Hamilton]

FIRMNESS TOWARD LEGISLATIVE.

477

and the wonder is that they so seldom err as they do, beset, as they continually are, by the wiles of parasites and sycophants, by the snares of the ambitious, the avaricious, the desperate; by the artifices of men who possess their confidence more than they deserve it, and of those who seek to possess rather than to deserve it. When occasions present themselves in which the interests of the people are at variance with their inclinations, it is the duty of the persons whom they have appointed to be the guardians of those interests to withstand the temporary delusion, in order to give them time and opportunity for more cool and sedate reflection. Instances might be cited in which a conduct of this kind has saved the people from very fatal consequences of their own mistakes, and has procured lasting monuments of their gratitude to the men who had courage and magnanimity enough to serve them at the peril of their displeasure.

But however inclined we might be to insist upon an unbounded complaisance in the Executive to the inclinations of the people, we can with no propriety contend for a like complaisance to the humors of the legislature. The latter may sometimes stand in opposition to the former, and at other times the people may be entirely neutral. In either supposition, it is certainly desirable that the Executive should be in a situation to dare to act his own opinion with vigor and decision.

The same rule which teaches the propriety of a partition between the various branches of power teaches us likewise that this partition ought to be so contrived as to render the one independent of the other. To what purpose separate the executive or the judiciary from the legislative, if both the executive and the judiciary are so constituted as to be at the absolute devotion of the legislative? Such a separation must be merely nominal and incapable of producing the ends for which it was established. It is one thing to be subordinate to the laws, and another to be dependent on the legislative body. The first comports with, the last violates, the fundamen

See

tal principles of good government; and, whatever may be the forms of the Constitution, unites all power in the same hands. The tendency of the legislative No. 47. authority to absorb every other has been fully displayed and illustrated by examples in some preceding numbers. In governments purely republican, this tendency is almost irresistible. The representatives of the people in a popular assembly seem sometimes to fancy that they are the people themselves, and betray strong symptoms of impatience and disgust at the least sign of opposition from any other quarter; as if the exercise of its rights, by either the executive or judiciary, were a breach of their privilege and an outrage to their . dignity. They often appear disposed to exert an imperious control over the other departments; and as they commonly have the people on their side, they always act with such momentum as to make it very difficult for the other members of the government to maintain the balance of the Constitution.

It may perhaps be asked how the shortness of the duration in office can affect the independence of the Executive on the legislature, unless the one were possessed of the power of appointing or displacing the other. One answer to this inquiry may be drawn from the principle already remarked—that is, from the slender interest a man is apt to take in a short-lived advantage, and the little inducement it affords him to expose himself, on account of it, to any considerable inconvenience or hazard. Another answer, perhaps more obvious, though not more conclusive, will result from the consideration of the influence of the legislative body over the people; which might be employed to prevent the re-election of a man who, by an upright resistance to any sinister project of that body, should have made himself obnoxious to its resentment.

It may be asked also whether a duration of four years would answer the end proposed; and if it would not, whether a less period, which would at least be recommended by greater security against ambitious designs,

Hamilton]

EFFECT OF FOUR YEARS' TERM.

479

would not for that reason be preferable to a longer period, which was, at the same time, too short for the purpose of inspiring the desired firmness and independence of the magistrate.

It cannot be affirmed that a duration of four years, or any other limited duration, would completely answer the end proposed; but it would contribute towards it in a degree which would have a material influence upon the spirit and character of the government. Between the commencement and termination of such a period there would always be a considerable interval in which the prospect of annihilation would be sufficiently remote not to have an improper effect upon the conduct of a man indued with a tolerable portion of fortitude; and in which he might reasonably promise himself that there. would be time enough before it arrived to make the community sensible of the propriety of the measures he might incline to pursue. Though it be probable that, as he approached the moment when the public were by a new election to signify their sense of his conduct, his confidence, and with it his firmness, would decline; yet both the one and the other would derive support from the opportunities which his previous continuance in the station had afforded him of establishing himself in the esteem and good will of his constituents. He might then hazard with safety, in proportion to the proofs he had given of his wisdom and integrity and to the title he had acquired to the respect and attachment of his fellowcitizens. As, on the one hand, a duration of four years will contribute to the firmness of the Executive in a sufficient degree to render it a very valuable ingredient in the composition, so, on the other, it is not enough to justify any alarm for the public liberty.' If a British

