things whatsoever which men do not of themselves, they do either by chance, or from compulsion, or by nature. Again, the things which they do of themselves, and of which they are themselves the causes, some they do through custom, and others through natural desire; and this partly through this desire influenced by reason, and in part through it devoid of reason. Now, the act of wishing is desire accompanied by reason, fixing on some good as its object; because no one wishes for anything other than what he conceives to be a good. The desires devoid of reason are anger and appetite. So that all things whatever which men do, they necessarily do from seven causes; by chance, compulsion, nature, custom, will, anger, or appetite. But to carry on distinctions in reference to age, or habits, or whatever else enacts itself in conduct, were superfluous. For, granting that it happens to young men to be passionate, it is not by motion of their youth that they act thus, but by motion of anger and appetite; neither is it by motion either of wealth or poverty simply, but (in the case of the poor) it is on account of their neediness that it happens that they cherish an appetite for wealth; and (in the case of the rich) on account of their having the means, that they risk an appetite for unnecessary pleasure; and these persons will act neither by motion of their wealth nor of their poverty, but by motion of appetite. And in exactly the same way, the just and unjust, and all such as are said to act conformably to habits, will in reality act, under all circumstances, by motion of these principles; for they act on the impulse either of reason or of passion; but some from good manners and passions, others from the contrary. Still, however, it happens that on habits of this particular character, principles of action the same in character are consequent; and on those of that kind, principles also of that kind. For on the temperate man perhaps forthwith, by motion of his temperance, are attendant good opinions and appetites respecting pleasures; but on the intemperate, the contrary on these same subjects. For which reason we must waive distinctions of such a kind; but we must consider on what conditions, what principles of conduct are wont to follow: for it is not ordained (in the nature of things), that, if a man be white or black, or tall or short, principles of this or that kind should be attendant on him; but if he be young or old, just or unjust, here some difference begins; and so, in a word, in the case of all contingent circumstances whatever, which produce a difference in the tempers of men, for instance, a man's seeming to himself to be rich or poor, fortunate or unfortunate; in all these cases there will be some essential difference. Of this, however, we will speak hereafter; let us now treat first of the remaining points. Things proceed from chance which are of such kind that their cause is not definite, and are produced in the absence of any final motive, and that neither invariably, nor usually, nor in any prescribed order. My meaning on these subjects will be plain from the definition of chance. All those things exist naturally whose cause is internal and ordinate; for they turn out, either invariably or generally, in the same way; since there is no need of an accurate inquiry on results contrary to nature, whether they be produced conformably to a certain nature, or any other cause. It would appear, too, that chance is the cause of such results. All things originate in compulsion, which are produced through the instrumentality of the agents themselves, contrary to their inclination and reason. In habit originates everything which men do because they have often done it before. From will proceed whatever of the forementioned goods appear to be useful, either as an end or as conducing to the end, when it is by reason of such their usefulness that they are realized in action: for even the intemperate do some things which are useful; but not on account of their usefulness, but on account of pleasure. Through the medium of anger and excited feeling arise acts of vengeance. Now, between revenge and punishment there is a difference; for punishment is for the sake of the sufferer, but revenge for that of the person inflict

ing it, in order that he may be satiated. On what subjects this excitement of feeling exists will therefore be plain in my treatise of the passions. But all such things as appear pleasant are produced in action on the impulse of appetite. But that which is familiar and has become habitual is of the number of things pleasant; for many things there are, even among such as are not pleasant naturally, which, when men have been habituated to, they do with pleasure. So that, to speak in one word comprehending the whole, everything whatsoever which men do of their own proper motion, either is good, or apparently good; pleasant, or apparently pleasant. But as they act voluntarily in whatever they do of their own motion, and involuntarily in whatever they do not of their own motion; all things whatsoever in respect to which they act voluntarily will be either good or apparently good; pleasant or apparently pleasant. For I also set down the getting quit either of evils or apparent evils, and the getting a less evil in exchange for a greater, in the class of goods; because they are in a certain way desirable things. And, among things pleasant, I likewise set down the getting quit of things bringing pain, or appearing to do so; or the getting things less so, in exchange for such as are so in greater degree.

We have, therefore, to ascertain the number of things pleasant and of what kinds they are. Now on the subject of what is useful, something has been already said in my treating of deliberative rhetoric; but on the subject of what is pleasant let us treat, beginning at this point. As to the definitions, you must deem them to be adequate [to my purpose] if they be found, on each subject, exempt from obscurity, though not accurately precise.

