ideas which are laid up in our memories, to be recalled when occasion requires them, may equally excite our astonishment. And if these wonders take place in our finite minds, it is not surprising, that an infinite Being should have all his ideas under his view at the same moment.

(2.) We cannot conceive how the interference. of God can be consistent with the freedom of the agent.

In ordinary life we constantly see one mind act upon another. When a man expresses an idea, the word he utters causes a motion in the air, by which it is conveyed to another person's ear. An impression is thus produced on the brain of the latter, by which he is enabled to comprehend the meaning of that expression. Now, this method is perfectly inconceivable, yet no argument is deduced from that, against the mutual communication of men. The same objection, therefore, of our inability to comprehend the operation of the Divine mind upon ours, should be no ground for denying the existence of that operation.

(3.) There is much evil in this world, which can only be accounted for by supposing God either unwilling or unable to remove it.a

But such a removal would be inconsistent with

a

See King on the Origin of Evil. Bishop Hamilton's Essay

on the Permission of Evil Works, v. 2.

p. and Turretin's Inst. Theol. L. 6. Q. 7.

137. Ed. Lond. 1809.,

the providence of God in other respects. He has made some beings capable of free action and of preferring good or evil. If, therefore, he were to restrain them from the commission of sin, he should, by so doing, destroy their liberty.

As to the degree to which God interferes in the government of the universe, some have supposed he is the immediate cause of every act and thought. But it is a great objection to this idea, that God should thus be the first physical cause of all the evil that exists in the world. This would destroy all distinctions of religion, for men would conclude that every thing was done without his direction, when they saw effects produced so opposite to his nature. It is more natural to suppose that he at first endowed things with certain properties, and framed them so that they should continue in the course in which he originally placed them. By this supposition, all actions are finally referred to him as their author, though not in such a way as to make him the immediate cause of sin. For the properties, from the direct operation of which all effects flow, were originally created by him, so as to produce those effects.

In the preceding observations, it may be observed that we assumed the existence of invisible or immaterial substances. We shall now proceed to demonstrate that,

C

The Soul is an immaterial substance.a For its operations cannot arise either from matter, or from motion.

(1.) Matter in its most refined state shows no symptoms of thinking.

Thus, when it has been attenuated to the last degree, as in air, heat, &c. it is still as far from evincing thought as before. Were such a power inherent in it, we should expect that the more it was refined, the nearer it should approach towards exhibiting this power.

(2.) Our intelligent principle can think of things altogether unconnected with matter. This it could not do, if it were material.

Thus we find we have ideas of God, of the proportions of bodies, and other immaterial things. It is evident that such results would be impossible, were the mind no more than a material principle.

(3.) We find we have a freedom of moving matter by an act of the mind. The mind, therefore, must be superior to matter.

a See Locke's Essay on the Understanding, B. 6. c. 10. sec. 14. Bentley's Lectures, lec. 2. Turretin's Inst. Theol. v. 1. Q. 14. p.

554.; and Dwight's Theol. ser. 23.

b Matter can only be known by its properties. These properties are figure and mobility. It is evident, therefore, that if the operations of the soul do not proceed from these properties, they must be independent of matter itself.

Thus we can move our limbs merely by willing that motion, which shews, that the mind which effects this, is not only distinct from, but superior to, matter.

Thought cannot arise from motion.

For (1) if thinking consisted in motion, it would involve an absurdity.

If thinking were inseparable from motion, every moving particle should necessarily think. We should thus have as many thinking principles as particles in our body; which is a palpable absurdity.

(2.) The soul should thus be soon destroyed.

For if the moving particles only think, then these, by constantly striking on each other, should in process of time wear away, and therefore the thinking substance be at the same time dissipated.

From these observations it follows, that the soul acts independently of body. Hence, it must subsist independently of body; for dependent existence necessarily implies dependent operations. Since, then, those operations are immaterial, the substance of the soul must be immaterial.

The immortality of the soul follows from its being an immaterial, and therefore a single principle, for mortality consists in a dissolution of parts; whatever, therefore, has no parts, is im

mortal. But the soul has no parts, and cannot, therefore, be liable to mortality.

To this doctrine of the immateriality of the soul, some objections are alleged.

1. Beasts seem to have thought and liberty, though to a small extent. If matter, then, can be capable of intelligence, in any degree, a higher organization of it might be capable of a still greater degree.

But this objection proceeds on the supposition, that beasts are merely material, whereas this is uncertain.b

It is not improbable that beasts may have an immaterial principle, though so much controlled by matter, as to preclude any responsibility from being attached to them. Indeed, if they have thought and liberty, they must have some such principle, since these could never be the effects of mere matter.

2. It is objected, that the mind depends so much on the body, that a disease of the latter frequently impairs the memory and other faculties. The inti

Any thing is then said to have parts, when it can be conceived capable of division and separation. Now this cannot be imagined with respect to the soul. Thus, let any person try to form an idea of a part of himself being in motion, while another part is at rest. Such a result he will find to be impracticable. By the word himself, I would be understood to mean that complex idea which we suppose to constitute personal identity. See Butler's Anal. of Rel. Part 1. c. 1. p. 22.

b See Butler's Anal. of Rel. Part. 1. c. 1. p. 30.