It is a signal advantage of taxes on articles of consumption that they contain in their own nature a security against excess. They prescribe their own limit, which cannot be exceeded without defeating the end proposed, that is, an extension of the revenue. When applied to this object, the saying is as just as it is witty, that "in political arithmetic, two and two do not always make See four." If duties are too high, they lessen the No. 35. consumption; the collection is eluded; and the product to the treasury is not so great as when they are confined within proper and moderate bounds. This forms a complete barrier against any material oppression of the citizens by taxes of this class, and is itself a natural limitation of the power of imposing them.' Impositions of this kind usually fall under the denomination of indirect taxes, and must for a long time constitute the chief part of the revenue raised in this country. Those of the direct kind, which principally relate to land and buildings, may admit of a rule of apportionment. Either the value of land or the number of the people may serve as a standard. The state of agriculture and the populousness of a country have been considered as nearly connected with each other. And, as a rule, for the purpose intended, numbers, in the view of simplicity and certainty, are entitled to a preference. In every country it is a herculean task to obtain a valuation of the land; in a country imperfectly settled and progressive in improvement, the difficulties are increased almost to impracticability. The expense of an accurate valuation is, in all situations, a formidable objection. In a branch of taxation where no limits to the discretion of the government are to be found in the nature of things, the establishment of a fixed rule, not incompatible with the end, may be attended with fewer inconveniences than to leave that discretion altogether at large. "" PUBLIUS. 1 Hamilton scarcely conceived the passage of a tariff bill framed purposely for the reduction of revenue by means of such excessive rates of duties as to reduce the importations to a minimum.-EDITOR. DEFECT OF THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION AS TO COMMERCE, ARMY, STATE EQUALITY, JUDICIARY, AND CONGRESS. Want of power to regulate commerce-Commercial treaties impossibleSeparate prohibitions of certain states-Irritation between the states of the United States-Commerce of Germany-Quotas of soldiers—Competition and results in expense and bounties-Equal suffrage of the states a great evil-And contradicts a fundamental maxim of republican government -Minority government—Resulting evils in Congress-A check on good legislation as well as on bad-Result as to foreign nations—Republics subject to foreign corruption-One advantage of monarchy-Example of United Provinces-Crowning defect of the confederation a want of judiciary power-Necessity for a supreme tribune-Thirteen separate courts an impossibility—Evils of a single assembly or congress— The confederation ratified by the states, not by the people. To the People of the State of New York: In addition to the defects already enumerated in the existing federal system, there are others of not less importance, which concur in rendering it altogether unfit for the administration of the affairs of the Union. The want of a power to regulate commerce is by all parties allowed to be of the number. The utility of such a power has been anticipated under the first head of our inquiries; and for this reason, as well as from the universal conviction entertained upon the subject, little need be added in this place. It is indeed evident on the most superficial view that there is no object, either as it respects the interests of trade or finance, that more strongly demands a federal superintendence. The want of it has already operated as a bar to the formation of beneficial treaties with foreign powers, and has given occasions of dissatisfaction between the States. Νο nation acquainted with the nature of our political association would be unwise enough to enter into stipulations with the United States, by which they conceded privileges of any importance to them, while they were apprised that the engagements on the part of the Union might at any moment be violated by its members, and while they found from experience that they might enjoy every advantage they desired in our markets, without granting us any return but such as their momentary convenience might suggest.' It is not, therefore, to be wondered at that Mr. Jenkinson, in ushering into the House of Commons a bill for regulating the temporary intercourse. between the two countries, should preface its introduction by a declaration that similar provisions in former bills had been found to answer every purpose to the commerce of Great Britain, and that it would be prudent to persist in the plan until it should appear whether the American government was likely or not to acquire greater consistency.* *This, as nearly as I can recollect, was the sense of his speech on introducing the last bill.