T

ON PLEASING THE JUDGES

HE materials, then, from which we must exhort and dissuade, praise and blame, accuse and defend, the notions also and propositions, useful in order to render these points credible, are those which we have discussed: for respecting these questions, and out of these sources, are enthymemes deduced, so that an orator, thus provided, may speak on each separate department of questions. But as rhetoric has in view the coming to a decision (for in deliberative oratory the assembly arrive at decisions; and the sentence of a court of justice is ipso facto a decision); it is necessary to look not only to your speech, in what way that will be of a character to convince and persuade, but also to invest yourself with a certain kind of character, and the judge with a certain kind of feeling. For it is a point of great consequence, particularly in deliberative cases; and, next to these, in judicial; as well that the speaker seem to be a man of a certain character as that his audience conceive him to be of a certain disposition toward themselves; moreover, it is of consequence if your audience chance to be themselves also disposed in a certain way. Now, as to a speaker's appearing to be himself of a certain character, this point is more available in deliberations: but the disposing the auditor in a certain way, in judicial cases; for things do not show themselves in the same light to persons affected by love and by hatred, nor to those under emotions of anger, as to those who are disposed to placability; but they appear either utterly different in character, or at least different in degree. For to a judge who is affected by love toward the party respecting whom he pronounces his decision, that party appears either not at all to be unjust, or to be so in a very trivial degree. To a judge, however, who is affected by hatred, the case has a contrary appearance. So also to a person who is eager and sanguine, the proposed object, if pleasant, takes the appearance, as well of being

likely to accrue, as of being likely to prove really a good; while by one who is indifferent and reluctant, the opposite view is taken.

Now, there are three causes of a speaker's deserving belief; for so many in number are the qualities on account of which we lend our credit, independently of proof adduced; and these are prudence, moral excellence, and the having our interests at heart (for men are fallacious in what they allege or advise by reason, either of all, or some, of these causes; for either, from want of ability, they do not rightly apprehend the question; or, rightly apprehending it, from their depravity, they do not tell you what they think; or, being men both of ability and moral excellence, they have not your interests at heart, on which account it is possible they should not give you the best advice, though fully known what is best); and besides these there is no other: it follows therefore, of course, that the speaker who appears to possess all these qualities is considered by his audience as deserving credit. Now, the means by which men may appear virtuous and prudent are to be derived from what has been laid down on the subject of the virtues; for it is by help of the very same things that an orator may invest himself, and any one else, in a certain character. The subject of feeling an interest, and of friendliness, must be discussed in my treatise of the passions, commencing henceforth. Passions, however, are all emotions whatsoever, on which pain and pleasure are consequent, by whose operation, undergoing a change, men differ in respect to their decisions: for instance, anger, pity, fear, and whatever other emotions are of such a nature, and those opposed to them. But it will be fitting to divide what I have to say respecting each into three considerations: to consider, respecting anger, for example, how those who are susceptible of anger are affected; with whom they usually are angry; and on what occasions. For, granted that we be in possession of one, or even two of these points, and not of them all, it will be impossible for us to kindle anger in the breast; and in the case of the rest of the passions in a similar way. In the same way, then, as on the subjects treated of above, I have separately drawn up the several propositions, so let me do in respect of these also, and make my distinctions according to the manner specified.

IT

THE PROPER HANDLING OF AN ARGUMENT

T FOLLOWS that I speak of the modes of disengaging oneself from arguments. They are either the meeting them with contradictory arguments, or starting an objection. Now as to the meeting them with counter arguments, it is evident that we may do it on the ground of the same topics [as were given for refutation]; for the arguments arise out of probabilities, and many things which appear likely are opposed to each other.

Objections, however (as was stated in the "Topics »), are started in four ways: 1. For either it may be from the same subject; 2. from a similar; 3. or an opposite [to that from which the adversary argues]; 4. or from points already decided. By deriving your objection from the same source, I mean that, supposing the enthymeme were respecting love, "that it was a good feeling»; there would be a twofold objection; for it [might be started] asserting generally that "every want is bad »: or, particularly, that "the proverbial expression 'Caunian loves' would not have arisen had there not been some wicked loves.» Again, an objection is alleged on the ground of a contrary fact; as if the enthymeme was this, "The good man benefits all his friends; » [and the objection,] «But the bad man does not hurt all his.» And on the ground of similar cases; if the argument be, "Those who have been treated ill always

hate;" [the objection,] that "those who have been treated well do not always love. » And again, the decisions of men of celebrity: thus, suppose one brought forward the argument, that “we ought to have some feeling for those who are intoxicated, because they err ignorantly »; this objection [may be started], that "Pittacus is not therefore entitled to praise, otherwise he would not in his enactments have imposed higher fines, in case the party committed the error while intoxicated.»

