This last observation points out to us, also, one principal foundation of the art of the orator. As his object is not so much to inform and to satisfy the understandings of his hearers, as to force their immediate assent, it is frequently of use to him to clothe his reasonings in that specific and figurative language, which may either awaken in their minds associations favourable to his purpose, or may divert their attention from a logical examination of his argument. A process of reasoning so expressed, affords at once an exercise to the judgment, to the imagination, and to the passions, and is apt, even when loose and inconsequential, to impose on the best understandings.

It appears farther from the remarks which have been made, that the perfection of philosophical language, considered either as an instrument of thought, or as a medium of communication with others, consists in the use of expressions, which from their generality, have no tendency to awaken the powers of conception and imagination; or, in other words, it consists in its approaching, as nearly as possible, in its nature, to the language of algebra. And hence the effects which long habits of philosophical speculation have, in weakening, by disuse, those faculties of the mind, which are necessary for the exertions of the poet and the orator, and of gradually forming a style of composition, which they who read merely for amusement are apt to censure for a want of vivacity and of ornament.

SECTION III.

Remarks on the Opinions of some modern Philosophers on the subject of the foregoing Section.

AFTER the death of Abelard, through whose abilities and eloquence the sect of Nominalists had enjoyed, for a few years, a very splendid triumph, the system of the Realists began to revive; and it was soon so completely re-established in the schools, as to prevail, with little or no opposition, till the fourteenth century. What the circumstances were, which led philosophers to abandon a doctrine, which seems so strongly to recommend itself by its simplicity, it is not very easy to conceive. Probably the heretical opinions, which had subjected both Abelard and Roscelinus to the censure of the church, might create a prejudice also against their philosophical principles; and probably too, the manner in which these principles were stated and defended, was not the clearest, nor the most satisfactory. The principal cause, however, I am disposed to think, of the decline of the sect of Nominalists, was their want of some palpable example, by means of which they might illustrate their doctrine. It is by the use which algebraists make of the letters of the alphabet in carrying on their operations, that Leibnitz and Berkeley have been most successful in explaining the use of language as an instrument of thought; and, as in the twelfth century, the algebraical art was entirely unknown, Roscelinus and Abelard must have been reduced to the necessity of conveying their leading idea by general cir

The great argument which the Nominalists employed against the existence of universals was: "Entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem."

cumlocutions, and must have found considerable difficulty in stating it in a manner satisfactory to themselves: a consideration, by the way, which, if it accounts for the slow progress which this doctrine made in the world, places in the more striking light, the genius of those men, whose sagacity led them, under so great disadvantages, to approach to a conclusion so just and philosophical in itself, and so opposite to the prevailing opinions of their age.

In the fourteenth century, this sect seems to have been almost completely extinct; their doctrine being equally reprobated by the two great parties which then divided the schools, the followers of Duns Scotus and of Thomas Aquinas. These, although they differed in their manner of explaining the nature of universals, and opposed each other's opinions with much asperity. yet united in rejecting the doctrine of the Nominalists, not only as absurd, but as leading to the most dangerous consequences. At last, William Occam, a native of England, and a scholar of Duns Scotus, revived the ancient controversy, and with equal ability and success vindicated the long-abandoned philosophy of Roscelinus. From this time the dispute was carried on with great warmth, in the Universities of France, of Germany, and of Englaud; more particularly in the two former countries, where the sovereigns were led, by some political views, to interest themselves deeply in the contest, and even to employ the civil power in supporting their favourite opinions. The emperour Lewis of Bavaria, in return for the assistance which, in his disputes with the Pope Occam had given to him by his writings, aided with the Nominalists. Lewis the eleventh of France, on the other hand, attached himself to the Realists, and made their antagonists the objects of a cruel persecution.†

The protestant reformation, at length, involved men of learning in discussions of a more interesting nature; but even the zeal of theological controversy could hardly exceed that with which the Nominalists and Realists had for some time before maintained their respective doctrines. "Clamores primum ad ravim," (says an author who had him"self been an eye-witness of these literary disputes)" hinc improbitas, sannæ, minæ, convitia, dum luctantur, et uterque alterum tentat pros"ternere: consumtis verbis venitur ad pugnos, ad veram luctam ex fic"ta et simulata. Quin etiam, quæ contigunt in palestra, illic non desunt, colaphi, alapæ consputio, calces, morsus, etiam quæ jam supra "leges palæstræ, fustes, ferrum, saucii multi, nonnunquam occisi." That this account is not exaggerated, we have the testimony of no less an author than Erasmus, who mentions it as a common occurrence: "Eos usque ad pallorem, usque ad convitia, usque ad sputa, nonnun(6 quam et usque ad pugnos invicem digladiari, alios ut Nominales, alios (6 ut Reales, loqui."S

66

*

Occam, we are told, was accustomed to say to the emperour: "Tu me defendas gladio, et ego te defendam calamo." BRUCKER, vol. iii. p. 848.

