EDITOR'S TABLE OF CONTENTS. liii of Montesquieu-Necessity for subdivision implied in Montesquieu's view-Federalization an expedient for the extension of government-Quotation from Montesquieu-Inaccurate distinction between confederation and consolidation-Definition of a confederate republic-Federal character of proposed constitution-Lycian confederacy, NO. 10. 47 MADISON. THE UNION A CHECK ON FACTION. Tendency of popular governments to faction-Complaints of injustice and instability in state governments-Definition of faction-Remedy of faction-Curtailment of liberty-Causes of faction innate in man-Opposing interests-Legislation by majority akin to interested judgments-Class legislation-Control of faction-Majority invasion of rights-A pure democracy unable to control faction-A remedy in representative governmentDifference between a democracy and a republic-Advantages of a delegated chosen body-Superiority of large over small republics-Greater proportion of fit characters-Advantage of greater number of electors-Necessity of acquaintance with local circumstances-Happy combination of national and local governments in the United States-Greater territory and population permitted by republican than by democratic government-Faction essentially local-Advantage of Union over States as to local prejudices and schemes of injustices-The Union a remedy for diseases most incident to republics, NO. II. 54 HAMILTON. UTILITY OF UNION AS REGARDS COMMERCE AND A NAVY. Adventurous commercial character of America-Commercial jealousy of Europe-A national commercial policy necessary to counteract European restrictions-Discrimination against Great Britain-Establishment of a federal navy-The United States likely to become the arbiter of Europe in America-Disunion certain to make our commerce a prey-Separation will enable maritime nations to prescribe the conditions of our political existence-National commercial rights which will be lost by a dissolution of the confederacy-The fisheries-A navy a great national object-Share of the south, middle, and New England states in a navy--Unrestrained intercourse between the statesUnlikelihood of free interstate commerce without unity-Ascenency in American affairs-European domination of the wordBuffon's and Raynal's theory of degeneracy in America, NO. 12. 64 HAMILTON. UTILITY OF UNION AS REGARDS REVENUE. Commerce the great source of national wealth-Commerce essential to agriculture-Taxes must be proportioned to the quantity of money-Small revenues of German empire-Poverty of state treasuries-Taxation in Great Britain-Duties the main dependence in America-Unpopularity of excise and direct taxes -Duties best levied by general government-State imposts will result in smuggling-Revenue patrols of France-Unlikelihood of smuggling under national government-Disadvantage of Britain as regards smuggling-State imposts-French and English duties-Revenue from ardent spirits-National existence impossible without revenue-Necessity for imposts-Unpopularity of excises and direct taxation-Without an impost, taxes will chiefly fall on land, NO. 13. 72 HAMILTON. ADVANTAGES OF UNION FROM THE STAND- Smaller expense of civil list-Civil lists of separate confederacies-Example of Great Britain-Probable lines of division of proposed confederacies-A northern and a southern league -Position of Pennsylvania-Greater economy of one confederacy, NO. 14. . 79 MADISON. OBJECTIONS TO THE EXTENT OF TERRITORY. An imaginary difficulty-Confusion of a republic with a democracy-Error of celebrated authors-Slight value of example of early republics-Early republics only democracies-Mechanical power of representation-Natural limit of a democracy-Experience in representation under the confederacy-Dimensions of the United States-Size of European countries-Limited jurisdiction of general government-Value of subordinate governments in relation to size of territory-Eventual growth of Union -Internal improvements facilitated-The more distant the state the greater the need of national government-Warning against those who favor disunion, NO. 15. 81 HAMILTON. DEFECTS OF THE PRESENT CONFEDERATION GOVERNMENTS. The sufficiency of the confederation a self-evident truthSketch of existing national humiliation-Contradictory conduct of oppose of the constitution-Necessity of a government that shal act on individuals-A government acting on the state governments nothing but an alliance-Epidemic rage in Europe for leagues-A league versus a confederate government in America-Distinction between a government acting on a state and one acting on individuals-Common interest ineffectual to obtain obedience to the Union-Origin of government-Centrifugal tendency of all confederacies-National laws will not be enforced by state governments-Various action of the thirteen states-Impotence of the Congress-Example of the various states, 87 EDITOR'S TABLE OF CONTENTS. lv HAMILTON. NO. 16. DEFECT OF THE CONFEDERATION IN ITS INABILITY TO COERCE. The only constitutional remedy against delinquent states is force-Impossibility of coercion-Sympathy between the statesProbable appeal of states to foreign nations-A probable dissolution of the Union-Unlikelihood of states supporting a national government-Certain degeneration into a military despotism-Impossibility of coercing the larger states-Military coercion a signal for civil war-The new government must extend to citizens-State resistance of national law-The distinction between non-compliance and active resistance-The new constitution puts state resistance in its true light-Employment of state agencies by national government-No form of government safe from revolution, NO. 17. 