But as all reasonings [of the orator] are derived from four sources, and these four are probability, example, proof positive (Tekμhpιov), and signs; and as the reasonings drawn from what is usual, or appears to be so, are drawn from probabilities, while those drawn by inference from similarity of circumstances, whether in one or more instances (when the speaker embracing what is general then infers particulars), exist by virtue of example; while those again which are inferred from what is necessary and fact are founded on proof positive; and lastly, as those drawn from what does or does not hold good, whether universally or particularly, result from signs, [it being remembered] that probability is not what always, but what usually occurs; it is plain that it is, in every case, possible to get rid of reasonings such as these by starting an objection. The solution is, however, [sometimes] apparent, and not always real; for the objector does not do it away on the ground of its not being probable, but on that of its not being necessary. Wherefore it always happens that the defendant has the advantage of the accuser, by means of this piece of sophistry. For as the accuser constructs his proof by means of probabilities (the task of getting rid of the positive certainty being by no means the same [in point of difficulty], as that of getting rid of the probability of the charge); and as that which is merely probable is invariably open to an objection (for it otherwise would not be a probability, but invariable and necessary); and if this method of solution have been adopted, the judge supposes either that it does not amount to a probability, or at least that he ought not to decide, having been imposed upon in the way mentioned above; because [in fact] he is not bound to pronounce on positive proofs alone, but also on probabilities, which is the spirit of the oath, "that he will decide to the best of his judgment"; wherefore that will not be a satisfactory objection which rests merely on the absence of proof positive, but it is further incumbent on the objector to get rid of the probability; this, however, will be the case, if the objection be probable in a higher degree (and it may be so in two ways, either on the score of time, or of the nature of the case; and pre-eminently so, if in both these particulars); for if in the majority of instances it be as you state, then it is a greater probability.

Signs also, and the reasonings deduced from them, may be got rid of, even if they be facts, as was stated in the first book; for it is clear to us from the «Analytics" that every sign is illogical.

The same method of solution applies to reasonings grounded on example as to those on probabilities; for if we have a single instance in contravention, it has been answered [sufficiently to show] that it is not necessary; or that in the majority of instances, and those of more frequent occurrence, the case is otherwise. If, however, it be the case more frequently, and in the majority of instances, we must contend that the present is not the case in point, or that its application is not in point, or that it has some difference at all events.

But proofs positive (TEKμýρia), and the reasonings grounded on them, we shall not be able to get rid of, at least not on the plea of inconclusiveness; this is clear to us from the "Analytics": it remains for us to show that what is asserted is not the case; if, however, it be clear both that it is true as a matter of fact, and that it is a proof positive of the point, from that moment it becomes irrefragable; for henceforth it is plain from demonstration.

Α

OF AMPLIFICATION AND EXTENUATION

MPLIFICATION and extenuation are not elements of enthymemes (by topic and element I mean the same thing), since the element and the topic is that under which many enthymemes fall; whereas amplification and extenuation are [themselves] enthymemes for showing that a thing is great or little, like those for showing that it is good or bad, just or unjust, or falls under either of the other denominations. And these are all the questions about which syllogisms and enthymemes are conversant; so that unless each of these be a topic of an enthymeme, amplification and extenuation are not.

Neither, again, are the topics which are available to solution of enthymemes, at all different in species from those employed in their construction: for it is evident that he effects solution who either proves [something contrary], or states an objection, and they establish a counter proof of the contrary; thus, "If one has argued that a fact has taken place, the other argues that it has not"; or "if one argues that it has not, the other insists that it has." So that this will not amount to a difference; for both employ the same vehicles of proof, inasmuch as they each allege enthymemes to show that it is, or is not the case.

But the objection is not an enthymeme, but is, as was stated in the "Topics," the stating some opinion from which it will appear that no legitimate inference has been arrived at, or that [the opponent] has assumed some false proposition.

Thus much, then, on the subject of examples, and maxims, and enthymemes, and, in a word, all the means of persuasion which address themselves to the understanding, both the sources whence we may furnish ourselves plentifully with them, and the means by which we may effect their solution. It remains for us to go over the subject of style and arrangement.

L

ON EXCELLENCE OF STYLE

ET excellence of style be defined to consist in its being clear (a sign of this is this, that the diction, unless it make the sentiment clear, will not effect its purpose); and neither low, nor above the dignity of the subject, but in good taste; for the style of poetry, indeed, is not low, yet it is not becoming in prose.

Of nouns and verbs those which are in general use produce the effect of clearness: to prevent its being low, and to give it ornament, there are other nouns which have been mentioned in the "Poetics," for a departure [from ordinary acceptations] causes it to appear more dignified; for men are affected in respect of style in the very same way as they are towards foreigners and citizens. On which account you should give your phrase a foreign air; for men are admirers of things out of the way, and what is an object of admiration is pleasant. Now in the case of metrical compositions, there are many things which produce this effect, and there are very becoming, because both the subject and the person stand more apart [from ordinary life]; in prose, however, these helps are much fewer, for the subject is less exalted: since even in that art were a slave, or a mere youth, or [any one, in fact, in speaking] of mere trifles to express himself in terms of studied ornament, it would be rather unbecoming; but here too [as in poetry] the rule of good taste is that your style be lowered or raised according to the subject. On which account we must escape observation in doing this, and not appear to speak in a studied manner, but