Madison] ADMISSION OF BRITISH COLONIES. 285 In the articles of Confederation, no provision is found on this important subject. Canada was to be admitted of right, on her joining in the measures of the United States; and the other colonies, by which were evidently meant the other British colonies, at the discretion of nine States. The eventual establishment of new States seems to have been overlooked by the compilers of that instrument. We have seen the inconvenience of this omission, and the assumption of power into which Con ritory by the Union, and this strange oversight caused Jefferson great embarrassment when the purchase of Louisiana was arranged, for in his own words, it made "waste paper" of the constitution, and he went so far as to draft an amendment to the constitution (see Appendix p. 686), dealing with what he said was "the case of a guardian, investing the money of his ward in purchasing an important adjacent territory; saying to him when of age, I did this for your good; I pretend to no right to bind you: you may disavow me." Some of the northern states, which saw in this addition of territory a destruction of balance between the north and south, protested against the acquisition; but, as a fact, it was from the territory so secured that those northwestern states were created which were eventually to give political supremacy to the north in the sectional issues of 1820-1860. In time the south came to realize this, and vainly sought, by the Mexican war and by the proposed purchase of Cuba, to counteract the result. Since the acquisition of Louisiana, constant additions have been made to our territory, (1) by permitting foreign countries to become states (Texas); (2) by conquest (California, etc.); and (3) by purchase (Alaska). A far graver constitutional difficulty, for which the framers likewise made no constitutional provision, is the distinct future possibility that through an unsuccessful war there may come a necessity for the ceding of territory. Great Britain attempted to obtain this in 1814, by demanding not merely the creation of a neutral Indian territory in the west, but even the joining to Canada of parts of Maine and New York. Yet both these latter sections were the property of the states, and not of the nation, and therefore it is difficult to see how any cession of them could have been made by treaty, should our necessities have compelled the acceptance of the terms. As yet we still possess territory owned by the nation, which might be legally alienated, but the time is not far distant when all the territories will be states. Presumptively, the nation could then only meet a demand for territorial cession by allowing the foreign country to take possession of the territory, leaving it solely to the state to protect itself, much as New England was left to secure itself in the War of 1812. Two significant facts are the clause in the articles of Confederation that no state shall be deprived of territory for the benefit of the United States," which was omitted in the federal constitution, and the agreement in the Ashburton treaty of 1842 respecting the disputed boundary between British America and Maine, by which land claimed by the latter was confirmed to Great Britain, and Maine was pecuniarily indemnified for the loss.-EDITOR. gress have been led by it. With great propriety, therefore, has the new system supplied the defect. The general precaution that no new States shall be formed, without the concurrence of the federal authority and that of the States concerned, is consonant to the principles which ought to govern such transactions. The particular precaution against the erection of new States by the partition of a State without its consent quiets the jealousy of the larger States, as that of the smaller is quieted by a like precaution against a junction of States without their consent.' 5. "To dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States, with a proviso, that nothing in the Constitution shall be so construed as to prejudice any claims of the United States, or of any particular State." This is a power of very great importance, and required by considerations similar to those which show the propriety of the former. The proviso annexed is proper in itself, and was probably rendered absolutely necessary by jealousies and questions concerning the Western territory sufficiently known to the public. 6. "To guarantee to every State in the Union a In 1799 Alexander Hamilton, in outlining what he thought the Federalist policy should be, wrote: "Happy would it be if a clause could be added to the constitution, enabling Congress, on the application of any considerable portion of a state containing not less than a hundred thousand persons, to erect it into a separate state, on the condition of fixing the quota of contributions which it shall make towards antecedent debts, if any there shall be, reserving to Congress the authority to levy within such state the taxes necessary to the payment of such quota, in case of neglect on the part of the state. The subdivision of the great states is indispensable to the security of the general government, and with it of the Union. Great states will always feel a rivalship with the common head, will often be supposed to machinate against it, and in certain situations will be able to do it with decisive effect. The subdivision of such states ought to be a cardinal point in the federal policy; and small states are doubtless adapted to the purposes of local regulation and to the preservation of the republican spirit. This suggestion, however, is merely thrown out for consideration. It is feared that it would be inexpedient and even dangerous to propose, at this time, an amendment of the kind."-EDITOR. Madison] MONARCHICAL INNOVATIONS. 