Investment Banking: Institutions, Politics, and LawOUP Oxford, 2008 M09 11 - 362 páginas Investment Banking: Institutions, Politics, and Law provides an economic rationale for the dominant role of investment banks in the capital markets, and uses it to explain both the historical evolution of the investment banking industry and also recent changes to its organization. Although investment decisions rely upon price-relevant information, it is impossible to establish property rights over it and hence is very hard to coordinate its exchange. The authors argue that investment banks help to resolve this problem by managing "information marketplaces," within which extra-legal institutions support the production and dissemination of information that is important to investors. Reputations and relationships are more important in fulfilling this role than financial capital. The authors substantiate their theory with reference to the industry's evolution during the last three centuries. They show how investment banking networks were formed, and identify the informal contracts that they supported. This historical development points to tensions between the relational contracting of investment banks and the regulatory impulses of the State, thus providing some explanation for the periodic large-scale State intervention in the operation of capital markets. Their theory also provides a technological explanation for the massive restructuring of the capital markets in recent decades, which the authors argue can be used to think about the likely future direction of the investment banking industry. |
Dentro del libro
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Página 1
... less important in other major economies like France and Germany. Nevertheless, the latter are increasingly shifting toward public market finance. Figure 1.2 illustrates the recent experience of these countries by reporting their equity ...
... less important in other major economies like France and Germany. Nevertheless, the latter are increasingly shifting toward public market finance. Figure 1.2 illustrates the recent experience of these countries by reporting their equity ...
Página 4
... less willing to invest in securities issued by firms about whose future performance they have little information. Conversely, such firms may gain little market feedback concerning their business decisions when the investor segment to ...
... less willing to invest in securities issued by firms about whose future performance they have little information. Conversely, such firms may gain little market feedback concerning their business decisions when the investor segment to ...
Página 6
... less than one percent of their total revenues from asset management fees. By 1990, this figure had risen to 4.17 percent, or about twothirds of the share of revenue generated by underwriting fees. In 2004, asset management fees ...
... less than one percent of their total revenues from asset management fees. By 1990, this figure had risen to 4.17 percent, or about twothirds of the share of revenue generated by underwriting fees. In 2004, asset management fees ...
Página 15
... less reliant upon hard-to-find, judgment-based, tacit professional skills which can only be acquired on the job. There is a declining dependence on human capital per unit of production within the industry. INDUSTRY STRUCTURE We have ...
... less reliant upon hard-to-find, judgment-based, tacit professional skills which can only be acquired on the job. There is a declining dependence on human capital per unit of production within the industry. INDUSTRY STRUCTURE We have ...
Página 20
... less exclusive basis at least until the early 1930s.7 Despite periodic episodes of public criticism and regulatory interference, there is considerable evidence that reciprocal cooperation has remained an important characteristic of the ...
... less exclusive basis at least until the early 1930s.7 Despite periodic episodes of public criticism and regulatory interference, there is considerable evidence that reciprocal cooperation has remained an important characteristic of the ...
Contenido
1 | |
2 Institutional Theory | 37 |
3 An Institutional Theory of Investment Banking | 65 |
4 Investment Banking Origins | 97 |
5 The Rise of the Investment Bank | 121 |
6 Investment Banking in the Age of LaissezFaire | 155 |
7 Leviathan and the Investment Banks | 187 |
8 The Modern Industrial Revolution | 225 |
9 Inside the Investment Bank | 265 |
10 What Next? | 293 |
Bibliography | 311 |
Index | 333 |
Otras ediciones - Ver todas
Investment Banking: Institutions, Politics, and Law, Volumen10 Alan D. Morrison,William J. Wilhelm, Jr. Vista previa limitada - 2007 |
Investment Banking: Institutions, Politics, and Law, Volumen10 Alan D. Morrison,William J. Wilhelm Vista de fragmentos - 2007 |
Investment Banking: Institutions, Politics, and Law Alan D. Morrison,William J. Wilhelm, Jr. Sin vista previa disponible - 2007 |
Términos y frases comunes
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