96 HAMILTON. REFUTATION OF THE ARGUMENT THAT A WILL BE TOO POWERFUL. Unlikelihood that the national government will absorb the residuary authority-Objects of national ambition-Local concerns not alluring objects of general jurisdiction-Easier for the states to encroach on the national authorities-Greater popularity of state government-Tendency of mankind to neighborhood attachment-Local justice the most attractive source of popular obedience and attachment-The national government less immediately connected with the people-Example in feudal times-The struggle between king and baron-Example of clanship in Scotland-State governments compared with feudal baronies-Local governments certain to possess the confidence of the people, NO. 18. 105 HAMILTON AND MADISON. EXAMPLES OF GREEK CONFEDERACIES. Amphictyonic council, its powers in history-The Achæan league, 108 NO. 19. HAMILTON AND MADISON. EXAMPLES OF MEDIEVAL AND MODERN CON FEDERACIES. The German empire-Example of Poland-The Swiss confoderacy, NO. 20. 114 HAMILTON AND MADISON. EXAMPLE OF THE UNITED NETHERLANDS. Nature of government-Historical illustrations-The present condition, 119 NO. 21. HAMILTON. SPECIFIC DEFECTS IN THE CONFEDERATION. No sanction of laws-No mutual guarantee of state governments-Dangerous possibility of despotism-Advantage of a national guarantee-System of quotas and its unfairness-Difficulty in finding a basis of taxation-Comparison between the states in respect to wealth-Complex sources of wealth and taxable ability--Inequality of taxation sure to destroy unionThe national government must raise its own revenues-Tendency of taxation to distribute itself-Taxes on articles of consumption prescribe their own limit-Distinction between indirect and direct taxes-Difficulties involved with direct taxes, NO. 22. 123 HAMILTON. DEFECT OF THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERA- Want of power to regulate commerce-Commercial treaties impossible-Separate prohibitions of certain states-Irritation between the United States-Commerce of Germany-Quotas of soldiers-Competition and results in expense and bountiesEqual suffrage of the states a great evil-And contradicts a fundamental maxim of republican government-Minority government-Resulting evils in congress-A check on good legislation as well as on bad-Result as to foreign nations-Republics subject to foreign corruption-One advantage of monarchyExample of United Provinces-Crowning defect of the confederation a want of judiciary power-Necessity for a supreme tribune-Thirteen separate, courts an impossibility-Evils of a single assembly or congress-The confederation ratified by the states, not by the people, NO. 23. 131 HAMILTON. NECESSITY OF A GOVERNMENT AT LEAST Objects to be provided for by national Government-Armies and fleets-Condition under present confederation-Vain project of legislating upon the states-Laws must be extended to individual citizens-The essential point in a compound government a discrimination of power-Fleets and armies from this point of view, NO. 24. 144 HAMILTON. POWERS CONFERRED BY NEW CONSTITUTION IN REGARD TO NATIONAL FORCES. Alleged want of proper provision against the existence of standing armies in time of peace-Restriction of the legislative authority as regards military establishments an unheard of EDITOR'S TABLE OF CONTENTS. lvii principle-Where the constitution vests control-Clauses in the state constitutions in regard to a standing army-The same clause in the Articles of Confederation-Dangers threatening America-Necessity for Western garrisons-British and Spanish colonies-Protection of navy yards and arsenals, NO. 25. . 150 HAMILTON. NATIONAL FORCES COMPARED WITH STATE FORCES. Necessity of national control of army and navy-Situation of states as regards foreign enemies-Critical position of New York-State governments natural rivals of the national-Likelihood that the people will support their local governmentThe states restrained from standing forces-Want of definition in proposed negative on standing armies-Impossibility of a conspiracy between the executive and the legislative departments-Actual effect of a prohibition on standing armiesInadequacy of the militia-Recent experience of Pennsylvania and Massachusetts-Experience of the Lacedæmonians, 156 NO. 26. HAMILTON. ABSURDITY OF RESTRAINING THE LEGISLA- Popular revolutions not able to apportion power and privilege-The restraint on legislatures as to defense in the state constitutions-General decision of America opposed to such restraint-History of the restriction on standing army in Great Britain-Present condition in that country-An hereditary prejudice against standing armies in America-The state constítutions-Clause in Pennsylvania and North Carolina constitutions-Biennial appropriations under the new constitution for army-Absurdity of the predictions of the subversion of the liberty of America-Impossibility of greatly augmenting the army-Danger from the executive-Danger all the greater in a disunited state, 162 NO. 27. HAMILTON. IMPOSSIBILITY OF A NATIONAL GOVERNMENT WITHOUT A NATIONAL FORCE. Alleged disinclination of the people to federal authority-A people's obedience to a government proportioned to its goodness or badness-Likelihood that the general government will be better administered than those of the states-Especial value of the national senate-Greater power of the nation in controlling sedition and faction-Government should be felt by citizens -Certainty that a union will need to employ force less often than separate confederacies-The general government able to use ordinary legal processes-Peculiar advantage enjoyed by national laws, 169 |