in an eminent degree, to the improvement and happiness of mankind, by the tendency which it has to accelerate the progress of society.

As the pictures which the Poet presents to us are never (even in works of pure description) faithful copies from nature, but are always meant to be improvements on the originals she affords, it cannot be doubted that they must have some effect in refining and exalting our taste, both with respect to material beauty, and to the objects of our pursuit in early life. It has been alleged, that the works of our descriptive poets have contributed to diffuse that taste for picturesque beauty, which is so prevalent in England, and to recall the public admiration from the fantastic decorations of art, to the more powerful and permanent charms of cultivated nature; and it is certain, that the first ardours of many an illustrious character have been kindled by the compositions of Homer and Virgil. It is difficult to say, to what a degree, in the earlier periods of society, the rude compositions of the bard and the minstrel may have been instrumental in humanizing the minds of savage warriors, and in accelerating the growth of cultivated manners. Among the Scandinavians and the Celta we know that this order of men was held in very peculiar veneration; and, accordingly, it would appear, from the monuments which remain of these nations, that they were distinguished by a delicacy in the passion of love, and by a humanity and generosity to the vanquished in war, which seldom appear among barbarous tribes; and with which it is hardly possible to conceive how men in such a state of society could have been inspired, but by a separate class of individuals in the community, who devoted themselves to the pacific profession of poetry, and to the cultivation of that creative power of the mind, which anticipates the course of human affairs; and presents, in prophetic vision, to the poet and the philosopher, the blessings which accompany the progress of reason and refinement.

Nor must we omit to mention the important effects of Imagination in multiplying the sources of innocent enjoyment, beyond what this limited scene affords. Not to insist on the nobler efforts of genius, which have rendered this part of our constitution subservient to moral improvement; how much has the sphere of our happiness been extended by those agreeable fictions which introduce us to new worlds, and make us acquainted with new orders of being! What a fund of amusement, through life, is prepared for one who reads, in his childhood, the fables of ancient Greece! They dwell habitually on the memory, and are ready, at all times, to fill up the intervals of business, or of serious reflection; and in his hours of rural retirement and leisure, they warm his mind with the fire of ancient genius, and animate every scene he enters, with the offspring of classical fancy.

It is however, chiefly in painting future scenes, that Imagination loves to indulge herself, and her prophetic dreams are almost always favourable to happiness. By an erroneous education, indeed, it is possible to render this faculty an instrument of constant and of exquisite distress; but in such cases (abstracting from the influence of a constitutional melancholy) the distresses of a gloomy imagination are to be ascribed not to nature, but to the force of early impressions.

The common bias of the mind undoubtedly is, (such is the benevolent appointment of Providence,) to think favourably of the future; to overvalue the chances of possible good, and to underrate the risks of

possible evil; and in the case of some fortunate individuals, this disposition remains after a thousand disappointments. To what this bias of

our nature is owing, it is not material for us to inquire; the fact is certain, and it is an important one to our happiness. It supports us under the real distresses of life, and cheers and animates all our labours: and although it is sometimes apt to produce, in a weak and indolent mind, those deceitful suggestions of ambition and vanity, which lead us to sacrifice the duties and the comforts of the present moment, to romantic hopes and expectations; yet it must be acknowledged, when connected with habits of activity and regulated by a solid judgment, to have a favourable effect on the character, by inspiring that ardour and enthusiasm which both prompt to great enterprises, and are necessary to ensure their success. When such a temper is united (as it commonly is) with pleasing notions, concerning the order of the universe, and in particular concerning the condition and the prospects of man, it places our happiness in a great measure beyond the power of fortune. While it adds a double relish to every enjoyment, it blunts the edge of all our sufferings; and even when human life presents to us no object on which our hopes can rest, it invites the imagination beyond the dark and troubled horizon which terminates all our earthly prospects, to wander unconfined in the regions of futurity. A man of benevolence, whose mind is enlarged by Philosophy, will indulge the same agreeable anticipations with respect to society; will view all the different improvements in arts, in commerce, and in the sciences, as co-operating to promote the union, the happiness, and the virtue of mankind; and, amidst the political disorders resulting from the prejudices and follies of his own times, will look forward with transport, to the blessings which are reserved for posterity in a more enlightened age.

NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS.

I

Note (A.) page 10.

AM happy in being able to quote the following passage, in illustration of a doctrine, against which I do not conceive it possible to urge any thing, but the authority of some illustrious names.

"Puisque l'existence des corps n'est pour nous que la permanence d'êtres "dont les propriétés répondent à un certain ordre de nos sensations, il en résulte 66 qu'elle n'a rien de plus certain que celle d'autres êtres qui se manifestent éga"lement par leurs effets sur nous; et puisque nos observations sur nos propres "facultés, confirmées par celles que nous faisons sur les êtres pensants qui ani"ment aussi des corps, ne nous montrent aucune analogie entre l'être qui sent ou "qui pense, et l'être qui nous offre le phénomène de l'étendue ou de l'impéné. "trabilité, il n'y a aucune raison de croire ces êtres de la même nature. Ainsi la "spiritualité de l'ame n'est pas une opinion qui ait besoin de preuves, mais leré"sultat simple et naturel d'une analyse exacte de nos idées, et de nos facultées." Vie de M. Turgot par M. Condorcet.

Des Cartes was the first philosopher who stated, in a clear and satisfactory manner, the distinction between mind and matter, and who pointed out the proper plan for studying the intellectual phenomena. It is chiefly in consequence of his precise ideas with respect to the distinction, that we may remark, in all his metaphysical writings, a perspicuity which is not observable in those of any of his predecessors.

