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Thus we can move our limbs merely by willing that motion, which shews, that the mind which effects this, is not only distinct from, but superior to, matter.

Thought cannot arise from motion.

For (1) if thinking consisted in motion, it would involve an absurdity.

If thinking were inseparable from motion, every moving particle should necessarily think. We should thus have as many thinking principles as particles in our body; which is a palpable absurdity.

(2.) The soul should thus be soon destroyed.

For if the moving particles only think, then these, by constantly striking on each other, should in process of time wear away, and therefore the thinking substance be at the same time dissipated.

From these observations it follows, that the soul acts independently of body. Hence, it must subsist independently of body; for dependent existence necessarily implies dependent operations. Since, then, those operations are immaterial, the substance of the soul must be immaterial.

The immortality of the soul follows from its being an immaterial, and therefore a single principle, for mortality consists in a dissolution of parts; whatever, therefore, has no parts, is immortal. But the soul has no parts, and cannot, therefore, be liable to mortality.

To this doctrine of the immateriality of the soul, some objections are alleged.

1. Beasts seem to have thought and liberty, though to a small extent. If matter, then, can be capable of intelligence, in any degree, a higher organization of it might be capable of a still greater degree.

But this objection proceeds on the supposition, that beasts are merely material, whereas this is uncertain.

It is not improbable that beasts may have an immaterial principle, though so much controlled by matter, as to preclude any responsibility from being attached to them. Indeed, if they have thought and liberty, they must have some such principle, since these could never be the effects of mere matter.

2. It is objected, that the mind depends so much on the body, that a disease of the latter frequently impairs the memory and other faculties. The inti


Any thing is then said to have parts, when it can be conceived capable of division and separation. Now this cannot be imagined with respect to the soul. Thus, let any person try to form an ide a of a part of himself being in motion, while another part is at rest. Such a result he will find to be impracticable. By the word himself, I would be understood to mean that complex idea which we suppose 10 constitute persowal identity. See Butler's Anal. of Rel. Part 1. c.l.p. 22.

b See Butler's Anal. of Rel. Part. 1. c. 1. p. 30.

macy of this connexion would seem to infer, that the soul is no more than the lively parts of the blood, called the animal spirits, and would, therefore, be dissipated by the destruction of our bodies. In answer to this, it may

be observed : (1.) That the mind must be distinct from the animal spirits.

The identity of an individual consists in his consciousness that he is the same thinking being at one time of his life, that he was some years before. Since, therefore, the individual always remains the same person, the soul, by whose acts he is enabled to judge of this, must be likewise incapable of change. On the contrary, the ani. mal spirits are of such a subtile nature, that they are in a constant state of alteration, and new ones ever succeeding the former. These, therefore, cannot be our thinking principle, which must be free from such alteration.

(2.) The spirits are the organs by which the mind acts. Its operations, therefore, are naturally effected by their decay.

Thus, when the eye is injured, the power of receiving ideas by that organ is consequently impaired. As a man is unable to work, when the instruments he uses are blunted and disordered, so the exercise of the thinking faculty may be affected by any derangement in our animal spirits ; still the nature of the one may be quite different from that of the other.

3. It is objected, that we cannot conceive how the mind should give motion to matter, if their substances be different.

But it may be answered, that God is of a different nature from matter, yet he produces impressions on it.

It is certain that the thoughts of the Supreme mind give motion to matter. It is equally certain that he is of a different nature from it. All but Atheists admit this. None others, therefore, can suppose the preceding objection of any weight.

II. We proposed to consider the leading doctrine of revealed Religion. The main doctrine of revelation, is that of the Trinity in Unity. With respect to this, we assert that,


Though this doctrine could never be learned from the operations of reason alone, it is yet certain, that a tradition of it was very general, not only among the ancient Jews, but also among the heathen philosophers. Thus, the compilers of the different targums, frequently ascribe the actions of “God” to his “ Word.” For instance, when it is said, “ God created the world,” they add, “ it was done by his Word.” See Jer. Targ. in Gen. 1. 27, and Targ. Jon. in Is. 44. 24. And so universally acknowledged was it by the Platonic Philosophers, that the primitive Fathers used to defend their tenets from the objections alleged against them, by retorting those objec. tions on their adversaries. Tertull. in Apol. c. 21. and Euseb. Evang. l. 1.c. 16. 19. The reader may consult Dr. Allix's Judgment of the Jewish Church. Scott's Christ. Life, v. 3. p. 15. note, and Whitby's Comment, on John. 1. 3.

1. The doctrine of a Trinity of persons in the Godhead, is declared in Scripture.a

In the Old Testament this doctrine was not clearly revealed. It was intimated in the use of the plural word Elohim being joined with a singular verb, and other allusions. But it must be allowed, that these allusions were not distinct.

In the New Testament, however, it is plainly expressed. Thus our Saviour charged his disciples to go and“ make disciples of all nations, “ baptising them in the name of the Father, of the “Son, and of the Holy Ghost.” (Matt. xxviii. 19.) Now, baptism is the rite by which men are received into a state of acceptance with God, and consequent pardon of their former sins. Baptism then, which contains such promises, can only be offered in the name of God. But we are baptised in the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost. The Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, therefore, must be God. Again, a name can never be predicated of an attribute, or of any other thing than a person. The Father, Son,

* In order to diseass this question fully, we should prove each person to be God in substance, power, and eternity. But as the divinity of the Father has never been denied, and that of the Son and of the Holy Ghost shall be considered hereafter, we have here mentioned only those texts which assert a Trinity of persons more directly.

This is the true meaning of the word translated teach. See Schleusner in voc. μαθητενω.

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