MOSHED's Ecclesiastical History..

+ LUDOVICUS VIVES.

The Nominalists procured the death of John Huss, who was a Realist; and in their letter to Lewis King of France, do not pretend to deny that he fell a victim to the resentment of their sect. The Realists, on the other hand, obtained, in the

The dispute to which the foregoing observations relate, although for some time after the Reformation interrupted by theological disquisitions, has been since occasionally revived by different writers; and, singular as it may appear, it has not yet been brought to a conclusion in which all parties are agreed. The names, indeed, of Nominalists and Realists exist no longer; but the point in dispute between these two celebrated sects, coincides precisely with a question which has been agitated in our own times, and which has led to one of the most beautiful speculations of modern philosophy.

Of the advocates who have appeared for the doctrine of the Nominalists, since the revival of letters, the most distinguished are, Hobbes, Berkeley, and Hume. The first has, in various parts of his works, reprobated the hypothesis of the Realists; and has stated the opinions of their antagonists with that acuteness, simplicity, and precision, which distinguish all his writings. The second, considering (and, in my opinion, justly) the doctrines of the ancients concerning universals, in support of which so much ingenuity had been employed by the Realists, as the great source of mystery and error in the abstract sciences, was at pains to everthrow it completely, by some very ingenious and original speculations of his own. Mr. Hume'st view of the subject, as he himself acknowledges, does not differ materially from that of Berkeley; whom, by the way, he seems to have regarded as the author of an opinion, of which he was only an expositor and defender, and which,

year 1479, the condemnation of John de Wessalia, who was attached to the party of the Nominalists. These contending sects carried their fury so far as to charge each other with "the sin against the Holy Ghost."

MOSHEIM'S Ecclesiastical History.

The universality of one name to many things, hath been the cause that men think the things themselves are universal; and so seriously contend, that besides Peter and John, and all the rest of the men that are, bave been, or shall be, in the world, there is yet something else, that we call Man, viz. Man in general; deceiving themselves, by taking the universal, or general appellation, for the thing it signifieth: For if one should desire the painter to make him the picture of man, which is as much as to say, of a man in general; he meaneth no more, but that the painter should chuse what man he pleaseth to draw, which must needs be some of them that are, or have been, or may be; none of which are univers: 1. But when he would have him to draw the picture of the king, or any particular person, he limiteth the painter to that one person he chuseth. It is plain, therefore, that there is nothing universal but names; which are therefore called indefinite, because we limit them not ourselves, but leave them to be applied by the hearer whereas a singular name is limited and restrained to one of the many things it signifieth ; as when we say, this man, pointing to him, or giving him his proper name, or by some such other way." HOBBES's Tripos, chap, v. § 6.

A very material question has been started concerning abstract or general ideas: Whether they be general or particular in the mind's conception of them; A great philosopher has disputed the received opinion in this particular; and has asserted, that all general ideas are nothing but particular ones annexed to a certain term, which gives them a more extensive signification, and makes them recall, upon occasion, other individuals, which are similar so them. As I look upon this to be one of the greatest and most valuable discoveries that have been made of late years in the republic of letters, I shall here endeavour to confirm it by some arguments, which, I hope, will put it beyond all doubt and controversy."

Treatise of Human Nature, book i. part i. § 7.

since the days of Roscelinus and Abelard, has been familiarly known in all the universities of Europe.*

Notwithstanding, however, the great merit of these writers, in defending and illustrating the Nominalists, none of them seem to me to have been fully aware of the important consequences to which it leads. The Abbe de Condillac was, I believe, the first, (if we except, perhaps, Leibnitz) who perceived that, if this system be true, a talent for reasoning must consist, in a great measure, in a skilful use of language as an instrument of thought. The most valuable of his remarks on this subject are contained in a treatise De l' Art de Penser, which forms the fourth volume of his "Cours d'Etude."

Dr. Campbell, too, in his Philosophy of Rhetoric, has founded, on the principles of Berkeley and Hume, a very curious and interesting speculation, of which I shall have occasion afterwards to take notice.