'This question of stability has already been discussed in a note to No. 37. Bagehot blames the American government, and especially the presidency, because "there is no elastic element; everything is rigid, specified, dated," and he cites as an advantage of the English system the power by which a new government can be promptly substituted, instancing the turning out of the Aberdeen cabinet during the Crimean difficulties, when, " as was said at the time, we turn out the quaker and put in the

House of Commons from the most feeble beginnings, from the mere power of assenting or disagreeing to the imposition of a new tax, have by rapid strides reduced the prerogatives of the crown and the privileges of the nobility within the limits they conceived to be compatible with the principles of a free government, while they raised themselves to the rank and consequence of a coequal branch of the legislature; if they have been able, in one instance, to abolish both the royalty and the aristocracy and to overturn all the ancient establishments, as well in the Church as State; if they have been able, on a recent occasion, to make the monarch tremble at the prospect of an innovation* attempted by them, what would be to be feared from an elective magistrate of four years' duration, with the confined authorities of a President of the United States? What but that he might be unequal to the task which the Constitution assigns. him? I shall only add that, if his duration be such as to leave a doubt of his firmness, that doubt is inconsistent with a jealousy of his encroachments. -PUBLIUS.

pugilist."" It may be granted that the English method is more elastic, in that it permits the transference of power to a set of men better fitted to deal with a peculiar condition; and it would have been an advantage to the United States to be able to substitute for such Presidents as Madison and Buchanan men better fitted for emergencies. A fairly close approximation to such a flexible method is, however, obtained by making the Secretary of War the actually responsible official, and then by substituting another for him if he fails, as was done twice in the War of 1812 and once in the Civil War. The real difficulty, certain to be experienced by such constitutional governments as Great Britain and the United States, is to find a man bred in political life, who possesses at the same time the peculiarly unpolitical faculties which are needed in conducting a war. Should either country be called upon at present to select an official to carry on a great war, the appointment of an able man would be very much of a lottery.-EDITOR.

*This was the case with respect to Mr. Fox's India bill, which was carried in the House of Commons and rejected in the House of Lords, to the entire satisfaction, as it is said, of the people.—PUBLIUS.

Hamilton]

RE-ELIGIBILITY OF PRESIDENT.

48i

No. 72 [71].

(Independent Journal, March 19, 1788.) Hamilton.

RE-ELIGIBILITY OF THE PRESIDENT.

Duration in office affects stability of administration—Heads of departments dependent on Executive and will change with him-Re-eligibility of Executive-The opposition to it considered—A limit of a single term would diminish inducements to good behavior, increase temptations to misconduct, prevent experience in the office, deprive the country in emergencies of the services of the best men, and act as a constitutional barrier to stability of administration—The supposed advantages of a single term considered-The people should not be prevented from choosing men of experience.

To the People of the State of New York:

The administration of government, in its largest sense, comprehends all the operations of the body politic, whether legislative, executive, or judiciary; but in its most usual and perhaps in its most precise signification, it is limited to executive details, and falls peculiarly within the province of the executive department. The actual conduct of foreign negotiations, the preparatory plans of finance, the application and disbursement of the public moneys in conformity to the general appropriations of the legislature, the arrangement of the army and navy, the direction of the operations of war-these, and other matters of a like nature, constitute what seems to be most properly understood by the administration of government. The persons, therefore, to whose immediate management these different matters are committed, ought to be considered as the assistants or deputies of the Chief Magistrate, and on this account they ought to derive their offices from his appointment, at least from his nomination, and ought to be subject to his superintendence. This view of the subject will at once suggest to us the intimate connection between the duration of the executive magistrate in office and the stability of the system of administration. To reverse and undo what has been done by a predecessor is very often considered by a successor as the best proof he can give