-PUBLIUS. In 1775 Parliament voted an entire cessation of trade with the revolted colonies, and these laws were in force when the treaty of peace was signed in 1783. In that year Pitt introduced a bill to ** admit the Americans into the benefits of English commerce on terms of equality with the English subject." As the initial departure from the " mercantile system" of Great Britain, it encountered the most obstinate resistance, and produced from Lord Sheffield his able " Observations on the Commerce of the American States." This, together with the disunited action of the various states, proved to the British government that they could enjoy the commerce of the United States without making any concessions whatsoever, and for more than twelve years the trade was "provisionally" regulated by orders in council. In a report of a Committee of the Lords of the Privy Council on the Trade of Great Britain with the United States, 1791 (Washington, 1888), this very question of the practicality of prohibitions and restraints from the British standpoint was discussed, and decided against, as certain to result in a loss of trade to the restricting country equal to the injury done to the country discriminated against. In America after the organization of the national government, Hamilton supported an equally enlightened policy, but Jefferson, in his report on Commerce (1793), advocated a contrary system, which Madison attempted to carry out in Congress by his resolutions of January 3, 1794. From that day there has frequently existed a strongly anti-British party in Congress which has sought to force special privileges from our greatest customer by legislation unfriendly to her commerce and shipping. The most recent suggestions in this direction have been to lay, Ist, additional taxes on British goods, unless Great Britain adopts a bimetallic money, and 2d, special taxes on all goods not imported in American ships.-EDITOR. Hamilton] CONFLICT OF STATE REGULATIONS. 133 Several States have endeavored, by separate prohibitions, restrictions, and exclusions, to influence the con See duct of that kingdom in this particular, but the want of concert, arising from the want of a general authority and from clashing and dissimilar views in the State, has hitherto frustrated every experiment of the kind, and will continue to do so as long as the same obstacles to a uniformity of measures continue to exist. The interfering and unneighborly regulations of some States, contrary to the true spirit of the Union, have, in See different instances, given just cause of umNo. 7. brage and complaint to others, and it is to be feared that examples of this nature, if not restrained by a national control, would be multiplied and extended till they became not less serious sources of animosity and discord than injurious impediments to the intercourse between the different parts of the Confederacy. "The commerce of the German empire* is in continual trammels from the multiplicity of the duties which the several princes and states exact upon the merchandises passing through their territories, by means of which the fine streams and navigable rivers with which Germany is so happily watered are rendered almost useless." Though the genius of the people of this country might never permit this description to be strictly applicable to us, yet we may reasonably expect, from the gradual conflicts of State regulations, that the citizens of each would at length come to be considered and treated by the others in no better light than that of foreigners and aliens. The power of raising armies, by the most obvious construction of the articles of the Confederation, is merely a power of making requisitions upon the States for quotas of men. This practice, in the course of the late war, was found replete with obstructions to a vigorous and to an economical system of defense. It gave birth to a competition between the States which created a kind of auction for men. of them, they outbid each other till bounties grew to an enormous and insupportable size.' The hope of a still further increase afforded an inducement to those who were disposed to serve to procrastinate their enlistment, and disinclined them from engaging for any considerable periods. Hence slow and scanty levies of men in the most critical emergencies of our affairs; short enlistments at an unparalleled expense; continual fluctuations in the troops, ruinous to their discipline and subjecting the public safety frequently to the perilous crisis of a disbanded army. Hence, also, those oppressive expedients for raising men which were upon several occasions practiced, and which nothing but the enthusiasm of liberty would have induced the people to endure. In order to furnish the quotas required This method of raising troops is not more unfriendly to economy and vigor than it is to an equal distribution of the burden. The States near the seat of war, influenced by motives of self-preservation, made efforts to furnish their quotas, which even exceeded their abilities; while those at a distance from danger were, for the most part, as remiss as the others were diligent in their exertions. The immediate pressure of this inequality was not in this case, as in that of the contributions of money, alleviated by the hope of a final liquidation. The States which did not pay their proportions of money might at least be charged with their deficiencies; but no account could be formed of the deficiencies in the supplies of men. We shall not, however, see much reason to regret the want of this hope, when we consider how little prospect there is that the most delinquent States will ever be able to make compensation for their pecuniary failures. The system of quotas and requisitions, whether it be applied. to men or money, is, in every view, a system of imbecility in the Union, and of inequality and injustice among the members. The right of equal suffrage among the States is another 1 The same evil was manifested in the Civil War.-EDITOR. |