Dr. Reid has remarked, that although Des Cartes infers the existence of mind from the operations of which we are conscious, yet he could not reconcile himself to the notion of an unknown substance, or substratum, to which these operations belonged. And it was on this account, he conjectures, that he made the essence of the soul to consist in thought; as, for a similar reason, he had made the essence of matter to consist in extension. But I am afraid, that this supposition is not perfectly reconcileable with Des Cartes's writings; for he repeatedly speaks with the utmost confidence of the existence of substances of which we have only a relative idea; and, even in attempting to shew that thought is the essential attribute of mind, and extension of matter, he considers them as nothing more than attributes or qualities belonging to these substances.

"Per substantiam nihil aliud intelligere possumus, quam rem quæ ita existit, "ut nulla alia re indigeat ad existendum. Et quidem substantia quæ nulla plane "re indigeat, unica tantum potest intelligi, nempe Deus. Alias vero omnes, non ❝nisi ope concursus Dei, existere posse percipimus. Atque ideo nomen substan"tiæ non convenit Deo et illis univoce, ut dici sulet in scholis; hoc est, nulla ejus "nominis significatio, potest distincte intelligi, quæ Deo, et creaturis sit com"munis.

"Possunt autem substantia corporea, et mens, sive substantia cogitans, creata, "sub hoc communi conceptu intelligi; quod sint res, quæ solo Dei concursu agent "ad existendum. Verumtamen non potest substantia primum animadverti ex " hoc solo, quod sit res existens, quia hoc solum per se nos non afficit: sed facile

ipsam agnoscimus ex quolibet ejus attributo, per communem illam notionem "quod nihili nulla sunt attributa, nullæve proprietates aut qualitates. Ex hoc "enim, quod aliquod attributum adesse percipiamus, concludimus aliquam rem "existentem, sive substantiam, cui illud tribui possit, necessario etiam adesse.

"Et quidem ex quolibet attributo substantia cognoscitur: sed una tamen est "cujusque substantiæ præcipua proprietas, quæ ipsius naturam essentiamque con"stituit, et ad quam aliæ omnes referuntur. Nempe extensio in longum, latum "et profundum substantiæ corporeæ naturam constituit; et cogitatio constituit "naturam substantiæ cogitantis."-Princip. Philosoph. pars. i. cap. 51, 52, 53.

In stating the relative notions, which we have of mind and of body, I have avoided the use of the word substance, as I am unwilling to furnish the slightest occasion for controversy; and have contented myself with defining mind to be that, which feels, thinks, wills, hopes, fears, desires, &c. That my consciousness of these and other operations is necessarily accompanied with a conviction of my own existence, and with a conviction that all of them belong to one and the same being, is not an hypothesis, but a fact; of which it is no more possible for me to doubt, than of the reality of my own sensations or volitions.

Note (B.) p. 40.

Doctor Reid remarks, that Des Cartes rejected a part only of the ancient theory of perception, and adopted the other part. "That theory," says he, " may be di“vided into two parts: the first, that images, species, or forms of external objects "come from the object, and enter by the avenues of the senses to the mind: the "second part is, that the external object itself is not perceived, but only the spe"cies or image of it in the mind. The first part, Des Cartes and his followers re"jected and refuted by solid arguments; but the second part, neither he nor his "followers have thought of calling in question; being persuaded that it is only a representative image in the mind, of the external object, that we perceive, and "not the object itself. And this image, which the Peripatetics called a species, "he calls an idea, changing the name only, while he admits the thing."

The account which this passage contains of Des Cartes's doctrine concerning perception, is, I believe, agreeable to his prevailing opinion, as it may be collected from the general tenor of his writings; and the observation with which it concludes is undoubtedly true, that neither he, nor any of his followers ever called in question the existence of ideas, as the immediate objects of our perception. With respect, however, to the first part of the ancient theory, as here stated, it may be proper to remark, that Des Cartes, although evidently by no means satisfied with it, sometimes expresses himself as if he rather doubted of it, than expressly denied it; and at other times, when pressed with objections to his own particular system, he admits, at least in part, the truth of it. The following passage is one of the most explicit I recollect, in opposition to the ancient doctrine.

"Observandum præterea, animam, nullis imaginibus ab objectis ad cerebrum "missis egere ut sentiat, (contra quam communiter philosophi nostri statuunt,) "aut ad minimum longe aliter illarum imaginum naturam concipiendam esse "quam vulgo fit. Quum enim circa eas nil considerent, præter similitudinem ea"rum cum objectis quæ repræsentant, non possunt explicare, qua ratione ab ob"jectis formari queant, et recipi ab organis sensuum exteriorum, et demum nervis "ad cerebrum transvehi. Nec alia causa imagines istas fingere eos impulit, nisi "quod viderent mentem nostram efficaciter pictura excitari ad apprehendendum "objectum illud, quod exhibet: ex hoc enim judicarunt, illam eodem modo ex"citandam, ad apprehendenda ea quæ sensus movent, per exiguas quasdam ima"gines, in capite nostro delineatas. Sed nobis contra est advertendum, multa præter, imagines esse, quæ cogitationes excitant, ut exempli gratia, verba et signa, nullo modo similia iis quæ significant."-Dioptric. cap. 4. § 6.

66

In his third meditation (which contains his celebrated argument for the existence of a Deity) the following passage occurs.

"Sed hic præcipue de iis est quærendum quas tanquam a rebus extra me exis"tendibus desumptas considero, quænam me moveat ratio ut illas istis rebus simi"les esse existimem; nempe ita videor doctus a natura, et præterea experior illas