we sometimes find men deprived of the use of their reasoning faculties, and in consequence of that privation, oppressed with peculiar miseries. From such instances no argument is ever deduced against the existence of reason in general; they rather furnish us with proofs of the value of that gift, to those who possess it.

2. It is likewise objected, that since men's ideas of the Deity have been so various, as that some have acknowledged one God, while others have held a plurality of Gods, no conclusion can be deduced from such consent,

This objection, however, refutes itself, for it implies the acknowledgment of the fact, we are endeavouring to establish.

It admits the idea of a God to be universal, while its force is only directed against the corruption of that idea. Besides, it is not difficult to discover the origin of that corruption. The idea of many Gods might be derived from the spirits employed by the Supreme Being in the government of the world. The apparitions of the Deity under certain figures might lead to the adoration of those figures. God being considered as the source of light, men might hence be induced to worship the sun as his representative. So that even the errors to which the objection alludes, tend to show the belief of a Superior Being to have been universal.

2. The existence of God is proved from the origin of the visible world.

This argument may be advantageously exhibited in the following method:

The existence of the world can only be accounted for by supposing, that it has been from all eternity in its present state, that it has fallen into that state by chance, or that it was created in time by a supreme mind.

But the two former suppositions are false.
Therefore, it was created in time by a supreme

mind.

The former of these assertions is evident from this, that nothing can give being to itself,a and therefore no other way can be imagined to account for the origin of the world. The latter we shall proceed to demonstrate.

1o. The world cannot have existed from all eternity in its present state.

This would involve a direct contradiction. For since the same thing is thus both cause and effect, we can assign a time (viz. the first moment in which it begins to act) in which it both had existence, and had not existence. It must have had existence, in order to act in the production of an effect. It must at the same instant not have had existence, since it was not yet brought into being. This conclusion being absurd, it is plain that the world could not give being to itself.

b Among the ancient philosophers, there were various doctrines as to the origin of the world. The pricipal are these three. 1. That the world existed from all eternity in the same state, and endared with the same motions as at present. This opinion was held by Aristotle and his followers. They acknowledged, however, a

It is clear, that the existence of things in the present state of the world is denoted by portions of time, which is marked out by the motions of the heavenly bodies. If then those motions have not been from eternity, neither can the present state of things have been from eternity. In order to show this, therefore, we assert,

(1.) A successive duration made up of parts, which is called time, and which is measured by a successive rotation of the heavens, cannot be eternal.

A contrary supposition would involve manifest absurdities. Saturn performs his revolution round the sun in thirty years: he performs the same revolution therefore in 10950

Deity, who acted by a necessity of nature, and was co-eternal with the universe. 2d. That the matter out of which the world was formed was eternal, though the Deity gave it its present form. This, which was the opinion of the Stoics, originated, equally with the former, in the maxim, ex nihilo nihil fit. 3d. That the world was made by the casual concourse of atoms. This opinion was embraced by Epicurus, who, consequently, denied totally the existence of a Supreme Being. The first and last of these doctrines are here alluded to, the second is considered at p. 15. A concise refutation of their errors may be found in Stillingfleet's Origines Sacra, 1. 3. c. 2. Lond. 1663.

a I have here supposed a year to consist accurately of 365 days. I am aware this supposition is not quite correct; but I have assumed it, in order to avoid unnecessary confusion in the argument. For the same reason I have used the word number as applied to an infinite quantity, though the application is unwarranted.

days. If then these revolutions have been eternal, the number of years during which they have continued is infinite, and therefore the number of days during which they have continued, is 10950 times infinite. But this conclusion is absurd, since one infinite cannot be greater than another. The present motion of the heavenly bodies, therefore, cannot be eternal. It has been objected to this argument, that no absurdity is implied in the assertion, that one infinite exceeds another. We know that matter is infinitely divisible, that is, a small particle of matter is capable of endless division, as well as a large one, yet the latter is acknowledged to be greater than the former. But there is no ana

a

A simpler illustration of this absurdity may be thus given: If the succession of men has been eternal,—that is, if the series is infinite, their eyes will be twice infinite, and their fingers ten times infinite. The absurdity of this conclusion is apparent.

b I have known some eminent mathematicians who could never be satisfied of the conclusiveness of this argument, from an impression, that it is perfectly possible to conceive one infinite greater than another. It is however certain, that the necessary equality of all infinites admits of algebraic demonstration.

Thus, the intercept between the circle and the tangent, of a line drawn from the centre to any point in the latter lying without the circle, is cut by the peripheries of all the circles described from centres taken in that radius produced, which is perpendicular to the aforesaid tangent. But these points may be taken ad infinitum; the intercept, therefore, is infinitely divisible.-See Elrington's Euclid, B. 3. P. 16. cor. 2.

logy between the composition of matter and the succession of time. The infinite divisibility of matter depends on this, that though a particle be assigned of the least apparent magnitude, a still less particle may be conceived. But in time, a moment is the least portion that can be imagined, and is, therefore, the unit of duration. Now, an infinite series of units involves a contradiction. This objection, then, does not invalidate the original argument.

Again, our assertion may be thus established. In considering any moment of time which has passed, we may advance these propositions, "that moment of time was once present," and, “there was a period, at which it was yet fu"ture." Hence, there was a period at which all the moments together were yet future; that is, there was a period at which all time was yet future. This never could be true of that which is eternal.

It may be objected, that there are beings, as angels, the duration of whose existence shall never cease, and thus a duration whose parts are successive, is allowed to be eternal. But it may be replied, the cases are quite different. The absurdity in asserting the eternity of the world in its present state, consists in this, that the supposed infinite duration is now completed. In the case of angels, the assertion made is, that it never shall be completed. It is true, that

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