287 republican form of government; to protect each of them against invasion; and on application of the legislature, or of the executive (when the legislature cannot be convened), against domestic violence." In a confederacy founded on republican principles, and composed of republican members, the superintending government ought clearly to possess authority to defend the system against aristocratic or monarchical innovations. The more intimate the nature of such a union may be, the greater interest have the members in the political institutions of each other: and the greater right to insist that the forms of government under which the compact was entered into should be substantially maintained. But a right implies a remedy; and where else could the remedy be deposited than where it is deposited by the Constitution? Governments of dissimilar principles and forms have been found less adapted to a federal coalition of any sort than those of a kindred nature. "As the confederate republic of Germany," says Montesquieu, "consists of free cities and petty states, subject to different princes, experience shows us that it is more imperfect than that of Holland and Switzerland." "Greece was undone," he adds, as soon as the king of Macedon obtained a seat among the Amphictyons." In the latter case, no doubt, the disproportionate force, as well as the monarchical form, of the new confederate, had its share of influence on the events. It may possibly be asked, what need there could be of such a precaution, and whether it may not become a pretext for alterations in the State governments, without the concurrence of the States themselves. These questions admit of ready answers. If the interposition of the general government should not be needed, the provision for such an event will be a harmless superfluity only in the Constitution. But who can say what experiments may be produced by the caprice of particular States, by the ambition of enterprising leaders, or by the intrigues and influence of foreign powers? To the second question it may be answered that, if the general government should interpose by virtue of this constitutional authority, it will be of course bound to pursue the authority. But the authority extends no further than to a guaranty of a republican form of government, which supposes a preexisting government of the form which is to be guaranteed. As long, therefore, as the existing republican forms are continued by the States, they are guaranteed by the federal Constitution. Whenever the States may choose to substitute other republican forms, they have a right to do so, and to claim the federal guaranty for the latter. The only restriction imposed on them is that they shall not exchange republican for anti-republican constitutions; a restriction which, it is presumed, will hardly be considered as a grievance. A protection against invasion is due from every society to the parts composing it. The latitude of the expression here used seems to secure each State, not only against foreign hostility, but against ambitious or vindictive enterprises of its more powerful neighbors. The history both of ancient and modern confederacies proves that the weaker members of the union ought not to be insensible to the policy of this article. Protection against domestic violence is added with equal propriety. It has been remarked that, even among the Swiss cantons, which, properly speaking, are not under one government, provision is made for this object; and the history of that league informs us that mutual aid is frequently claimed and afforded; and as well by the most democratic as the other cantons. A recent and well-known event among ourselves has warned us to be prepared for emergencies of a like nature.' At first view, it might seem not to square with the republican theory to suppose either that a majority have not the right, or that a minority will have the force to subvert a government; and consequently, that the federal interposition can never be required but when it would 1 Shays's Rebellion.-EDITOR. Madison] STRENGTH OF MINORITY. 289 be improper. But theoretic reasoning, in this as in most other cases, must be qualified by the lessons of practice. Why may not illicit combinations for purposes of violence be formed as well by a majority of a State, especially a small State, as by a majority of a county, or a district of the same State, and if the authority of the State ought, in the latter case, to protect the local magistracy, ought not the federal authority, in the former, to support the State authority? Besides, there are certain parts of the State constitutions which are so interwoven with the federal Constitution that a violent blow cannot be given to the one without communicating the wound to the other. Insurrections in a State will rarely induce a federal interposition, unless the number concerned in them bear some proportion to the friends of government. It will be much better that the violence in such cases should be repressed by the superintending power than that the majority should be left to maintain their cause by a bloody and obstinate contest. The existence of a right to interpose will generally prevent the necessity of exerting it. Is it true that force and right are necessarily on the same side in republican governments? May not the minor party possess such a superiority of pecuniary resources, of military talents and experience, or of secret succors from foreign powers, as will render it superior also in an appeal to the sword? May not a more compact and advantageous position turn the scale on the same side, against a superior number so situated as to be less capable of a prompt and collected exertion of its strength? Nothing can be more chimerical than to imagine that, in a trial of actual force, victory may be calculated by the rules which prevail in a census of the inhabitants, or which determine the event of an election! May it not happen, in fine, that the minority of CITIZENS may become a majority of PERSONS, by the accession of alien residents, of a casual concourse of adventurers, or of those whom the constitution of the State has not admitted to the rights of suffrage? I take no notice of |