Investment Banking: Institutions, Politics, and LawOUP Oxford, 2008 M09 11 - 362 páginas Investment Banking: Institutions, Politics, and Law provides an economic rationale for the dominant role of investment banks in the capital markets, and uses it to explain both the historical evolution of the investment banking industry and also recent changes to its organization. Although investment decisions rely upon price-relevant information, it is impossible to establish property rights over it and hence is very hard to coordinate its exchange. The authors argue that investment banks help to resolve this problem by managing "information marketplaces," within which extra-legal institutions support the production and dissemination of information that is important to investors. Reputations and relationships are more important in fulfilling this role than financial capital. The authors substantiate their theory with reference to the industry's evolution during the last three centuries. They show how investment banking networks were formed, and identify the informal contracts that they supported. This historical development points to tensions between the relational contracting of investment banks and the regulatory impulses of the State, thus providing some explanation for the periodic large-scale State intervention in the operation of capital markets. Their theory also provides a technological explanation for the massive restructuring of the capital markets in recent decades, which the authors argue can be used to think about the likely future direction of the investment banking industry. |
Dentro del libro
Resultados 1-5 de 42
Página 5
... trust the investment bank to stand as an intermediary between them and new security issuers, rewarding them for providing their, otherwise private, information, and using this information to establish market demand conditions and thus ...
... trust the investment bank to stand as an intermediary between them and new security issuers, rewarding them for providing their, otherwise private, information, and using this information to establish market demand conditions and thus ...
Página 8
... trust between them, which underpins their market relationships. The core information-creation activity of investment banks has scarcely changed since the inception of securities markets (see chapters four to seven). However, the way in ...
... trust between them, which underpins their market relationships. The core information-creation activity of investment banks has scarcely changed since the inception of securities markets (see chapters four to seven). However, the way in ...
Página 15
... trust underpins agreements to find, and to pay for, price-relevant information. Hence, as we demonstrate in greater detail in chapters two and three, investment banks rely upon their reputational capital. Moreover, investment banks have ...
... trust underpins agreements to find, and to pay for, price-relevant information. Hence, as we demonstrate in greater detail in chapters two and three, investment banks rely upon their reputational capital. Moreover, investment banks have ...
Página 20
... trust.9 Again, a noteworthy example is provided by Goldman Sachs, who, starting from 1956, had a nearly fifty year exclusive banking relationship with Ford Motor Company. We argue in chapter eight that recent technological changes have ...
... trust.9 Again, a noteworthy example is provided by Goldman Sachs, who, starting from 1956, had a nearly fifty year exclusive banking relationship with Ford Motor Company. We argue in chapter eight that recent technological changes have ...
Página 21
... trust and hence ensure that valuable information is created and paid for. We study investment bank relationships in greater detail in chapter nine. INVESTMENT BANK ACTIVITIES We now put some meat on the bones of our industry-level ...
... trust and hence ensure that valuable information is created and paid for. We study investment bank relationships in greater detail in chapter nine. INVESTMENT BANK ACTIVITIES We now put some meat on the bones of our industry-level ...
Contenido
1 | |
2 Institutional Theory | 37 |
3 An Institutional Theory of Investment Banking | 65 |
4 Investment Banking Origins | 97 |
5 The Rise of the Investment Bank | 121 |
6 Investment Banking in the Age of LaissezFaire | 155 |
7 Leviathan and the Investment Banks | 187 |
8 The Modern Industrial Revolution | 225 |
9 Inside the Investment Bank | 265 |
10 What Next? | 293 |
Bibliography | 311 |
Index | 333 |
Otras ediciones - Ver todas
Investment Banking: Institutions, Politics, and Law, Volumen10 Alan D. Morrison,William J. Wilhelm, Jr. Vista previa limitada - 2007 |
Investment Banking: Institutions, Politics, and Law, Volumen10 Alan D. Morrison,William J. Wilhelm Vista de fragmentos - 2007 |
Investment Banking: Institutions, Politics, and Law Alan D. Morrison,William J. Wilhelm, Jr. Sin vista previa disponible - 2007 |
Términos y frases comunes
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