The explanation which the doctrines of these writers afford of the process of the mind in general reasoning, is so simple, and at the same time, in my apprehension, so satisfactory, that, I own, it is with some degree of surprise I have read the attempts which have lately been made to revive the system of the Realists. One of the ablest of these attempts is by Dr. Price; who, in his very valuable Treatise on Morals, has not only employed his ingenuity in support of some of the old tenets of the Platonic school, but has even gone so far as to follow Plato's example in connecting this speculation about universals, with the sublime questions of natural theology. The observations which he has offered in support of these opinions, I have repeatedly perused with all the attention in my power; but without being able to enter into his views, or even to comprehend fully his meaning. Indeed, I must acknowledge, that it appears to me to afford no slight presumption against the principles on which he proceeds, when I observe, that an author, reinarkable, on most occasions, for precision of ideas, and for perspicuity of style, never fails to lose himself in obscurity and mystery when he enters on these disquisitions.

Dr. Price's reasonings in proof of the existence of universals are the more curious, as he acquiesces in some of Dr. Reid's conclusions with respect to the ideal theory of perception. That there are in the mind images or resemblances of things external, he grants to be impossible; but still he seenis to suppose, that, in every exertion of thought, there is something immediately present to the mind, which is the object of its attention. "When abstract truth is contemplated, is not" (says he) "the very object itself present to the mind? When millions of intellects " contemplate the equality of every angle of a semicircle to a right an"gle, have they not all the same object in view? Is this object nothing?

* Leibnitz, too, has declared himself a partisan of this sect, in a dissertation "De Stilo Philosophico Marii Nizolii." This Nizolius published a book at Parma, in the year 1553, entitled, "De Veris Principiis et vera Ratione Philosophandi;" in which he opposed several of the doctrines of Aristotle, particularly his opinion concerning universals. An edition of this work, with a Preface and Notes, was published by Leibnitz at Frankfort, in the year 1670. The preface and notes are to be found in the fourth volume of his works, by Dutens. (Geneva, 1768.) I have inserted a short extract from the former, in Note (1) at the end of the volume.

"Or is it only an inage, or kind of shadow? These inquiries,” he adds, "carry our thoughts high."*

The difficulty which has appeared so puzzling to this ingenious writer, is, in truth, more apparent than real. In the case of Perception, Imagination, and Memory, it has been already fully shewn, that we have no reason to believe the existence of any thing in the mind distinct from the mind itself; and that, even upon the supposition that the fact were otherwise, our intellectual operations would be just as inexplicable as they are at present. Why then should we suppose, that, in our general speculations, there must exist in the mind some object of its thoughts, when it appears that there is no evidence of the existence of any such object, even when the mind is employed about individuals?

Still, however, it may be urged, that, although, in such cases, there should be no object of thought in the mind, there must exist something or other to which its attention is directed. To this difficulty I have no answer to make, but by repeating the fact which I have already endeavoured to establish, that there are only two ways in which we can possibly speculate about classes of objects; the one, by means of a word or generic term; the other, by means of one particular individual of the class which we consider as the representative of the rest; and that these two methods of carrying on our general speculations, are at bottom so much the same, as to authorize us to lay down as a principle, that, without the use of signs, all our thoughts must have related to individuals. When we reason, therefore, concerning classes or genera, the objects of our attention are merely signs; or if, in any instance, the generic word should recall some individual, this circumstance is to be regarded only as the consequence of an accidental association, which has rather a tendency to disturb, than to assist in us our reasoning.

Whether it might not have been possible for the Deity to have so formed us, that we might have been capable of reasoning, concerning classes of objects, without the use of signs, I shall not take upon me to determine. But this we may venture to affirm with confidence, that man is not such a being. And indeed, even if he were, it would not therefore necessarily follow, that there exists any thing in a genus, distinct from the individuals of which it is composed; for we know that the power, which we have, of thinking of particular objects without the medium of signs, does not in the least depend on their existence or nonexistence at the moment we think of them.

The whole passage is as follows: "The word idea is sometimes used to sig. nify the immediate object of the mind in thinking, considered as something in the mind, which represents the real object, but is different from it. This sense of an idea is derived from the notion, that when we think of any external existence, there is something immediately present to the mind, which it contemplates distinct from the object itself, that being at a distance. But what is this? It is bad language to call it an image in the mind of the object. Shall we say then, that there is indeed no such thing? But would not this be the same as to say that, when the mind is employed in viewing and examining any object, which is either not present to it, or does not exist, it is employed in viewing and examining nothing, and therefore does not then think at all? When abstract truth is contemplated, is not the very object itself present to the mind? When millions of intellects contemplate the equality of every angle in a semicircle to a right angle, have they not all the same object in view? Is this object nothing? Or is it only an image or kind of shadow?—These inquiries carry our thoughts high.”