledge the American sove reignty, (p. 22.). I never pretended to talk of peace, much less of a separate peace, but definitely declared that whatever was undertaken" must not contravene, (Mem. Jan. 1782 p. 21,) nor ever bring into question, treaties already subsisting."

L

On this ground it was, that upon my first overtures I proposed that while I was treating with the American ministers, Mr. Hobart might be authorized to treat with French minis ters as the properest man then in England, as living with the men of business of that Court; as known to them; as knowing them; and between whom and him there was that degree and those habits of acquaintance and good opinion, which is the only soil out of which practical confidence in negociation can grow; as one with whom I could communi

cate with the most perfect confidence, as one in whose hands I would repose my life and honor. I said first that if these two lines of treaty were not instituted at the same time; and secondly, that if Mr. Hobart was not the person joined with me, I would not engage in what I had offered. This gentleman, a man of honor, brother to the Earl of Buckingham, of a noble distinct landed estate of his own; a man designed by his education at the Court of Vienna, under former ministers in a former reign, for the corps diplomatic, and actually having served in Russia, was also inadmissible. And they thus ended all matters in which I had made my offers.

... Having thus found the ministers with whom I had communicated, impracticable towards peace in the only line in which I thought it might be obtained, and seeing an opportunity in which I could be principally instrumental in turning them out, I seized the occasion, and effectuated the purpose.

f. General Conway had communicated to me a measure which he was to take of moving an address of the House of Commons, to pray his Majesty to relinquish the farther prosecution of the War. I stated to him the following difficulty which might be thrown on the ground of his motion, so as to obstruct his proceeding in it. The ministers might in general terms, and equivocal assertions, say, that they were trying the ground of treaty, and that propositions towards negociation were afloat, &c. &c., and then if on this ground they called upon him, not at such a juncture to bring forward measures which might obstruct their endeavours, and destroy all hopes and views of peace, he would be puzzled what to answer and how to proceed. But, that if he could have it in his power to say, That so far from opening the ground of negociation, or being disposed to take a way to such; which offers had opened to them; that they had offers made by persons communicating with other persons actually autho

rized and willing to treat of peace, and had rejected those offers; I thought the ministers would not know how to oppose his motion. He said, that indeed would be strong ground, from whence if the ministry were attacked, he did not see how they could maintain their ground. I then proceeded in my communications to him, without naming my correspondent, nay absolutely refusing to name when earnestly pressed, and told him, that I was the person to whom communications had come," that there were in Europe persons authorized to treat of peace, and who had declared that any reasonable measures to that end, should have every assistance in their power.' That I had communicated this to the ministry, that after delaying all answer from December 6th to the end of January, to offers which I had made them on that ground, they had finally and absolutely rejected the persons and the offers. He said if this could be proved it must turn them out. I then authorized him to make those assertions1 which he made in the House, and that we might not misunderstand one another, I desired they might be written down; and farther authorized him, if the ministry by denying the assertions should render it neces sary, to name me, as ready to come and declare the same at the bar of the House of Commons; and that in the mean while he need not make any secret of me on this matter. The ministers could not, and did not venture to deny it, and were forced to quit their ground and their places.* Upon the change of ministers, I by letter to General Conway made an offer of my services to open the same negociation

1 Which were not those the newspapers published.

2 The country gentlemen, tired of the war, and grown impatient for peace, left the old ministry on this question, and declared themselves the supporters of those who promised to end the war, and give peace to the country.

which I had proposed to the late ministers; but from that hour to this day have never heard from him; and soon after found that Lord Shelburne had employed Mr. Oswald, who was Mr. Laurens's surety, and that his Lordship had seen Mr. Laurens.

Richmond, July 2, 1782.

MEMORANDUM BY DAVID HARTLEY, ESQ.

July 8, 1782.

To a person who no longer thinks of American dependence, what disadvantage can there be in making its independence a fixed article (whether the treaty succeeds or no) instead of making it a first article of the treaty, and so to depend on the success of that which may miscarry? To a person indeed who looks on it as an evil, and as an evil which there are yet some hopes to avoid, it is a rational proceeding to provide for all possibilities of realizing those hopes; and the case of the treaty not succeeding is that reserved possibility. Were I treating with an enemy indeed for a barrier town (which I certainly wish to keep or to get something for,) nothing I own would be so absurd as to give up at starting, as a fixed article before the treaty, instead of making it the first article of a treaty, and dependent on the success of the rest. But I had rather have American independence, (for one reason amongst others,) because the bolder way of giving it up, will secure a greater certainty of peace; I would then be for giving it up in that bolder way; nay, had I some reluctance to American independence, I should still think the smallest probability added of peace, would over-balance the whole value of a mere reserved possibility of dependence, which could only, after all, arise from the failure of the treaty.